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PREFACE:
In the last decades, the gravest violations of fundamental human rights, have
occurred in states of emergency, where the emergency has been used as an
excuse, for breaching basic human rights. Moreover, since the Second World
War, states of emergency, however described, in different legal systems,
have been a familiar feature of government, and have been resorted to, as
much, as by States claiming adherence to the rule of law, as by others. One
of the most important problems, in the international protection of these rights,
is identifying the standards governing them.
The Rule of Law in a State of Emergency, inter alia, analyses the principles
regulating this question, in international law and in South Africa.
In Section A, I try to explain the background, scope and purpose of the .
International Law Association's (ILA) research project, for developing certain
minimum standards, for a rule of law, in a state of emergency. Thus, Section
A deals with the principle of exceptional threat, in other words, with the
question of the kind of emergency which the treaties, namely, The European
Convention on Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms (1950); the
International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (1966); and the American
Convention on Human Rights (1968), foresee, as justifying the declaration of
emergency.
Section S, refers to the principle ofproclamation, that is, to the requirement of
officially proclaiming the state of emergency, in the country, for the valid
operation of the derogation clause. Moreover, Section S will study the
principle of notification, that is, the obligation of the State, to notify the
exercise of the right of derogation, all the derogating measures taken, and the
reasons for them, to the other States, that are parties to the treaty. The
essential principle of non-derogability of fundamental rights, will also be
studied; this principle establishes that even in situations of emergency, there
are some rights which can never be derogated from. The different lists of
rights, under the three treaties, and the other provisions of the treaties, which
are non-derogable by implication, will also be analysed. Furthermore, Section
S, will examine the important principles, referring to the substantive
conditions, required in order to derogate from human rights provisions. These
conditions are: proportionality, non-discrimination, and consistency with other
obligations under international law. .
Section C, focuses on the systematic demolition of the rule of law by security-
law measures, enacted during the numerous states of emergency, that were
proclaimed in South Africa. In effect, these measures enthroned a system of
state lawlessness, which was countered by growing anti-state lawlessness,
and was responsible for a great deal of anarchic violence as well. The security
establishment, undermined the rule of law, with methodical deliberation in the
pursuit of its objectives. Thus, Section C, seeks to explain the institution of
"government under law" that had been so disastrously destroyed in South
v
Africa. Section C, being also evaluative, applies the requirements of the rule
of law to internal security enactments. The effect of the assessment, is to
highlight the grossness of the South African deviations, from the rule of law,
and to question the asserted law-and-order function, of the security system in
South Africa.
Section D, focuses on a new, democratic South Africa, a system which entails
that governmental power, will be exercised, only through a system of defined
procedures and limits. The Constitution, not only embodies and expresses
those limits; it serves as the founding charter of our nation, and as an
expression of the nation's commitment, to the rule of law. The first part of the
Section, outlines certain factors, that may determine how often a post-
apartheid government, will need emergency powers, and other features, that
may affect the magnitude of the risk, that these powers will be misused, as
well as used. These factors, are not matters on which easy predictions are
possible, but I will suggest, that it is safe to assume, both that South Africa will
need emergency powers, and that it might abuse them. In the light of this
prospect, it will be pointed out, that the drafters of the Constitution, have
greatly minimized the risk of South Africa, abusing its emergency powers, by
the creation of Section 37 of the Constitution, which effectively regulates the
use of emergency powers.
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" The 1980s were the years of the unaccountable, all-powerful "securocrats"
and the permanent states of emergency. That was a time when the army
smashed down your door in the middle of the night and left a sticker on the
wall saying, "We are your friends.,,1
INTRODUCTION:
One of the most important problems in the protection of human rights is that of
identifying the standards governing these rights in situations of emergency.
Public emergencies present a grave problem for States: that of overcoming
the emergency and restoring order in the country while at the same time
respecting the fundamental human rights of individuals. The derogation clause
of human rights treaties establishes a legal regime regulating this crucial
problem. This clause problem has been described as the "cornerstone" of the
entire system for protecting human rights, and as the most important provision
of human rights treaties.2
ryloreover, there are two additional reasons, which make this topic highly
relevant. First, in the last decades the gravest violations of fundamental
human rights have occurred in the context of states of emergency. In these
situations, States, using the emergency as an excuse, frequently deny the
application of basic standards and take derogating measures which are
excessive and in violations of international treaties on human rights.
Therefore, in order to know the exact extent of the protection afforded by
these treaties, a detailed examination of the treaty standards, undertaken in
the light of the jurisprudence of the international monitoring bodies, is of
fundamental importance.
Secondly, almost half of the States of the international community are not
parties to the international treaties on human rights, which establish a legal
regime for emergencies, and therefore treaty standards are not applicable as
such to these states. This fact, together with the notable absence of studies
on this question, has created a dangerous uncertainty concerning the main
criteria governing human rights in emergencies, in terms of general
international law. This ~ncertainty can be seen in the practice of the UN
monitoring organs. At the same time, some international treaties on human
rights have no derogation clauses (that is, the African Charter, and some ILO
Conventions); consequently the regime applicable in these cases also remains
uncertain. For these reasons, a thorough analysis of the standards in general
international law is of paramount importance.
In short, the main purpose of this study is twofold: to analyse the main
principles regulating human rights in emergencies as contained in the
derogation clause of the treaties; and secondly, to examine the principles
governing the same question in South Africa.
SECTION A : EMERGENCY: DECLARATION, DURATION
AND CONTROL:
(1.) PUBLIC EMERGENCY AND ALLIED CONCEPTS: A GENERIC
TERM:
The expression "public emergency" is being used in a generic sense to
embrace the central concept of a variety of legal terms in different legal
systems to identify an exceptional situation of public danger permitting the
exercise of crisis powers in a particular State. This terminology would
therefore cover the status of different regimes known as states of emergency,
of siege, of alert, of prevention of internal war, of suppression of guarantees,
of martial law, of special powers etcetera.
3
The expression would include, for instance, what is described as martial rule
(which has a variety of pseudonyms, the most important being martial law) as
it is known in the common law countries of the erstwhile British Empire and the
USA, as well as the state of siege, as it is known in civil law countries of
continental Europe and Latin America.
(1.1) The distinction between a state ofsiege and martial law :
A view has been expressed, not free from controversy, that "the state of siege
and martial law are two edges to the same sword, and in action they can
hardly be distinguished.,,4 On the other hand, Charles Fairman draws the
following distinction between martial law and a state of siege: "In contrast to
the French state of siege, where the powers of the military authorities are
somewhat precisely defined in advance, martial rule is provisional in character.
The former is more certain, the latter more f1exible.,,5
Again, at the report review session of the Human Rights Commission,
Columbia and Chile drew a distinction between some of these expressions in
terms of the powers conferred on the executive. Columbia claimed that unlike
martial law, the state of siege in Columbia was applied under strict control and
did not affect the independence of the judiciary or the functioning of Congress
or the holding of free elections.6 Chile distinguished between a state of siege
and a state of emergency in that a state of siege was provided for in the 1925
Constitution while a state of emergency had been established by Congress
through a law enacted in 1958; it was also pointed out that the much criticized
concept of "latent subversion" applied only to a state of siege to determine
whether certain cases should be tried by the peacetime or wartime military
courts. 7
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(1.2) Mpublic emergency~as defined in the cases of Lawless v
Ireland and The Greek case (Denmark, Norway, Sweden, and
the Netherlands v Greece) under the European Convention:
The term "public emergency" as appearing in Article 15 of the European
Convention on Human Rights (ECHR) has been interpreted according to the
natural and customary meaning of the words by the European Court of Human
Rights in the Lawless case as explained by the European Commission of
Human Rights in the Greek case. In the Lawless case, the European Court
interpreted a "public emergency threatening the life of the nation" according to
the natural and customary meaning of the words in the French text, as:
"In the English text: an exceptional situation of crisis and emergency,
which affects the whole population and constitutes a threat to the
organized life of the community of which the State is composed."
The European Commission in the Greek case observes that the notion of
"imminent danger", which is represented in the French but not directly in the
English text of the judgement, must be given weight because it is the French
text which is authentic. The Commission then described the four
characteristics of a public emergency as follows:
(a) It must be actual or imminent.
(b) Its effects must involve the whole nation.
(c) The continuance of the organized life of the community must be
threatened.
(d) The crisis or danger must be exceptional, in that the normal
measures or restrictions, permitted by the Convention for the
maintenance of public safety, health and order, are plainly
inadequate.8
(1.3) Other definitions of Mpublic emergency~: for example
Questiaux, Stephen Marks, and the ILO Convention No. 29:
Without excluding the foregoing definition, Mrs Questiaux has provided a
workable but "somewhat oversimplified" definition of public emergency as : "a
crisis situation affecting the population as a whole and constituting a threat to
the organized existence of the community which forms the basis of the State."
The crisis situation envisages exceptional circumstances. Such circumstances
result from temporary factors of a generally political character, which in varying
degrees involve extreme and imminent danger. The danger must be of
sufficient gravity to threaten the organized existence of a nation, that is to say,
the political and social system that it comprises as a state. 9
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Another workable definition by Stephen Marks states: "In short, an
"emergency situation" will be understood here as one resulting from temporary
conditions which place institutions of the State in a precarious position and
which leads the authorities to feel justified in suspending the application of
certain principles." 10 Further, a well-recognized definition of empirical
importance can be found in intemationallabour conventions (at least eight of
which recognize an emergency situation). For instance, Convention No. 29 on
Forced Labour, 1930, provides that the prohibition against "forced or
compulsory labour" shall not include,
"any work or service exacted in cases of emergency, that is to say, in
the event of war or of a calamity or threatened calamity, such as fire,
flood, famine, earthquake, violent epidemic or epizootic diseases,
invasion by animal, insects or vegetable pests, and in general any
circumstance that would endanger the existence or the well-being of
the whole or part of the population." (Emphasis added).11
(2.) PUBLIC EMERGENCY ENVISAGED IN THREE DIFFERENT
SITUATIONS:
Broadly speaking, emergency situations may be envisaged in three different
circumstances resulting from:
(a) a serious political crisis (armed conflict and internal disorder);
(b) force majeure (disasters of various kinds); or
(c) particular economic circumstances, notably those relating to
underdevelopment.
The travaux preparatoires in the context of Article 4 of the International
Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (hereinafter, referred to as the
Covenant or ICCPR) cover the first two situations of public emergency (a
serious political crisis and force majeure) but not the third situation
(underdevelopment). 12 This was because the breadth of the question posed by
underdevelopment would require a special study (which is the subject of
profound, persistent research at the United Nations and other levels) and not
because of any perception that underdevelopment has no linkage with public
emergency.
Though the ILA study, like that of Mrs Questiaux, is mainly concerned with the
situation of public emergency caused by a serious political crisis, a brief
reference to the other two contemplated situations of public emergency - force
majeure and underdevelopment - would be useful.
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(2.1 )Force majeure:
The concept of force majeure in both municipal and international law covers
calamities like earthquakes, tidal waves, cyclones and other natural disasters.
An emergency situation caused by such natural calamities, actual or imminent,
requires the marshalling of relief and rehabilitation sources. These might
necessitate the impositions of limitations or restrictions on the enjoyment of
certain rights and freedoms, such as the freedom of movement and residence
(forced evacuations from affected danger areas); the freedom of the press and
other information media (to avoid panic and the need to inform the population
of steps to be taken); freedom of employment (use of the labour force to build
shelters, dykes etcetera); the right to property (requisitions); as well as other
rights.
Such restrictions must be strictly necessary and in compliance with the just
requirements of general welfare (Article 29 of the Universal Declaration of
Human Rights and the terms of the limitation clauses in international human
rights treaties, such as the ICCPR). Thus, the ILO Committee of Experts on
the Application of Conventions and Recommendations points out that "the
length and extent of compulsory service, as well as the purposes for which it is
used, should be strictly limited in accordance with the requirements of the
situation." The Committee compares this stipulation with the rule of
proportionality in Article 4 of the ICCPR. 13
The same Committee having noted the magnitude of the national catastrophe
of the Nicaraguan earthquake and the difficulties arising for the normal
fulfillment of the international obligations of the government, decided to
suspend the examination of compliance with the conventions, and expressed
the hope of a rapid return to normalcy which would enable the country "to give
full effect to its obligations" under the ratified conventions. 14
Again, in the report review session of Peru in 1983, the members of the
Human Rights Committee wanted to know how the government justified the
suspension of political rights in the event of an emergency caused by a natural
disaster. The reply was that although a proclamation of emergency was
usually prompted by terrorist activity, sometimes (as happened recently in
Lima), it was also caused by a natural disaster, "in which case their purpose
was to prevent any public disturbance which would make the situation even
worse." 15
There are very few precedents arising from force majeure because such
situations have been specifically provided for in the- international instruments,
notably in ILO Conventions 29 and 105. Accordingl~, there is a greater chance
of them being controlled by the competent organs.1
(2.2) UNDEVELOPMENT-EMERGENCY SYNDROME:
(2.2.1) The Stephen Marks study:
Stephen Marks in his seminal contribution makes three valid points. First, the
"implications of the argument that underdevelopment constitutes an
emergency situation" becomes clear when one sees that all human rights -
civil and political rights on the one hand and economic, social and cultural
rights on the other - are indivisible; consequently "the enjoyment of the former
(civil and political rights) are not possible without that of the latter (economic,
social and cultural rights)." Second,
"Whatever view one may have on the claims put forward by Third
World countries, the fact remains that, for these countries, until a new
international economic order is achieved, the economic and social
conditions of underdevelopment will constitute an emergency situation
making the implementation of at least some human rights difficult, if not
impossible."
Third, the Economic and Social Council (ECOSOC) has repeatedly affirmed its
conviction that the early realization of economic, social and cultural rights
cannot be achieved until all countries and people co-operate for global
development.17
It is, however, clear that economic18 underdevelopment per se does not and
cannot justify the declaration of a state of emergency for the simple reason
that while civil and political rights are to be normally implemented with
immediate effect, the process of deveJopment for the realization of economic,
social and cultural rights, is naturally time-consuming and programmatic.
The ILA Sub-Committee was, however, of the view that there are five
overriding limitations before any restrictions are placed on the exercise of the
guaranteed rights even during an emergency.
(a) Such restrictions can only be imposed by law.
(b) Such a law must be the product of a democratic law-making
process, namely, one in which the entire population will, through
appropriate procedures, have participated.
(c) No justification can be advanced for any restriction being imposed
on the enjoyment of rights recognized as non-derogable even during
an emergency under the current and developing norms of
international law.
(d) Restrictions imposed must be strictly required for general welfare by
the exigencies of development.
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(e) Reasons of development can never justify the curtailment of those
civil and political rights necessary for the establishment and
functioning of fundamental democratic institutions, namely,
representative, legislative and executive branches of government
and an independent judiciary.
The "general welfare in a democratic society" - and what is required to
promote it - can only be decided by people themselves, through
representative institutions, and not by usurpers of political power by
unconstitutional means. In each case there is a heavy onus cast upon the
government in power to justify the imposition of any restriction for the
purposes of development. 19
(2.2.2)Underdevelopment as a pretext for impermissible
derogations ofhuman rights:
More serious is the third dimension. Very often underdevelopment is used as a
pretext for the perpetuation of authoritarian regimes, particularly by military
juntas, involving severe repression of popular civil and political rights. The
problem was examined in some detail by the ILA Sub-Committee. Three
serious aberrations were considered. It concluded thereafter: "Thus, the
enjoyment of basic civil and political rights can be seen as a necessary
condition for the progressive realization of economic, social and political rights:
hence the importance of adopting an integrated approach to the realization of
both sets of rights. "20
The aberrations noticed by the Sub-Committee include the following:
(a) Serious derogations on civil and political rights, particularly in the
developing countries of Asia, Africa and Latin America, are sought
to be justified by reference to the supposed exigencies of economic
development. Authoritarian regimes in various states of
emergency/exception seek to justify the curtailment of civil and
political rights on the pretext that, given the economic
backwardness and poverty in their societies, rapid economic
development and the removal of poverty, demand a higher priority
than the enjoyment of civil and political rights, and so the latter must
be traded off, for the former. Upon analysis, however, such
arguments are misleading and actually obscure the significant
linkages between the civil and political rights on the one hand and
the social and cultural rights on the other.21
(b) Empirically, there is now a respectable body of evidence to show
that derogation of civil and political rights in different types of states
of emergency/exception, partiCUlarly in the Third World has, with
very few exceptions, not resulted in a significant measure of
economic development. In the few cases that it has, the benefits of
such development have tended to accrue to privileged groups rather
than to the bulk of the population in the countries concerned.
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Economic investment takes unproductive forms, generating no
development and leading to a serious waste of resources, which
increases poverty, not welfare.
22
(c) Examples abound of the waste and misallocation of resources of
which authoritarian regimes in the developing world are guilty. A
large majority of such regimes are dominated by the military elite - it
was established in 1980 that nearly half of the Third World States
are ruled by military forces. A common feature of military regimes is
the diversion of resources to meet increasing military expenditure at
the cost of economic development or general welfare coupled with
the strengthening of the coercive instruments of the State to
suppress popular protest. In sum, the ILA Sub-Committee found that
in general, there was a negative correlation between military rule
and economic advance, and a positive correlation between military
rule and economic backwardness.23 In the same vein, Professor
Franck, tersely commented at the ILA Manila conference: "There is
no correlation - indeed there is a nepative correlation - between
dictatorship and economic growth.,,2
Another serious danger is the tendency of an authoritarian regime to
perpetuate the state of emergency, even when normalcy has returned, or on
the pretext of underdevelopment. This has been highlighted by two
distinguished international jurists, Judge T.O. Elias (Nigeria) and Judge Keba
Mbaye (Senegal).25
(3.) A PUBLIC EMERGENCY RESULTING FROM A POLITICAL
CRISIS:
A political crisis may be caused by armed conflict or internal disorder of a
serious nature. Armed conflicts may be of three types, namely: first, external
aggression or war or international armed conflicts; second, wars of national
liberation; third, non-international armed conflicts. The Questiaux study is,
however, confined to serious political crisis arising out of a situation of internal
disorder or internal tension?6
Both the European Convention (ECHR) and the American Convention (ACHR)
refer to "war". But Article 4 of the International Covenant (ICCPR) makes no
such reference. The travaux preparatoires indicate clearly that the omission
was deliberate: "While it is recognized that one of the most important public
emergencies was the outbreak of war, it was felt that the Covenants should
not envisage, even by implication, the possibility of war, as the United Nations
·was established with the object of preventing war.27
But the omission of "war" was never intended to deny a permissible right of
derogation in wartime, which is perhaps the most vivid paradigm of a threat to
the life of a nation. The main concern of the draftsmen was to ensure that the
Covenant "would not be open to abuse" and hence the wording emphasized
"that the public emergency should be of such a magnitude as to threaten the
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life of the nation as a whole. ,,28
It remains to be seen how the expression "state of war" is construed in
European jurisprudence; its existence was relevant only in the case of de
Becker v Belgium where the measures were taken in wartime though their
effects continued in peacetime. It would probably not make much difference
because, as Higgins points out, the party invoking Article 15 of the European
Convention may always rely, in the alternative, on a state of public
emergency.29
However, it is interesting to note that in some of the dissenting opinions in the
Lawless case, a view was expressed which in effect means that the words
"other public emergency" must be understood as covering a threat which has
to be read ejusdem generis to a modern "war". This is because the expression
is preceded by the words "in time of war". Thus, it has been said that a public
emergency other than war must be "tantamount to war" or be analogous to the
"case of war". 30 This interpretation obviously cannot apply to the global pattern
of the definition of a public emergency in Article 4 of the ICCPR which does
not refer to llwar" at all; this, however, in no way diminishes the magnitude of
the internal political crisis, which will satisfy the test of a threat to justify, the
proclamation of an emergency.
(4.) THE INTERNATIONAL LAW ASSOCIATION'S DEFINITION OF
A PUBLIC EMERGENCY: FOUR BASIC ELEMENTS:
Analytically speaking, there are four basic elements in the definition:
(a) territorial scope;
(b) magnitude of threat;
(c) provisional or temporary status of the public crisis and
(d) official proclamation.
(4.1) Ten1tDrial SCDpe :
By definition, the crisis or public danger must be one, which poses a threat to
the life of the nation. In other words, the emergency must be nationwide in its
effect. Otherwise, however severe the local impact of the emergency, it will
not be a "public emergency" within the meaning of Article 4(1) of the ICCPR. A
mere local crisis cannot be converted into a national emergency. For instance,
as Hartman puts it, problems such as localized labour unrest cannot justify the
nationwide imposition of a state of siege.
An instance of such an impermissible declaration of a state of siege is that of
Columbia in 1976 in response to a strike at the social security service. The
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condition persisted with modifications until 1982. Hartman rightly suggests that
even when the emergency is properly declared, "the principle of proportionality
requires that measures be carefully tailored to the geographically confined
emergency. ,,31
However, a threat to the nation may arise even if the immediate danger is
perceived in certain limited geographic areas. This was the case in Northern
Ireland. The European Court of Human Rights observed in Ireland v United
Kingdom:32
"Article 15 comes into play only "in time of war or other public
emergency threatening the life of the nation." The existence of such an
emergency is perfectly clear from the facts summarized above
(Paragraphs 12 and 29-75) and was not questioned by anyone before
either the Commission or the Court. The crisis experienced at the time
by the six countries therefore comes within the ambit of Article 15."
(Emphasis added.)
Relying upon the decision of the European Court in Ireland v UK, Buergenthal
points out that a public emergency need not engulf or threaten to engulf the
entire nation before it can be said to "threaten the life of the nation". One must
distinguish between the seriousness of a threat and the geographical
boundaries in which the threat appears or from which it emanates.
A public emergency which threatens the life of a nation "could presumably
exist even if the emergency appeared to be confined to one part of the country
- for example, one of its provinces, states or cantons - and did not threaten to
spill over to the other parts of the country." A contrary interpretation, argues
Buergenthal, would be unreasonable "since it would prevent a state party from
declaring a public emergency in one of its remote provinces where a large-
scale armed insurrection was in progress merely because it appeared that the
conflict would not spread to other provinces. ,,33
The definition of a public emergency adopted by the ILA clarifies the position
by stipulating two conditions with regard to the territorial scope of a regime of
emergency. First, the declaration of a state of emergency may cover the entire
territory of the state or any part thereof, depending upon the areas actually
affected by the circumstances motivating the declaration. Second, this will not
prevent the extension of emergency measures to other parts of the country
whenever necessary nor the exclusion of those parts where such
circumstances no longer prevan.34
(4.2) Magnitude of the threat:
The crisis or public danger, actual or imminent, must be exceptional in the
sense that "the normal measures of restrictions, permitted by the (European)
Convention for the maintenance of public safety, health and order, are plainly
inadequate" as stated by the European Convention in the Greek case. In the
context of ICCPR, it would mean that if the magnitude of the crisis is such that
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it can be controlled or regulated by the normal measures with any or all of the
six limitation clauses attached to some of the guaranteed rights, recourse to
derogation measures under Article 4, is not permissible.
The six limitation clauses in Article 12 (freedom of movement and residence),
14 (right to a fair and public trial), 18 (freedom of thought, conscience and
religion), 19 (freedom of opinion and expression), 21 (right of peaceful
assembly) and 22 (freedom of association) should normally suffice to enable
the public authorities to deal ~ith even serious cases of public dissent or
disorders, inherent in a democratic state.
To put it differently, the emergency does not have to be one in which the life of
the nation "as such is threatened with extinction, but one in which there is.
such a breakdown of order or communications that organized life cannot, for
the time being, be maintained.,,35
There has been a further refinement in Siracusa Principle 39 which provides,
inter alia, that a threat to the life of the nation is one that:
(a) affects the whole of the population and either the whole or part of
the territory of the State; and
(b) threatens the physical integrity of the population, the political
independence or the territorial integrity of the State, or the existence
or basic functioning of institutions indispensable to ensure and
protect the rights recognized in the Covenant.
It would therefore follow that the public danger must be such as to imperil
those institutions, which are essential for the proper functioning of a
democratic government. Again, the danger must be a patent one and
objectively demonstrable, not a latent one subjectively perceived or
apprehended. The emergency regime of a preventive nature is impermissible.
Equally impermissible is a state of emergency, which is declared or continued
to protect the government in power and to delay the return of a popular
government.
Internal political unrest has been identified as the primary basis for the
imposition of states of emergency under the regime of the Covenant, for
example derogations by Chile ("there continue to exist in Chile extremist
seditious groups whose aim is to overthrow the established Government"); by
the United Kingdom ("campaigns of organized terrorism related to Northern
Irish Affairs"); and by Sri Lanka (widespread acts of terrorism).36
The ICJ study has revealed that certain authoritarian governments have
abused the doctrine of national security to maintain themselves in power
contrary to the basic objective of Article 4. 37
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(4.3) Provisional nature:
The concept of "emergency" is incompatible with a perpetual state of affairs
and is necessarily limited in time and space.
38
No derogation is legitimate
unless it is clearly aimed in good faith at the preservation of democratic
institutions and the return to their full operation at the earliest opportunity.39
The topic will be discussed in some detail later, while dealing with the problem
of the durat~on of a state of emergency.
(4.4) OHicial Proclamation:
The requirement of an official proclamation is mandatory under Article 4(1) of
the ICCPR, but is not mentioned in either the ECHR or the ACHR. Initially the
European Court in the Lawless case observed that the European Convention
"does not contain any special provision to the effect that the contracting state
concerned must promulgate in its territory, the notice of derogation addressed
to the Secretary-General of the Council of Europe.,,4o However, later on, the
European Commission took the view, in the case of Cyprus v Turkey that in
order to invoke the right of derogation prescribed in Article 15 of the
Convention, the derogating state should justify this beforehand by an official
proclamation.41
The travaux preparatoires indicate:
"Reference was made to the fact that in most countries a public
emergency could be declared only under conditions defined by law, and
that, that guarantee would be lost unless a requirement of public
proclamation was maintained. It was emphasized that the Article should
in no way imply that constitutional and legal limits imposed upon the
powers of governments during an emergency could be derogated from
or that the executive power was not responsible for taking measures
which might conflict with national guarantees.,,42 .
Siracusa Principles 42 and 43 provide that an official proclamation in
accordance with the procedures under national law "prescribed in advance of
the emergency" is mandatory. In substance, it means that the proclamation
must be made by some official having lawful authority to do SO.43
The ILA is of the view that the official proclamation of an emergency is an
important safeguard and should be accepted as a legitimate international
norm. The purpose behind an official proclamation is quite different from that
of a notification of derogation under Article 4(3) of the ICCPR. The idea of a
public proclamation seems to be to reduce the number of de facto emergency
situations by encouraging the states to respect a certain formality of procedure
in municipal law and thereby eliminating to some extent the possibility of
arbitrary assumption or exercise of emergency powers.44
One example of the importance of the need to comply with the constitutional
formality of an official proclamation can be seen in Article 352(3) of the Indian
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Constitution which provides that the President shall not issue a proclamation
of emergency under Clause (1) of Article 352 "unless the decision of the Union
Cabinet (that is to say, the Council consisting of the Prime Minister and other
Ministers of Cabinet rank, appointed under Article 75), that such a
proclamation may be issued, has been communicated in writing." This was
introduced by the Constitution (44th Amendment) Act, 1978 to "exclude the
possibility of a Prime Minister advising the issue of a Proclamation on his or
her own initiative without the authority of the Cabinet - as Mrs Gandhi actually
did, professing that a rule of business, enabled her to act, as she did."45
(5.) THE EXISTENCE OF AN EMERGENCY: EUROPEAN
PRECEDENTS:
Having discussed the definition of a "public emergency" in its different aspects,
it would perhaps be useful to examine the application of the definition to three
concrete cases under the European Convention: the Lawless case, the Greek
case and Ireland v United Kingdom. No discussion on emergency
jurisprudence would be fruitful without a critical appraisal of these precedents
under the European Convention.
In this section these three cases will be examined only in the context of the
existence of a public emergency, in Section B the same cases will be
examined to determine compliance with the requirement of the rule of
proportionality in derogation measures.
In the Lawless case, the European Commission and the Court held
affirmatively that there was in existence a public emergency on the facts of the
case; in the Greek case, however, the Commission by a majority took a
negative view. In Ireland v United Kingdom, although the existence of an
emergency was not disputed, the Commission and the Court suo motu upheld
.the fact of the existence of an emergency.
All the three cases indicate that while there is a judicial consensus about the
definition of emergency, its application to the facts of a concrete case is
usually a highly controversial issue. This explains how different conclusions
have been drawn, from identical evidence on record, by eminent jurists, under
the European Convention.46
In the Lawless case, the European Commission, following the natural and
ordinary meaning of the term "public emergency", came to a finding by a
majority of nine to five that on 20 July 1957 there existed in Ireland a state of
public emergency; an opposite view was taken by the minority, of five
members. The analytical approach of the Commission was to examine the
evidence in the light of three elements: the existence of iIIega.1 organizations in
the Republic of Ireland; the activities of such organizations within and outside
the territory of Ireland; and the threat which the existence of these
organizations and their activities, constituted to the life of the Irish Republic at
the relevant time.47 The evidence was examined with regard to the nature ~f
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the acts both within and outside the Republic of Ireland. Five elements within
the territory of Ireland were noted from an analysis of the evidence.
First, there had long existed in Ireland an illegal organization called the Irish
Republican Army (IRA) which continued to operate as an illegal military
organization with a view to the ending of partition by employing violent
measures against the government and forces of Northern Ireland.
Second, from 1954 onwards the activities of the IRA took a serious turn. The
recruitment and training of members and the planning of guerilla activity
across the border of Northern Ireland were all performed within Irish territory.
Third, to control and regulate such illegal activity there had been a diversion of
considerable police and security strength - at a considerable cost to the small
and poor country.
Fourth, there were two successful armed raids by the IRA in December 1956
and July 1957 on a factory storehouse in the Republic to steal explosives for
its sabotage operations.
Fifth, with regard to the administration of justice, while ordinary Courts
functioned without interruption, in the trial of the IRA accused, there were
attempts at intimidation of judges and witnesses. The majority, however,
conceded that the application of criminal law to IRA members was not
rendered wholly impossible by the action of the IRA. The majority was of the
view that the activities made comparatively little impact on the daily life of the
general public except perhaps in the area near the border of Northem Ireland
and that the effect was primarily felt outside the Irish Republic.
However, the homicidal ambush in Northern Ireland on the night of 3-4 July
1957, just before 12 July (a day which for historical reasons is particularly
critical in the preservation of public peace and order), the imminent danger to
the nation caused by the continuance of unlawful activities in Northern Ireland
by the IRA and its associated groups, operating from the Irish State, justified
the declaration of a public emergency, by the Irish State.48
In the Greek case, the European Commission, by a majority of ten to five
decided after a detailed examination of the materials on record, that there did
not exist any public emergency in Greece on 21 April 1967. Starting with the
proposition that the burden of proof lies upon the Respondent State which, in
the instant case, came to power by overthrowing the constitutional regime, the
evidence was evaluated under three heads: the threat of a communist
takeover of government by force; the crisis of public order; and constitutional
crisis.
With regard to the communist threat, the Commission observed that the two
pieces of evidence produced by the govemment were so slender that no
communist takeover of the govemment by force could be anticipated. The
facts were that the arms caches found were described by the Sub-
Commission as negligible in size and quality, which the so-called "general plan
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of action" did not involve an imminent overthrow of the lawful government.
In so· far as the crisis of public order was concerned, the Commission was of
the view that there was nothing to show that the street demonstrations, strikes
and stoppages (only twenty-three strikes of short duration) could not have
been dealt with by the police forces in the normal course; in fact earlier, on 11
April 1967, the police had cleared the University building in Salonica, of its
illegal occupants.
Also, the prohibitory order against the Marathon March, scheduled to be held
on 6 April 1967, had been fully effective. The Commission concluded that
there was certainly no indication of any disorganization - let alone one
involving the whole nation - of vital supplies, utilities or services, as a result of
the strikes. That is to say, the organized life of the community was not
disturbed by such strikes, which was a common feature in many countries in
Europe over a similar period.
With regard to the constitutional crisis, the question was whether on 21 April
1967 there was any serious threat to the organized life of the community for
the three reasons advanced by the Respondent State. First, that the elections
in May 1967 would lead to the creation of a popular front government,
dominated in effect by the communists and their allies committed to an
ultimate takeover of the government. Second, that street demonstrations and
disorders would increase to a point beyond the control of the police forces or
the army. And, finally, that the army was infiltrated by communists and in the
event of any massive popular demonstration it would refuse to fire on them;
public order would thus break down.
On an evaluation of the evidence, the Commission held that there was no
imminent threat of a constitutional crisis to justify an emergency for two
reasons: it had not been shown that the formation of the popular front
government after the May elections was certain or even likely. Second, there
was no indication that the public disorder would be fomented to a point beyond
police control.
In sum, the Respondent Government had not satisfied the Commission, on
evidence, that there was a public emergency, threatening the life of the Greek
nation, on 21 April 1967.49
In Ireland v united Kingdom, there was no dispute that there was in existence
a public emergency in Ireland at the relevant time; yet both the Commission
and the Court came to an independent finding that such an emergency did
exist. As the Commission had observed:
"The Commission is satisfied that there existed in Northern Ireland at all
times material for the present case, a public emergency threatening the
life of the nation within the meaning of Article 15. The degree of
violence, with bombing, shooting and rioting, was on a scale far beyond
what could be called minor civil disorder and it is clear that the violence
used was in many instances planned in advance, by factions of the
community organized and acting on paramilitary lines. To a great extent
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the violence was directed against the security forces, which were
severely hampered in their function to keep or restore the public
peace."~o
The existence of an emergency was not in dispute between the parties. As
noted earlier, the European Court fully concurred with this view.
(6.) THE THRESHOLD ISSUE: THE LEGITIMACY OF A
GOVERNMENT COMPETENT TO DECLARE AND MAINTAIN AN
EMERGENCY:
Before dealing with the competency of the political organs in a democratic
society to declare and maintain a state of emergency as provided for in ILA's
reference model, an important issue arises at the very threshold: the
legitimacy of a government competent to declare an emergency. Has any
usurper of state powers the competency to declare an emergency?
The response of the ILA is categorical and unambiguous:
"A declaration of emergency by any authority other than the
democratically constituted political organs is a departure from this basic
norm, for example, the declaration of emergency by an authority which
has come into existence by the usurpation of state powers by extra-
constitutional means."
The ILA has referred to with approval, the basic proposition of Daes, who had
observed :"No really democratic system can entrust to military or police
officers, the power to proclaim an emergency without violating the rule of
law.,,51
The observation by Professor Lauterpacht made forty years ago, even before
the adoption of the Universal Declaration, is now firmly established as a
principle of International law. According to him, since the right of man to
government by consent is a part of the law of nations, recognition would be
denied to a dictatorial regime that declines to submit its rule to the test of
clearly expressed popular approval. 52 The principle of self-determination and
the right to a government by consent, as enshrined in the Preamble and
Article 21 of the Universal Declaration and Articles 1, 2, 5 and 25 of the
ICCPR, provide the basic foundation of the standard of legitimacy, which is
essential for the enjoyment of the recognized human rights and freedoms. The
fact that very often there is a departure from the standard of legitimacy of a
democratic form of government does not in any way diminish its fundamental
value; on the contrary, it provides a measure for the assessment of the nature,
and extent of the derogation, by an undemocratic regime.
In the submissions of this.writer, the following principles are relevant to the
threshold question of legitimacy of the authority assuming or exercising
emergency powers. First, a clear distinction exists between a state, which is
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the party to the International Treaty, and the government, which purports to
represent the particular state; the government in power is not a party to the
Treaty. A state duly recognized in International Law may have a government,
which lacks legitimacy.
Second, the ECHR, like the ACHR and the ICCPR, accepts the legitimacy
only of a democratically elected constitutional government. Third, if therefore
emergency powers are assumed or exercised by a revolutionary or
unconstitutional government, it must be considered of a provisional and interim
nature and, in the words of Professor Lauter~acht "a temporary adaptation to
a transient period of political retrogression".5 Similar views in modern context,
have been expressed by Questiaux and Hartman.
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(7.) THE PARIS MINIMUM STANDARDS: THE DECLARATION,
DURATION AND TERMINATION OF AN EMERGENCY:
With these observations relating to the threshold issue, it would be appropriate
to examine the minimum standards formulated by the ILA for regulating the
declaration, duration and termination of an emergency.
(7.1) The Organic Law to prescribe the Procedure:
The constitution of the organic law of every state "shall define the procedure
for declaring a state of emergency". The procedural requirement is mandatory.
It provides a very important safeguard against abusive assumption or exercise
of emergency powers by the executive branch. In a country with a written
constitution, formalities prescribed, must be duly complied with, by the
legislative and executive branches. However, with a view to avoiding the
provisional proclamation of an emergency by the executive, it has been
suggested that the constitution or ad hoc legislation may authorize the
legislature to declare a public emergency "by the adoption of a simple
resolution" instead of "the burdensome procedure of ordinary resolution."55
(7.2) The competence of the popular Legislature and the
Executive:
In every democratic society, the declaration of a state of emergency is
primarily a function of the political organs, namely, the legislature and the
executive. These organs are the ones in a position to make an appropriate
assessment of facts relevant to national security and the dimensions of public
danger. Among the two political organs, the primary responsibility for the
declaration of an emergency belongs to the legislature, which is expected to
examine with meticulous care, the nature and extent of the public danger.
However, in urgent cases the executive may be in a better position to take an
immediate decision, for example,
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"... that the dangers of survival of the nation such as arise from a
sudden military challenge may call for urgent and drastic measures by
the executive which by the nature of things are susceptible only to a
posteriori legislative ratification and judicial review',;56 or in situations in
which the legislature may not be able to act "with the necessary speed"
and "only the executive could properly and with adequate promptness
respond to special circumstances, callin.p for swift action, in defence of
the state and the community, at large.,,5
A declaration of emergency by the executive, however, must necessarily be of
a provisional nature, always subject to the legislative approval at the earliest
moment. The time factor has been variously described as "within the shortest
possible time" (ILA); "as soon as possible" (Lagos conference); "immediately"
(CAS); and "as soon as practicable" (Council of Europe). The Lagos
conference concluded:
"In any other case, however, it is the Parliament duly convened for the
purpose that should declare whether or not the state of emergency
exists. Wherever it is impossible or inexpedient to summon Parliament
for this purpose, for example, during Parliamentary recess, the
executive should be competent to declare a state of emergency, but in
such a case, Parliament should meet as soon as possible thereafter.,,58
By implication, the legislative authority competent to approve a declaration of
emergency by the executive should equally have the power, inter alia, firstly,
to revoke the proclamation of public emergency; secondly, to amend the
period of its validity by a simple resolution. 59
An example of express power of revocation can be found in Article 352(7) of
the Constitution of India which provides that a proclamation of emergency may
be revoked at any time by a simple resolution of the House of the People in
the manner prescribed.
(7.3) Temporary or Provisional Status:
The strict observance of the limited fixed period (both initial and extended) is a
basic safeguard. The only exception is in a case of war or external aggression,
the uncertain duration of which makes a timeframe constraint unreal and
impracticable.
The International Commission of Jurists (ICJ) has recommended that the
constitution should specify "that no state of emergency have legal force
beyond a fixed period of time, which should not exceed six months" and that
every declaration of emergency should specify the duration of the
emergency.60
The Questiaux study discloses that there are four different forms for fixing time
limits:
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(a) the basic text does not include a time limit but stipulates that the
proclamation of a state of emergency itself shall set such a limit;
(b) a fixed time limit is expressly laid down in the basic text and cannot
be extended (for example, in Costa Rica it is thirty days);
(c) the time limit may be extended without any condition other than
compliance with the requirement to renew the formalities of
proclamation (which is the most frequent case); and
(d) systems providing for limited extension, which amount to a
compromise between the two previous systems: either the limit is
expressly provided for in the text (for example, in El Salvador, it is
thirty days and may be extended only once) or it depends upon the
occurrence of some event.
Questiaux concludes from this analysis that the variation in the choice of the
one or the other form depends less on the country than on the nature of the
emergency regime in question: a state of siege will fall into the third category,
while a state of emergency, will fall into the fourth.61 .
The ILA Sub-Committee in its Belgrade report considered the relevant
provision of the Indian Constitution and observed that "the states parties to the
International Treaty may find it useful to refer to the Indian experience while
reconciling the emergency provisions in the constitutional framework of their
respective countries, with the treaty obligations, under Article 4 of the Political
Covenant. "62
In the present context it would therefore be pertinent to refer to the relevant
provisions in Article 352 of the Indian Constitution as amended by the
Constitution (44th Amendment) Act, 1978. Under the previous provision, once
the initial declaration by the President was approved by both Houses of
Parliament by a simple majority, within a period of two months, the emergency
could continue indefinitely. After the Amendment, unless approved by both
Houses of Parliament (the Council of State and the House of the People)
within a -period of one month, the declaration will cease to be operative.
An important safeguard is that an emergency can be approved or confirmed,
and continued for a further period of six months at a time, only by an
enhanced majority of total membership and not less than two-thirds of the
members present and voting in the two Houses of Parliament. This seems to
be in conformity with the ICJ standard, which contemplates legislative
approval of a declaration by the executive "preferably by an enhanced
majority".63
Two other safeguards are relevant first, if the House of the People is
dissolved at the date of the issue of proclamation or within one month thereof
(without approving the proclamation), in that event the proclamation may only
survive until thirty days from the date of the first sitting of the reconstituted
House, provided the Council has in the meantime approved of it; second, a
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proclamation of emergency, may be revoked by a simple resolution, adopted
by the House of the People.
(7.4) The Democratic Control ofan Emergency Regime: Four
ILA Norms:
The two parameters of the ILA norms with regard to the period and control of
an emergency regime are: first, a renewed emphasis on the temporary or the
provisional status of a state of emergency; second, democratic control of such
a regime, without any structural changes, in the basic representative
institutions of the country. This ensures that a vigilant popular legislature
should be able to enforce strict accountability of the executive branch, which
assumes or exercises emergency powers. The following four ILA norms are
teleologically linked with a view to achieving the aforesaid twin objectives:
(a) The duration of the emergency shall never exceed the period strictly
required to restore normal conditions.
(b) The duration of the period of emergency (save in the case of war or
external aggression) shall be for a fixed term established by the
constitution.
(c) Every extension of the initial period of emergency shall be supported
by a new declaration made before the expiration of each term (that
is, with the prior approval of the legislature) for another period to be
established by the constitution. A strict scrutiny of every extension
of the period of emergency is imperative; prior approval is essential
since the reason of urgency, which might have justified the initial
declaration by the executive, is no longer relevant.
(d) The legislature shall not be dissolved during the period of
emergency but shall continue to function effectively; if dissolution of
a particular legislature is warranted, (for example, the expiry of its
term under the Organic Law), it shall be replaced as soon as
possible, by a legislature duly elected, in accordance with the
requirements of the constitution, which shall ensure that it is freely
chosen, and representative of the entire nation.
The essence of the concept of emergency (with a right to take derogation
measures) is its provisional or temporary status; it therefore follows that it
should be terminated as soon as the circumstances which brought it into
existence are reasonably controlled or no longer exist; or where the
emergency situation (even if it exists) can be controlled by the normal powers
under the Covenant, for example, the termination of the state of emergency in
Northern Ireland, by the United Kingdom, on 22 August 1984.
(8.) ABERRATIONS FROM THE REFERENCE MODEL:
Frequent violations of the norm of temporality have led to a variety of
pathological aberrations from the reference model, variously described as a de
facto state of emergency, a permanent state of emergency, the
institutionalization of an emergency regime and a complex state of emergency,
etcetera.64
(8.1) A De Facto State ofEmergency:
A de facto state of emergency very often transforms itself into another equally
serious aberration known as a permanent state of emergency. There are two
important dimensions of what is known as a de facto state of emergency. First,
there is no proclamation or termination of an emergency at all or it is one in
which a state of emergency in fact subsists even after an officially proclaimed
emergency had purportedly been terminated. Second, there is, in such a
regime, derogation from, and suspension of, an increasing number of rights
and freedoms which, according to law, can only be derogated from and
suspended by virtue of a proper proclamation of a public emergency. An
illustrative case will clarify the position.
In South Africa, although in some regions, a state of emergency had been
declared, (for example, in Transkei on 5 June 1980 under Section 44 of the
Transkei Public Security Act; Proclamation 252 of the Emergency Regulations
of the Ciskei, September 1980), in all other cases, the applicable legislation
producing similar effects, as those associated with emergency situations,
without complying with constitutional legal norms, is fully in force, as ordinary
laws. This was illustrated by Questiaux with reference to Namibia, "a country
occupied by the South African military forces, and therefore, in a state of war."
In Namibia, the "ordinary laws" of a highly repressive nature and containing
substantive rules characteristic of emergency legislation, have been applied:
for example, the South African laws which carried the death penalty for
political offences in peacetime and the repressive laws of detention without
trial. These were made applicable in Namibia on account of the state of war.
The danger of such repressive measures, was also highlighted by the UN Ad
Hoc Working Group of Experts, on violations of human rights in Southern
Africa. 55
(8.2) A Permanent State ofEmergency:
The recent findings of the Commonwealth Eminent Persons Group (EPG) on
Southern Africa have examined the status of the state of emergency in South
Africa, inter alia from 1960 onwards (frequently proclaimed, terminated and
then re-imposed). The EPG report reveals that increasingly enormous powers
of repression were being conferred even on low-ranking members of the police
and security forces, which were being exercised with immunity and without
accountability. In such a situation the proclamation of a formal state of
emergency has become irrelevant. The EPG concluded that, although there
had been a technical compliance with the Nassau Accord which called upon
the government to "terminate the existing state of emergency", yet" ... in
reality, however, South Africa was sliding even further into a permanent state
of emergency, in terms of the ordinary laws of the land.,,66
It is ironic that the fear expressed by the EPG came true on 12 June 1986, the
very day when its report was to be published. On that day, the South African
government declared a nationwide state of emergency. This was one of the
most drastic attempts at continuing repression by the racist regime, as was
made clear from the enormous powers given to the security forces, which
were widely enforced.67
Questiaux concludes that in such cases where a state of emergency has
become the rule, the common features are:
(a) less and less account is taken of the imminence or otherwise of the
danger;
(b) the principle of proportionality is no longer considered to be
fundamental; and
(c) no time limit is envisaged.68
(8.3) Emergency Regime Institutionalized:
This new pattern of deviation has emerged recently with a view to establishing
an extended transitional emergency regime with a veneer of legitimacy by
professing to return to some form of democracy - which may be variously
described as "authoritarian", "restricted" or "gradual" democracy. These
processes, ostensibly meant for transition to new forms of democracy, are in
reality intended to provide an institutional base for an extended transitional
regime characterized by a hierarchization of powers in which the ultimate
control rests with the military elates. There are variations with different
techniques of refinement to conceal the substantive control of a military junta
or an authoritarian regime giving the impression of a return to a civilian rule.
(8.4) A Complex State ofEmergency:
A brief reference to this form of deviation exposed by Questiaux will also be
.relevant. In essence, it 'means an attempt to validate all decrees and laws
enacted by authoritarian regimes of exception pari passu with the
constitutional and normal legal framework. Two examples, (Turkey and Brazil),
cited by Questiaux, clearly show, that the resultant complexity in the legal
system, is not only destructive of the basic structure, of the normal
constitutional regime, but also makes it impossible, for any lawyer to advise a
client, about the nature and content, of the legal regime in force.59
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(9.) THE ROLE OF THE LEGISLATURE IN AN EMERGENCY
REGIME:
As will have been observed, the legislature has a crucial role to play at every
stage in a regime of emergency. In particular, the power and duty of the
legislature to monitor with meticulous care, the declaration and duration of a
state of emergency is of pivotal significance for the maintenance of a rule of
law during a serious public crisis. It is for this reason that the ILA
recommends:
(a) In order to exercise effective control, it is essential that the
legislature should be able to function throughout the period of the
crisis. 7o For instance, not infrequently, taking advantage of the
absence of Parliament, a de facto regime of emergency has been
systematically extended.
(b) Even if a member of the legislature is detained without trial, he shall
be entitled to participate in, and vote 'on, any decision in connection
with the declaration or confirmation or extension and termination of
a state of emergency. 71
This recommendation is important because, among the various patterns of
violations, during an emergency, the most unusual one, is that the duly elected
government, is replaced by an authoritarian regime, through a coup d' etat,
violent or peaceful; the constitution is suspended; the duly elected Parliament
is dissolved, and the country is governed by decrees promulgated, by an
authority which has assumed power, by extra-constitutional means. In the
process, the most important mechanism of government by consent, is
destroyed.72
(9.1) Article 16 ofthe French Constitution - an exception:
It will have been observed that effective Parliamentary or legislative control of
a regime of exception is of the essence of the reference model of the Paris
minimum standards. Where, however, the assumption or the exercise of
emergency powers is virtually the exclusive monopoly of the executive branch,
with little or no control by the legislative or judicial branches, such a regime
represents a radical departure from the reference model. The Questiaux study
has described the powers of such a regime as "emergency powers through
self-empowerment by the executive". The classic example of this type can be
found in Article 16 of the French Constitution.
In the French case, emergency powers are concentrated in the hands of the
executive except the power to amend the Constitution. Apart from the extreme
case of trial for "crime against the Constitution" by the High Court (itself
composed of members of Parliament), there is no direct control of emergency
by the French Parliament. Parliament is powerless to judge the validity of the
proclamation of emergency; equally powerless are the courts of law, and the
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Council of State (Conseil d'Etat), to judge the validity of the proclamation of
an emergency, or to review the special 'powers, or legislative measures
pursuant thereto, taken by the executive.
With a view to preventing any scrutiny by the organs of implementation under
the European Convention, France has entered a reservation to Article 15 of
that Convention.73 Again, in 1983, the representative of France informed the
Human Rights Committee that its reservation applied to paragraph 1 only of
Article 4 of the Covenant which, it was claimed, "was quite legitimate under
the Vienna Convention". He also stated that "the President of the Republic
was entitled, in a time of public emergency, to take both legal and
administrative decisions, but that they were subject to review by the Council of
State, which could annul them. "74
The French model has been adopted by a number of new Francophone states
in Africa. The possibility of abuse of emergency powers in a country without
the liberal tradition of France, with its in-built democratic structure, cannot be
ruled OUt.75
(9.2) The Role Df the Legislature: Six NDrms in the Paris
Minimum Standards:
Apart from monitoring the declaration and the duration of a state of
emergency, the continuing function of the legislature is equally, if not, more
important for the protection of the individuals during the entire period of the
crisis. Six important norms are recommended by the ILA:
(a) There shall be no alterations but the fundamental functions of the
legislature shall remain intact despite the relative expansion of the
authority of the executive.
(b) The prerogatives, immunities and privileges of the legislature shall
remain intact.
(c) As far as practicable, norms to be applied during an emergency
shall be formulated when no emergency exists.
(d) All emergency measures adversely affecting the rights of the
individuals, shall be supported by the authority of law, duly enacted
by the popular legislature.
(e) Since delegated legislation by the executive during a period of
serious public danger often becomes necessary to meet the
exigencies of the situation, the legislature by enacting enabling
statutes shall provide clear and appropriate guidelines to regulate
executive discretion in respect of permissible measures of
delegated legislation.
The absence of such guidelines would result in the effacement or
abdication of legislative function, which is impermissible even during
an emergency. The legislature will further have the necessary power
to ratify with retrospective effect, if it deems fit, emergency
measures having the effect of law, introduced by the executive to
cope with a critically urgent situation.
It would be interesting to compare this standard of legislative supervision with
some of the forms described by Mrs Questiaux in her comparative law
analysis of emergency legislation in different municipal systems. 76
(f) Last but not least, it is for the legislature to ensure that from time to
time there is an impartial and objective review of the derogation
measures (legislative or executive) with a view to upholding
reasonable guarantees to every individual on a continual basis
against abusive exercise of emergency powers.77 The effective
functioning of a legislature through debates and popular
participation in the exposure of abuses of power, is an important
guarantee for the protection of the individuals in a state of
emergency. There are instances of legislatures functioning
successfully in a time of civil war. 78
(10.) THE ROLE OF THE EXECUTIVE IN AN EMERGENCY
REGIME:
Control of the executive occupies a central place in most studies of the rule of
Law. In the words of a distinguished Austrian judge, "[the] demand that the
executive be subject to the laws was the main postulate of the rule of law
state".79 The phenomenon of the growth of executive power in the twentieth
century explains,the continued preoccupation of studies of the rule of law with
this organ of government.80 One of the most important causes of increased
executive power is the assumption by government, in this century, of vast
planning and welfare responsibilities. The problem of the control of
government in the exercise of these new powers is, beyond the scope of this
work.
The first principle, established by deduction from the above introduction, is
that the executive organ of government, (and all who act under the authority of
the executive), must be subject to law, in the sense that its actions, (especially
those which touch upon the freedoms protected by the rule of law), are limited
and controlled, by specific provisions of the law. There are two facets to this
principle: The actions of the executive must be within its legal powers and
must correspond to clearly formulated legal standards. It follows that
delegation to an officer of power to invade an individual's basic liberties
without the enactment of "specific provisions controlling his actions",81 would
be directly contrary to the most fundamental requirement of the rule of law.
As part of an attempt, to give more specificity to this requirement, it has been
suggested, that laws which authorize the exercise of a discretion, must be
drawn in such a way, that it is possible to pass judgement on the question
whether, in an individual case, the discretion has been exercised, within the
"meaning of the law',.82 The salient point of this suggestion is that legislative
delegation of authority to the executive or its officers, must be accompanied by
detailed standards against which the exercise of the authority can be
measured. This applies equally to the delegation of legislative authority.
The second principle, which may be deduced from the rule of law, is the
principle that in general, the executive should not be given power to enact
inroads into the fundamental freedoms even if its regulations lay down detailed
standards. The grounds upon which a citizen's liberties may be interfered with
in normal times are well established and the executive should not be
empowered to extend them, except in times of compelling urgency.83 A
delegation of legislative power to the executive must not, therefore, include
authority to limit or abolish the freedoms protected by the rule of law. The
limitation of these liberties is a broad question of policy more suitable for
legislative action than for decision by a subordinate rule-making authority. This
necessary principle, was adopted as a specific recommendation, of the Lagos
Conference of the International Commission of Jurists (ICJ), where it was
declared that, "legislation should as far as possible, be delegated, only in
respect of matters of economic, and social character, and that the exercise of
such powers, should not infringe upon, fundamental human rights".84
An independent body (preferably the ordinary courts) acting in accordance
with appropriate judicial standards, must be entrusted with the power to
determine the legal competence of the actions of the executive and its officers.
On the necessity of independent judicial control of the executive, there is
almost complete unanimity; in fact, some authorities make judicial control of
the executive the identifying feature of the rule of law state.85
The principle of judicial control was adopted as part of the conclusions of the
Delhi Conference in 1959, and was reaffirmed after intensive exploration of
the problem in Lagos supra, in 1961 and Rio in 1962. Of course, judicial
control should be supplemented by legislative control of executive action
(especially of executive rule making); but it is judicial control, which is vital in
the protection of the basic freedoms. Legislative supervision has a special
relevance to the economic and social activities of govemment.
For the purposes of giving effect to the rule of law, the individual, should have
a right of action, for unlawful infringement of any of his or her basic freedoms,
and an effective remedy, in the nature of the habeas corpus writ, for securing
his or her reJease, from unlawful detention or arrest.86 In appropriate cases,
the courts should have power to make a declaratory order or to issue a
mandarnus.
Any consideration, of the problem of judicial control, of the executive in
present times, must pay particular attention, to a claim of the executive, which
tends to defeat that control, and which is nowadays, asserted with increasing
frequency and success, namely, the claim of the executive, to be virtually
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exempt from supervision and control, during a state of emergency. This claim,
presents a dangerous threat to the rule of law and therefore calls for more
extensive treatment.
The claim by an executive of the right or power to set up an emergency rule is
essentially a demand to govern without law. The danger of power unchecked
by law is an old lesson, which needs to be learned anew by each generation:
"Where laws end, tyranny begins." The prevention of an unjustified resort to
emergency government is therefore crucial to the maintenance of the rule of
law in any society. The central and most difficult problem is that of restricting
the government to the use of emergency powers during periods of true
emergency only.
A problem of only slightly less importance, is the difficulty of putting some
limits, to the exercise of emergency power, during times of crisis for, though
emergency is government without the restraint of the law, it would be
disastrous, to fix no bounds whatsoever, for its exercise; law may be pushed
into the wings during emergency rule, but need not be totally banished from
the house. Each of these two questions needs separate treatment.
If the executive is constitutionally or legally bound to exercise exceptional
powers during strictly limited periods of time when crisis actually occurs or
threatens, the need for setting legal limits to its crisis powers is not as great.
Nevertheless, though an executive, acting in a time of genuine crisis,
obviously must have the power to act swiftly and effectively, it remains
important to fix certain outer limits, to its capacity, which may prevent abuse,
or unnecessary injUry whilst freeing it of those normal, peacetime restrictions,
which stand directly in the way of remedial action.
It must be remembered that some emergencies, such as war unaccompanied
by invasion, do not involve internal disorder or upheaval and may be
successfully controlled without a total suspension of rights and procedures.
Even where disorder prevails, a government should not be free to resort to
any kind of barbarity that may seem efficacious in controlling the situation. In
short, the controls of law must be considerably slackened in times of crisis but
they need not disappear entirely.
The enlargement and concentration of power in the executive's hands during
an emergency, necessarily means a reduction of individual liberty. In fact,
emergencies necessarily involve, to a greater or lesser degree, a breach of all
the requirements of the rule of law already outlined. The government may find
it necessary to detain, or otherwise restrict freedom, without charge - a
procedure, which infringes the legality principle, and the right to personal
freedom. It may also decide to restrict or even abolish the liberties of speech
and association and to set up special courts applying special procedures to try
persons for emergency offences.
Though these invasions of the rule of law may be lamentable necessities in a
time of crisis, they must not be allowed to degenerate into excesses and
abuses. The first and most important safeguard against a danger of that kind
is the institutionalization of emergency procedures and powers in a
constitutional instrument or ordinary statutory enactment. Clinton L Rossiter
has formulated this requirement in the following terms:
"If a state decides that an emergency institution is to be provided for in
law, then the purpose, powers
j
effects and limitations of that institution
ought to be clearly qualified."s
As he ar~ues elsewher~, the emerg~ncy should be for~see~ and methodized
in detail. 8 The conclusions of the RIO conference on this POint were almost
identical:
liThe conditions under which an emergency may be declared
should be formulated in a law which determines the authority
capable of proclaiming it, as well as the relevant procedures,
duration and appropriate methods of control. ,,89
The institutionalization of emergency powers must not be a blanket transfer of
authority to the executive to legislate and to act. Thus, it is provided in Article
15 of the European Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and
Fundamental Freedoms that only measures "strictly required by the exigencies
of the situation" may be taken during an emergency. The question of the kind
of limitation, which should be imposed on the exercise of emergency powers,
is one which cannot be answered in general but only in relation to each
separate power.
The delegation of legislative power to the executive during an emergency
could be controlled by a provision requiring parliamentary W'proval of
regulations enacted by the executive within a fixed period. Another example
of a reasonable restriction on executive crisis power, is the provision of a right
of appeal by detained persons to a specially appointed tribunal, if not to the
courts. Then again, the powers of military courts may be circumscribed by
limiting the offences they may try, the punishment to be imposed, and the
conditions in which they may function.
(11.) THE SCOPE OF ~UDICIALREVIEW IN A TIME OF
EMERGENCY:
In the context of a state of emergency, the question of judicial review arises in
two types of cases: first, whether there exists a public emergency threatening
the life of the nation and, second, whether the measures taken are permissible
in law to restore normalcy. The question can arise before two different forums,
namely, national courts as well as the appropriate organs of a regional or
international treaty to which the respondent state may be a party. The
mechanism of judicial review both at national and international levels will be
considered.
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(11.1) Judicial review at a national level:
The safeguard of judicial control at the national level over a declaration of
public emergency is far from generally accepted. In 1961, the Lagos
conference on the rule of law of the International Commission of Jurists (ICJ),
did provide that a declaration of emergency, by the executive is susceptible,
"only to a posteriori legislative ratification and judicial review". 91 In the same
year, an important UN seminar on Human Rights held in Mexico expressed
three different views on the topic:
(a) the court should have the power to annul the declaration of
emergency where it was considered "undesirable" in the sense that
it was "not justified by the de facto situation";
(b) the power of the court should be limited to cases where requisite
formality has not been complied with; and
(c) the declaration of a state of emergency, being a political decision,
should be entirely withdrawn, from the control of the court.92
Six years later, the Kingston seminar of the United Nations recorded the
general agreement that the "declaration of a state of emergency should not be
subject to judicial control. "93 Despite the possibility, of the conflicting views of
international organs and national courts, confronted with political judgements,
over the proclamations of emergency, Mrs Daes, is of the opinion that "the
ordinary courts of a state, should not abdicate the responsibility, of testing the
legality of a deClaration of emergency, even if it may be considered necessary,
or advisable to leave the political organs of the State with a certain -
preferably implied - margin of appreciation.,,94
On the other hand, the ICJ, while accepting the position that it is "axiomatic
that, for the protection of human rights, the greatest possible degree of judicial
control should be striven for", observed:
"However, it is widely thought that the executive and the legislature, the
political branches of government, are entitled to discretion in
determining the existence and gravity of a threat to the nation, that is
the need for a state of emergency, and the necessity for recourse to
specific measures. Whether judicial review of these two decisions is
advisable is, therefore, another issue which must be decided in the light
of the legal traditions of each country".95
(11.2) Alexander1s seminal study:
The seminal study of the role of national courts in different types of emergency
situations by Professor George J. Alexander, is a significant contribution
bearing in mind the dearth of legal literature on the topic. Having examined the
history, of court involvement in the case law, of eight common law countries,
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(the United States, Great Britain, South Africa, Ireland, New Zealand, Canada,
Australia and India), its main thesis, is that the court is vulnerable in times of
national crisis, and that" in the most serious cases, courts have performed
badly, will necessarily continue to perform badly, and should ideally not be
involved,,96 (emphasis added). In the United States and other common law
countries the courts have upheld, with few exceptions, "far-reaching expansion
of govemmental power with corres~onding contraction of individual rights
during times of public emergency". 7 According to Alexander, the response of
national courts varies in three different types of emergency, depending upon
the public danger.
First, in wartime measures, the British and American courts in substance will
not involve themselves with the military or executive decisions. According to
him, the courts in Britain, the USA and the Commonwealth countries will not
involve themselves in the legitimacy of military decisions in the absence of bad
faith. Issues, which arise in this sort of emergency, put courts at the most
extreme disadvantage except in rare instances where they are bold enough to
act. "Regrettably, they often act shamefully at such times as did the American
and Canadian courts in approving Japanese relocation which, it should be
pointed out, they did after the end of World War 11 without even the excuse
fervor.,,98
Second, at the opposite extreme, a number of cases involve an emergency
that is much more controversial than war or active insurrection, for example,
when troops have been called to quell labour disturbances and peaceful
civilian protest. In such circumstances, several courts have intervened and
determined whether a state of emergency is of the sort that immediately
threatens the continued existence of a nation; a situation of this sort is at
some level "manageable by courts".99
Third, there is a middle ground in which problems arise out of a variety of
threats to national security (excluding armed conflicts). In this area, the issues
such as freedom of expression or precursors of unlawful overthrow of the
government are involved. In such cases, which are of the utmost importance
in democratic countries, the national courts can play an important role in
preserving fundamental liberties and in particular "should insist on the rule of
law and resist the temptation to embellish legislative proscriptions. ,,100
Any review of the decision of national courts in emergency cases, particularly
of a serious type, seems to reveal that the precedents of the court are so
perplexingly ambivalent as to render recourse to the doctrine of stare decisis,
an exercise in futility. Accordingly, in human rights cases, legal experts in an
adversary position can each cite powerful but conflicting precedents in support
of their respective contentions.
On the specific issue of whether a declaration of emergency is justiciable, the
preponderant view is that the judgement of the political branches of the
government (executive and legislature), is normally immune-from judicial
review, but there are some exceptions. 101 In principle, recent juristic ~inions
support a more activist judicial role in reviewing emergency powers. 1
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(11.3) The court~spower ofreview: a few examples:
Another important question which arises is the court's power to direct (for
example, by issuing a writ of mandamus), the political branches of the
government to terminate an emergency when the circumstances that
warranted its initial declaration or continuation, have ceased to exist. The point
arose in several decisions.
(11.3.1) Malaysia: The Judicial Committee:
For instance, in the case of Teh Cheng Poh v Public Prosecutor, Malaysia, 103
the point, involved in the case, before the Privy Council, was whether the court
had the power, to revoke the proclamation of emergency in MaJaysia, made by
the constitutional ruler, on the advice of the cabinet of Ministers. It was
observed by Lo~d Diplock, per curiam, that a mandamus can be issued against
the members of the cabinet requiring them to advise the ruler to revoke the
proclamation in an appropriate case where, the failure to exercise his power of
revocation would be an abuse of his discretion. On the facts of the case, the
contention of the Defendant that the security area proclamation must be
treated in law as having lapsed, was however not accepted by the Privy
Council on the ground that:
"Their Lordships are far from suggesting that there was any material in
existence before that date which would have satisfied an application for
mandamus on the grounds that have been mentioned above. They do
not regard themselves as qualified to express any views on the matter
either way."
As noted in the ILA's Montreal report (at 114), the effect of the decision, was
pointed out, by a Malaysian jurist:
"But Teh Cheng Peh was short-lived. The executive marshalling its
majority in Parliament validated the invalidated emergency laws, made
proclamations of emergency no longer justiciable before the Courts,
and as a sop to the conscience, provided for a review of security cases
already tried, all with gymnastic dexterity reminiscent of the great
Olympian masters. And now the Privy Council is no more; the ultimate
court of appeal in these matters, of the cherished freedoms is the
Federal Court."
(11.3.2) India~s three proclamations ofemergency: the
perspective ofthe Supreme Court:
It may be recalled that the first proclamation of emergency in India continued
from 26 October 1962 till 1 July 1967. It was first proclaimed immediately after
the Chinese attack on India, but was continued even after China declared a
cease-fire on 21 November 1962. The emergency acquired a new lease of life,
as it were, with the outbreak of armed conflict between India and Pakistan
across their borders in April 1965 followed by a war later in the same year.
The cease-fire took place in terms of the resolution of the UN Security
Council, and the two heads of govemments signed a declaration on 10
January 1966, stipulating the procedure for the normalization of relations.
The emergency, however, continued in force even after the normalization;
criticisms of abuse of power became very pronounced. Prominent jurists
asked the Prime Minister to revoke the emergency. The International
Commission of Jurists, in its bulletin in March 1967, pointed out that since the
features of grave emergency did not appear to exist any longer, there was no
justification for the suspension of the fundamental rights. It was against this
background that on 18 March 1967, the Home Minister announced the
decision of the government to revoke the state of emergency with effect from
1 July 1967.104 The Supreme Court of India, was at that stage, "rudely
disturbed" with prolongation of such measures, as detention without trial, by
the continuation of an emergency, "without the existence of justifying necessity
"105
The second proclamation of emergency was made on 3 December 1971, on
the outbreak of war between Pakistan and India, but it continued till 25 June
1975 when the third emergency was proclaimed. Although the hostilities
between India and Pakistan ceased on 16 December 1971, the emergency
continued. In early 1975, in a habeas corpus petition before the Supreme
Court, the validity of the continuation of the emergency was challenged on the
ground that there was no longer any threat of external aggression. The
arguments lasted from March 1975 till the beginning of May 1975 when the
Supreme Court was closed for its summer vacation. Before the judgement
could be delivered on the reopening of the Supreme Court in July 1975, a new
emergency was declared. 106 An opportunity was thus lost for a definitive
pronouncement of the Supreme Court on this issue.
In an important case, Waman Rao and Others v Union of India, the validity of
the 40
th
and 42nd constitutional amendments was challenged. 107 The Supreme
Court left open the question whether the issuance of the proclamations of
emergency of 3 December 1971 and 25 June 1975 raised a justiciable issue,
and on the basis of the materials placed before it, the Court came to the
conclusion that they had been duly issued. Chandrachud CJ observed in the
course of his judgement:
"Thus, in the first place, we are not disposed to decide the question as
to whether the issuance of a proclamation of emergency raises a
justiciable issue. Secondly, assuming it does, it is not possible in the
present state of record to answer that issue one way or the other. And,
lastly, whether there was justification for continuing the state of
emergency after the cessation of hostilities with Pakistan, is a matter on
which we find ourselves ill-equipped to pronounce."
The validity of the two proclamations, was upheld by the Court. The challenge
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that the proclamation of 3 December 1971 should have been revoked much
earlier and that the second proclamation of 25 June 1975 was wholly uncalled
for and mala fide, was negated. 108 The decision was followed recently by a
two-member bench of the Supreme Court in P.B. Samant v Union of India
Oudgement of 17 December 1987).
An additional contention, was that the resolutions passed by Parliament, which
had the effect, of continuing the duration of emergency, should have been
published in the official Gazette; this was not done, and for this reason, the
proclamations should be deemed, to have become ineffective, on the expiry of
the period of two months, from the issue thereof. This contention was rejected
on the ground that the two resolutions were duly published in the official
reports of the two Houses of Parliament which fully met the requirement of due
publicity. 109 That apart, the recent trend in the Supreme Court of India shows
that the individual judges are inclined to take a restrictive view of the power of
the court to terminate an emergency by a mandamus.
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(11.3.3) The US Supreme Court :
The position is ambivalent in the United States. In a number of cases, the US
Supreme Court has supported the proposition that war and emergency
measures may be exercised until the emergency has ended, and that the
determination of when the emergency had ceased is a political act, not subject
to judicial review. For instance, in Ludecke v Watkins, 111 some three years
after the hostilities had ceased, the Supreme Court upheld the applicability of
the Alien Enemy Act of 1798, which gave the President broad power to
restrain and remove alien enemies during declared war. In striking contrast to
the aforesaid view, the Supreme Court held in ChastJeton v Sinclair,112 that the
Court should inquire whether the exigency of circumstances, which justified a
particular law, still existed.
(11.4) Judicial Review: JLA~sNational Standard:
Paragraph 7 of Section (A) of the Black Letter Rule provides, inter alia, that at
the national level, power of judicial review, over declaration and duration of an
emergency, shall be exercised "in terms of the constitution, and legal tradition
of the state concerned, keeping in view, the undertaking of the state, to adopt
legislative or other measures, to give effect to the rights recognized, by any
treaty, to which it may be a party." Two important points are to be kept in view
by the national judiciary in reviewing the validity of the declaration or
continuation of a state of emergency.
First, whatever may be the status of the emergency regime, in the legal
framework of a particular state, which is a party to an international treaty, like
the Covenant, compliance with the crux of that state's obligations, under the
treaty, as embodied in Article 2, must be considered a crucial and relevant
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factor, by the national court in exercising its jurisdiction, of reviewing the initial
or continuation of a declaration of emergency.
Second, which is indeed an illustration of the first proposition, the national
court, should also take into account, the vital significance of the fact, that the
obligation of a state party, to any of the three treaties, (Article 4 of the ICCPR;
Article 15 of the ECHR and Article 27 of the ACHR), is to satisfy the objective
standard, that the public emergency, must be one which threatens the life of
the nation. The existence of such a threat is a condition precedent to the
exercise of the power of proclamation. It is the incumbent duty of the national
court to note that the international or regional treaties do not in terms provide
for any subjective satisfaction of the executive. For instance, there is nothing
in such treaties which can accommodate a theory of subjective standard, such
as, in Article 352 of the Indian Constitution: "If the President is satisfied that a
grave emergency exists ... "
These two vital aspects are of great relevance for the consideration of an
activist judiciary in an egalitarian society where there is a need for the
protection of individuals against abusive assumption or exercise of emergency
power by an independent judiciary. This, however, does not mean the
rejection of the doctrine of margin of appreciation; on the contrary, one has to
appreciate the necessity of executive discretion and the constraints of judicial
review without patently overstepping the permissible limits of the executive's
margin of appreciation. Accordingly, the ILA has come to the conclusion:
"So far as the scope of judicial review, of a declaration of an
emergency, under the municipal system, this Committee would like to
emphasize, that the factual existence of circumstances, which threaten
the life of the nation, is a condition precedent, for the assumption of
power by the political organs, of the particular state. The Municipal
Court, neither having the expertise nor access to certain sources of
information, necessarily will have to allow a significant measure of
discretion to the political organs on the complex problems relating to the
declaration of emergency.
Nevertheless, there is no reason why, in appropriate cases, the
judiciary should not be able to pronounce judgement invalidating the
declaration of an emergency where, for instance, it is mala fide or a
fraud on the exercise of constitutional powers. In all cases, the
Municipal Court should ensure compliance with the constitutional or
legal formalities relevant to such declaration. It is in the light of these
observations that the Committee has formulated the principle laid down
in paragraph 7 above." (Para 14 at 63 of ILA's Paris report).
(12.) THE IMPORTANCE OF AN INDEPENDENT ~UDICIARY IN A
TIME OF EMERGENCY:
The important role of the judiciary in a time of emergency has been
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emphasized in each of the three sections of the ILA's Paris Standards. As
noted earlier, the emasculation of the judiciary and the harassment of defense
lawyers are not uncommon in a state of emergency. As Alexander's profound
study revealed, in such an environment, the protection of the individual, by the
judiciary, becomes largely illusory.113
During an emergency, the expansive horizon of executive power is necessarily
commensurate, with substantial contraction, of the rights and freedoms of the
individuals. The necessity for a rule of law in an emergency regime, to ensure
reasonable protection to the individuals on the one hand, and to prevent
abusive exercises of executive powers on the other, is an imperative
necessity. This task can only be performed by an independent judiciary, "for a
subservient judiciary cannot be relied upon, to accomplish the difficult task of
protecting human rights and the rule of law, during an emergency. ,,114
The role of the judiciary, in protecting individuals, against repression and
abusive exercise of emergency powers, is one of the best guarantees, for a
rule of law, in a state of emergency. The judiciary shall have the power and
jurisdiction to decide four areas of vital controversy between the state and the
individual.
First, whether or not an impugned emergency legislation is in conformity with
the constitution of the state. For instance, if the constitution stipulates a
separation of powers, for the three branches of government, and prohibits
military courts from trying civilians, a decree law by the executive, or an
enacted law by the legislature, empowering a trial of civil.ians, by military
courts in contravention of the constitutional ban, (as was done in Argentina in
1976 by the military govemment115), should be declared in-operative and a
nullity by the judiciary.
Second, the judiciary should decide whether or not any particular exercise of
emergency power, is in conformity with the emergency legislation. For,
example, if a law of preventive detention, in a time of emergency, sets out the
specific grounds permitting detention without trial, an order of detention by the
executive authority, on a ground outside those grounds, should be struck
down by the court. A detainee will be entitled to show that the order of
detention was not under, or in compliance, with the law or, was mala fide.
Third, there are several basic rights, which are non-derogable even in a time
of emergency. If any legislative or executive emergency measure results in an
encroachment of any non-derogable right, the court shall decide the issue and
declare, if satisfied, such encroachment ultra vires and of no effect. Again, and
perhaps more important, in a case where an emergency measure, (legislative
or executive), is challenged by a victim, on the ground of non-compliance with
the rule of proportionality, the court shall examine the complaint with
meticulous care, and if satisfied that the grievance is a genuine one, it shall
make an appropriate declaration to that effect.
Finally, where existing municipal laws and orders are not specifically rescinded
or suspended, the judiciary shall continue to regard them, as being in effect
and, if necessary, grant relief on such a basis. In any event a court of law shall
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have full power to declare null and void any emergency measure, (legislative
or executive), or any act of application of an emergency measure which does
not satisfy any, or more, of the aforesaid, four tests.
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SECTION B: EMERGENCY POWERS AND THE
PROTECTION OF THE INDIVIDUAL:
GENERAL PRINCIPLES:
(1.) During the period of the existence of a public emergency, the state
concerned, may take measures, derogating from its obligations, to respect
and ensure to all individuals, within its territory, and subject to its
jurisdiction, the human rights and fundamental freedoms internationally
recognized, but it may not derogate, from internationally prescribed rights,
which are, by their own terms, "non-suspendable" and not subject to
derogation.
(2.) The power to take derogatory measures as aforesaid, is subject to five
general conditions:
(a) Every state, which is a party to a regional or international human
rights treaty, shall comply with the principle of notification, as may
be prescribed by the particular treaty.
(b) Such measures must be strictly proportionate to the exigencies of
the situation.
(c) Such measures must not be inconsistent with the other obligations
of the state under international law.
(d) Such measures must not involve any discrimination solely on the
ground of race, colour, sex, language, religion, nationality or social
origin.
(e) The basic rights and freedoms, guaranteed by international law,
shall remain non-derogable, even during an emergency. As the
minimum, the constitution shall provide that the rights recognized
as non-derogable in intemationallaw, may not be affected by a
state of emergency.
(1.) While assuming or exercising emergency powers, every state shall respect
the following principles:
(a) The fundamental functions of the legislature, shall remain intact,
despite the relative expansion of the authority of the executive.
Thus, the legislature, shall provide general guidelines to regulate
executive discretion, in respect of permissible measures of
delegated legislation.
(b) The prerogatives, immunities and privileges of the legislature, shall
remain intact.
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(c) The guarantees of the independence of the judiciary and of the
legal profession, shall remain intact. In particular, the use of
emergency powers to remove judges or to alter the structure of the
judicial branch or otherwise to restrict the independence of the
judiciary, shall be prohibited by the constitution.
(1.) (a) All emergency measures in derogation of the rights of individuals, shall
be supported by the authority of law, as enacted by the duly elected
representatives of the people.
(b) As far as practicable, norms to be applied during an emergency, shall
be formulated when no emergency exists.
(c) States shall review and, if necessary, revise the emergency measures,
(legislative or executive), from time to time, to ensure reasonable
guarantees against any abusive exercises of emergency powers.
(2.) The judiciary, shall have the power and jurisdiction to decide firstly,
whether or not an emergency legislation is in conformity with the
constitution of the state.
Secondly, whether or not any particular exercise of emergency power, is in
conformity with the emergency legislation.
Thirdly, to ensure that there is no encroachment upon the non-derogable
rights, and that derogatory measures, derogating from other rights, are in
compliance with the rule of proportionality; and
Fourthly, where existing municipal laws and orders are not specifically
rescinded or suspended, the judiciary shall continue to regard them as
being in effect. A court of law shall have full powers, to declare null and
void, any emergency measure, (legislative or executive), or any act of
application of anx emergency measure which does not satisfy the
aforesaid tests. 1 6 .
(1.) THE POWER TO TAKE DEROGATORY MEASURES: FIVE
CONDITIONS PRECEDENT:
The power to take derogatory measures, is subject to five conditions:
notification; the rule of proportionality; no inconsistency with other obligations
under international law; derogation measures must be non-discriminatory; and,
finally, rights non-derogable, even during an emergency. Each one of the five
conditions needs discussion.
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(1.1) The notification ofderogation:
The first condition, is that the principle of notification of derogation, as may be
prescribed by the particular treaty, shall be duly complied with. Such a
notification, serves three main purposes:
(1.1.1) Three main purposes:
First, it is an important restriction on the use of emergency powers, in as much
as, in the words of Rene Cassin, "the real purpose of Article 4, was to require
states to take a decision in public, when they were obliged to restrict such
rights."117 Years later, the importance of a public notice of derogation, was
emphasized by the Human Rights Committee, when it stated in 1984, in
reviewing the state report of El Salvador, that such a notice was "no mere
formality, and that it could lead governments, to abandon their plans with
respect to certain derogations, because, all things considered, they did not
find them absolutely essential. "118
Second, a notification of derogation, is a matter of serious concern to the other
states parties - as was emphasized in the travaux preparatoires: "It was,
generally agreed, that the proclamation of a public emergency, and
consequential derogation, from the provisions of the Covenant, was a matter
of the gravest concern, and that the states parties, had the right to be notified
of such action."119
The community of interest, in matters of derogation measures, it has been
rightly suggested, gives rise to a certain ordre public between states parties,
giving each of them an interest in human rights situations in other states
parties. 120
Third, states of public emergency, and their effects need to be thoroughly
scrutinized by the organs charged with the implementation of the relevant
human rights treaty. 1
(1.1.2) The Provision ofNotice in the three treaties: CDmmon
and distinctive features:
All three treaties, namely, the European Convention on Human Rights,
(hereinafter, referred to as the European Convention or the ECHR), the
International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, (hereinafter, referred to as
the International Covenant or the ICCPR), and the American Convention on
Human Rights, (hereinafter, referred to as the American Convention or the
ACHR), provide for a notification of derogation, at the time of a public
emergency, and also for a further notice, in the event of its termination. Apart
from these two common features, there are four points of difference in the
language of Article 4(3) of the ICCPR and Article 27(3) of the ACHR, on the
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other. These differences, discussed below, seem more semantic than
substantial.
(1.1.3) To whom is the notification to be sent? :
Under the ICCPR and the ACHR, the notification, is to be sent to the other
states parties, through the intermediary of the Secretary-General of the United
Nations, and the Organization of American States (OAS) respectively; under
Article 15(3) of the ECHR, it is to be sent to the Secretary-General of the
Council of Europe. However, although the ECHR does not expressly provide,
that the Secretary-General is to send notifications to the other states parties,
in resolution (56) 16 of 26 September 1956, relating to the implementation of
Article 15(3) of the ECHR, the Committee of Ministers of the Council of Europe
filled this gaPi2and hence, in practice, there is no difference between the three
instruments.1
(1.1.4) Within what time is the notification to be sent? :
While the ICCPR and the ACHR provide that the notifications should be sent
11 immediately", the ECHR is silent on this point. Although, Buergenthal
considers the insertion of the term, "immediately", an improvement of the
ECHR, on the ground that it calls for a "notice to be dispatched almost
simultaneously, with the proclamation of the emergency, or the taking_of
derogating measures",12 it seems that the difference is more apparent than
real. The word, "immediately", really means that the notice should be sent,
"within a reasonable time and in any case, without delay", (as Daes puts it), or,
"within a brief period", (as Questiaux puts it). Although, it is true that the ECHR
is silent on this point, the European Court in the Lawless case, has considered
that the notification without delay, was an element, in the sufficiency of
information, as required by Article 15(3).124
(1.1.5) What should be the contents 0' the notification?:
While both the ICCPR and the ACHR, provide that the "provisions" of the
relevant treaty, from which the state had derogated, and the "reasons" by
which it was actuated, are to be indicated in the notification, the ECHR
provides that the "measures" of derogation taken, and the "reasons", are to be
specified. Two diametrically opposite views have been expressed, about the
interpretation of the terms quoted. Buergenthal, for instance, feels that the
ICCPR version, is an improvement upon the ECHR. This is because, under
the ECHR, the requirement of "measures", "would be met by a state, which
merely declared that certain provisions of its national constitution, have been
temporarily suspended" and even if accompanied, by reference to the relevant
provisions of the constitution, "would not necessarily indicate, from which
specific rights guaranteed in the Convention, the state party is derogating, and
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some very serious infringements, might consequently go unnoticed. Article
4(3) of the Covenant, reduces this risk.,,125
Questiaux, on the other hand, has expressed the view, that the obligation
under the European Convention, is "broader" because: "Apart from the
provisions from which a state party has derogated, the reasons by which it
was actuated, and the date on which it terminates such derogation, all cases
provided for in the three instruments, the European Convention, extends the
obligation, to include the nature of measures taken.,,126 This is perhaps,
technically not correct because the ECHR in its terms, does not require a
notification of the "provisions" of the treaty, from which a state party had
derogated, nor does it mention "the nature" of measures taken. In practice,
however, the better view, seems to be, that under all three instruments, the
monitoring authority requires, that the notification should cover, not only the
provisions of the treaty suspended, but also the derogation measures actually
taken, and the reasons which influenced the state, to take recourse to such
measures. The "reasons" must be indicated with sufficient clarity, although,
"every detail of each particular measure taken", need not be given.127
The fact that there is not much difference with regard to the type of information
required under the three treaties, despite differences in phraseology, will be
clear from the practice, inter alia, of the Council of Europe and of the Human
Rights Committee. Apart, from the four stages dealing with the mechanical
aspects, of a notice of derogation under the ECHR, (namely, the note verba/e
in a summary form is sent to the Secretary-General, the latter acknowledges
receipt, and then notifies the other states parties, and finally transmits a copy
to the heads of the important organs of the ECHR), the practice of the Council
of Europe, envisages that such a note verba/e, should contain at least the
following information: grounds invoked, (that is, a brief description of the
manifestations of the political crisis); a list of provisions of the ECHR restricted
or suspended; the emergency clauses of the municipal law, referred to in the
note; and, if applicable, the expected period of derogation and its geographic
extent. 128
In the same vein, albeit in different terms, general comment 5/13, (on
emergency), of the Human Rights Committee, emphasizes the importance of
the notification under Article 4(3). It stipulates, that the state party should
furnish at least, the following information: "whether a state of emergency has
been officially declared"; "the derogations it has made, including the reasons
therefor ... the nature of each right derogated from, together with the relevant
documentation"; "the applicable provisions of law governing derogations"; and
whether any non-derogable right "had in fact, been derogated from".129
(1.1.6) The Role of the Depository:
The fourth point of difference, is that, while the Secretary-General of the
Council of Europe as depository, is to be kept "fully informed", under the terms
of the ECHR, the other two treaties are silent on this issue. That apart, the
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Secretary-General under the ECHR, can ask for additional information or
explanations, lion his own responsibility and at his discretion", as confirmed by
the proceedings before the Consultative Parliamentary Assembly of the
Council of Europe. This power is derived from the express provisions of Article
57 of the ECHR. The absence of a similar provision in the ICCPR, makes it
difficult for the depository to exercise similar powers, in respect of a notice of
derogation under Article 4(3) of the Covenant.
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In sum, the notification of derogation by common consent, is an important
requirement for the protection of individuals in a state of emergency. Any
notification without adequate information, is useless and futile. The principle of
effectiveness means, that prompt, adequate information is absolutely
essential, if the control mechanism under the Covenant, however imperfect, is
expected to achieve a minimum level of efficacy.
The result can be achieved, by interpreting the general obligation of a state
party, under Articles 4(3) and 40 of the ICCPR, construed in the light of
general comment 5/13, to require it to submit additional information, or a
special report, whenever the Committee so requires, or on a voluntary basis,
when an emergency has been so declared, outside the scheduled reporting
period: for instance, as Nicaragua did, "in submitting additional information on
the subject, (relating to derogation measures, during a notified emergency),
without being requested to do so", as noted by the Committee in 1983.131
The growing international consensus, for the improvement of the content and
timing of the notice of derogation, and for submitting the requisite information
to the Human Rights Committee, as reflected, for instance, in Siracusa
Principles 45 and 46 and 71 - 76, are all aimed, at making the control
mechanism more effective, to prevent abuses of human rights, in a time of
emergency.
(1.1.7) The notice oftermination ofderogation:
All three treaties, provide for a notice of termination. A derogation shall be
terminated in the shortest possible time necessary, to bring to an end, the
public emergency. The requirement under Article 4(3) of the ICCPR, that a
state should communicate "on the date" on which it terminates such
derogation, was made advisedly. It stresses the importance of its effects at the
earliest possible moment, namely, full restoration of all rights and freedoms
protected by the Covenant, namely, those rights suspended or derogated from
during a temporary period of public emergency.
(1.1.8) The Consequences ofnon-compliance with the notice of
derogation =-
The precise legal effect of non-compliance with a notice of derogation remains
somewhat unclear. In the well-known Landinelli Si/va case, the Human Rights
Committee points out, on the one hand, that although "the substantive right to
take derogatory measures may not depend on a formal notification being
made pursuant to Article 4(3) of the Covenant", the Committee is of the view:
"If the Respondent Government, does not furnish the required
justification itself, as it is required to do, under Article 4(2) of the
Optional Protocol and Article 4(3) of the Covenant, the Human Rights
Committee cannot conclude, that valid reasons exist to legitimize a
departure from the normal legal regime, prescribed by the Covenant.,,132
Further, in reviewing the report of Sri Lanka in 1984, the Committee
emphasized that "as long as no notification or justification had been given, in
respect of rights permitting derogation, they must be considered in force and
hence, the government must account for them as in normal situations. ,,133 In
the case of Sri Lanka, no notice under Article 4(3) had been sent, despite the
fact that the existence of an emergency was an admitted fact.
In any event, non-compliance with the notification requirements, amounts to a
breach of obligation, which may deprive a state party, "of the defences
otherwise available to it, in procedures under the Covenant"; 134 and further,
such failure "will not validate measures taken, or continued after the events
which justified the public emergency and derogation has ceased to exist.,,135
The fact that the Covenant does not, as yet, provide any effective sanction for
breach of such an important obligation, does not in any way diminish the
imperative need for its compliance by a state of emergency.
It may be useful·to refer to some precedents under the ECHR, as well as, the
ICCPR and the Optional Protocol in the context of a notice of derogation.
While the two cases under the European Convention do not seem to clarify
sufficiently the important legal issues involved, the Human Rights Committee -
despite the importance it attaches to a notice of derogation - has yet to
develop a consistent jurisprudence in this area.
(2.) THE RULE OF PROPORTIONALITY:
(2.1) The rationale of this important safeguard:
The second condition, namely, that the rule of proportionality or necessity has
to be strictly observed, is perhaps one of the most important and significant
safeguards for the protection of individuals in a time of public emergency.
Basically, this rule derives from the fundamental theory, that the authority of
.govemments to curtail rights, even in a time of public crisis, is limited by the
overriding provisions of Articles 29(2) and 30 of the Universal Declaration of
Human Rights upon which, are based the provisions of Article 5(1) of the
ICCPR. The emergency powers cannot be used to destroy the guaranteed
rights altogether or to impose unwarranted limitations on their exercise. As
Buergenthal succinctly puts it:
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"Article 5(1) stipulated, in effect, that rights and powers conferred for
one purpose may not be used for another, illegitimate purpose. Viewed
in this light, Article 5(1) forms, an integral part of all the provisions of
the Covenant, that authorize derogations, limitations, or restrictions.
Thus, a government's exercise of the right of derogation under Article 4
of the Covenant, for example, must be judged not only for its formal
compliance with the requirements of the provision, but also by asking,
in reliance on Article 5(1), what the government's "aim" or purpose
is.,,136
In other words, as Daes puts it, the principle of proportionality implies "that the
extent of any limitation should be strictly pro?ortionate to the need or the
higher interest protected by the limitation."13 It will follow that the exercise of
the individual's rights and freedoms is the general rule and any limitation or
derogation is an exception to the rule, and is permissible to the extent strictly
required, for the protection of the general welfare in a democratic society.
Accordingly, every measure of derogation has to be justified by satisfying the
test laid down in this rule. Thus, conclusion 5(iii) of Committee 11 of the Lagos
conference on the rule states: "Finally, during any period of public emergency,
the executive should take only such measures as are reasonably justifiable for
the purpose of dealing with the situation, which exists during that period. ,,138
Another theoretical basis for the rule is the principle of self-defense in
international law "which requires the existence both of an imminent danger
and of a relationship between that danger and the measures taken to ensure
protection against it, which measures must be proportionate to the danger."139
This is an attempt to apply within national frontiers, in a time of public
emergency, the limits of the right of self-defence as recognized, for instance,
in the Caroline doctrine, (1837), which laid down two tests for a lawful resort to
wartime armed intervention in self-defence:
(a) there must, initially, be a necessity of self-defense that is
instant and overwhelming, leaving no choice of means and
no moment for deliberation; and
(b) the acts done in self-defense must not be unreasonable or
excessive, since the acts justified by a necessity of self-
defense must be limited to that necessity and kept within it.
While the first test, laid down the minimum condition for the commencement of
the exercise of the right, namely, the imminence of danger, the second test,
laid down the condition regulating the actual exercise of that right, namely, the
rule of proportionality - the defensive measures must be proportionate to the
threat involved. 140 Apart from the questionable status of the Caroline doctrine,
in the scheme of the UN Charter, the need for great caution in applying the
doctrine of preventive self-defence, in a time of public emergency is obvious,
in view of the fact that the pretext of the imminence of a threat, has often been
used in recent years, in assuming or exercising exceptional powers.
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(2.2) The guidelines in the Siracusa Principles: severity~ time
andspace:
The Siracusa Principles have laid down certain objective and valuable
guidelines relating to the scope and application of the principle of
proportionality. The three crucial factors - namely, severity, duration and
geographic scope - introduce the three constituents of reasonableness, time
and space for testing the compliance of a particular derogation measure, with
the requirement that it shall be strictly required by the exigencies of the
situation. Thus, Principle 51 provides that the "severity, duration and
geographic scope of any derogation measure shall be such, only as are strictly
necessary to deal with the threat to the life of the nation and are proportionate
to its nature and extent."
To illustrate, the first constraint of severity envisages that where ordinary
measures presumably, under the specific limitation clauses of the Covenant,
would be adequate to deal with the public danger, the derogation measure
cannot be considered strictly necessary. For example, administrative detention
without trial, was to be justified both in the Lawless case and Ireland v UK
cases because normal measures were not considered adequate. The second
constraint - of time - requires that the derogation measures must cease to
operate when the intensity of the public danger that brought it into existence,
no longer subsists. The third constraint - of space - means that a nationwide
derogation measure is not strictly required when the public crisis is confined to
a limited area of the state.
The Siracusa Principles also laid down several other safeguards to ensure
that the rule of proportionality is properly observed. The derogation measure,
must be applied in an objective manner, to meet an actual or imminent, and
not a latent or speculative, danger; the need for a proper assessment, and
prompt and periodic review by the legislature, is another important safeguard;
and effective remedies should be available, when a challenge is made, that a
particular derogation measure, does not satisfy the rule of strict necessity.141
In this respect the four functions of the national judiciary laid down in
paragraph 5 of Section B of the Paris Standards, are particularly relevant. The
judgement of the national authorities is not conclusive on this issue and is
subject to such international supervision as a particular applicable treaty may
provide.
(2.3) The application of the rule in decisions under the
European Convention: a critical evaluation:
From the decisions under the European Convention, it appears that
compliance with the rule of proportionality, can be tested on three grounds.
First, the application of the ordinary law and of the restrictive clauses that are
permissible in normal times, must be insufficient to meet the public danger.
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However, it has been held that the rule of proportionality was not ipso facto
infringed, despite the fact that subsequently the measures of derogation were
abated or brought to an end, without any corresponding abatement of the
intensity of the danger having been noticed.
Second, emergency measures should, at the very least, apparently make it
possible to abate or bring to an end the specific situation of danger, even
though their justification is not dependent on ascertaining whether, in fact, the
application of such measure achieved their objective.
Third, the rule must be deemed to have been observed if the undue severity of
the measures taken, are offset by the introduction of adequate safeguards or
extra-judicial guarantees, as a substitute. 142
On the question of the rule of proportionality, before the Human Rights
Committee, the travaux preparatoires of Article 4, bring out two points: first,
there was "general agreement" among the draftsmen about the importance of
the concept, and there wa~ hardly any controversy from the beginning. 143
The purpose was to ensure that the derogation must be strictly limited and
was not an "escape clause" .144
General comment 5/13, emphasizes that the measures under Article 4 of the
Covenant, must be "exceptional, and temporary measures, may last as long
as the life of the nation is threatened." Both while reviewing state reports and
examining individual communications, the Committee had made a meticulous
endeavour to ensure compliance, with the rule of strict necessity; if the results
are not spectacular, the reason is non-cooperation of the governments
concerned, to respond to the request for adequate information.
(3.) CONSISTENCY WITH OTHER INTERNATIONAL LAW
OBLIGATIONS:
The third condition, on the power to take derogatory measures, is that the
measures of derogation must not be inconsistent with "other obligations under
international law". This is a legal criterion which, requires to be satisfied in the
facts and circumstances of each case.
The measures of derogation must not be in conflict with the obligations of a
state party, under a treaty, or any principle of customary international law.
Such treaties include, inter alia, the Charter of the United Nations; the
Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide,
1948; the Geneva Conventions of 1949 and the relevant Protocols thereto,
(humanitarian law applicable to war and armed conflicts, particularly relevant
to an emergency situation); the 1951 Convention on the Status of Refugees
and the 1967 Protocol, as well as, other instruments concerning the
prevention of statelessness and the right of asylum; International Convention
on the Elimination of all Forms of Racial Discrimination, 1966; the International
Convention on the Suppression and Punishment of the Crime of Apartheid;
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the relevant International Conventions of the International Labour
Organization, (ILO); the International Convention against Torture, (opened for
signature on 4 February 1985), and various other international, regional and
even bilateral human rights instruments.
So far as the obligations of states under customary international law are
concerned, the ILA broke new ground when it laid down the test:
"The categories of human rights, now a part of customary international
law, cannot be considered to be static, and new norms are emerging
which already are recognized by the community of nations, either as
binding principles or, as candidate rules for future legal recognition. "145
In fact, the test has been developed and applied by the ILA, in the formulation
of the expanded list of rights which are not derogable, even in a time of
emergency, in Section C of its report.
There are two consequences of the particular principle, in the context of the
validity of a derogatory measure taken by a state, in a time of public
emergency. First, the obvious consequence, is that if the derogatory measure
is in breach of any other obligation, under conventional or customary
international law, it would necessarily amount to a breach of both Article 4 of
the ICCPR, and the other international law obligations. 146
Second, even derogation measures strictly required under a particular
emergency, may nevertheless be impermissible under Article 4(1), if they
conflict with other obligations of the derogating state, under international law,
for instance, when a state is a party to another treaty, which contains no
derogation clause, or has a stricter derogation clause forbidding, derogation
from some rights, for which derogation is permitted under Article 4, such as
the wider list of non-derogable clauses, in the ACHR. 147
Other instances, which may be cited include, "basic human rights conventions"
of the lLD, which refer to Convention numbers 11,87,98,136,141 and 151
concerning freedom of association; Convention numbers 29 and 105
concerning forced labour; and Convention numbers 100, 111 and 156
concerning equality of opportunity and treatment. Of these, only Convention
number 29 concerning forced labour, creates an express exception to the
applicable international standards during a national emergency. In this context,
one may also refer to the rights guaranteed by common Article 3 of the 1949
Geneva Conventions, ratified by 152 states as well as, Article 6(2) and (3) of
Protocol 11, which provide for ""indispensable judicial guarantees" for a fair
trial. 148
There has as yet been no authoritative interpretation of the common
expression of the three treaties concerned, namely, "other obligations under
international law". The question arose in the Lawless case, where the
European Court observed, that although, neither the Commission nor, the Irish
Government, had referred to this provision in the proceedings, yet, it was the
function of the Court, which was to ensure, the observance by the parties, to
the Convention, (Article 19), required the Court to determine proprio motu,
whether this obligation had been fulfilled, in a particular case. No facts came
to the knowledge of the Court, to suggest that the measures taken, might have
conflicted with other obligations of the Irish Government, under international
law. 149
A moot question of some importance, may be mentioned in this context. If a
state commits a "crime against humanity", during a war or, an armed conflict,
or even during a peacetime emergency, obviously the state concerned would
be violating its obligations under Article 4 of the Covenant. In general
comment 14(23), relating to the right to life, (Article 6), the Human Rights
Committee has recently expressed its view that "the production, testing,
possession, deployment and the use of nuclear weapons should be prohibited
and recognized as crimes against humanity. ,,150 The victims of radiation, of the
testing of nuclear weapons, if any, it seems can lawfully claim a violation of
Articles 4 and 6 of the Covenant, if the facts so warrant.
(4.) THE PRINCIPLE OF NON-DISCRIMINATION:
The fourth condition, is that the measures of derogation taken, must not
involve any discrimination solely, on the ground of race, colour, sex, language,
religion or social origin. This prohibition is based on the fundamental principle
of equality and non-discrimination; a principle which is generally regarded as a
basic prerequisite for the protection of human rights. Almost all national
constitutions and important international human rights instruments, recognize
the principle as a basic one. 151
The principle of equality and non-discrimination, is generally enshrined in
Articles 2(1), 3 and 26 of the ICCPR and 2(2) of the International Covenant on
Economic, Social and Cultural Rights. This principle, is also enshrined in
Article 14 of the ECHR. The grounds of discrimination prohibited, are
substantially identical in the aforesaid intemational and regional instruments,
save and except, that Article 14 of the ECHR, also forbids any discrimination,
on the ground of "association with a national minority".
Although the ILA Committee, is mainly concerned with the non-derogable
aspect of the principle, as contained in Article 4(1) of the ICCPR, a brief
reference as to the status of the principle of equality and non-discrimination in
national and international jurisprudence, may be useful. Broadly speaking, the
principle has two dimensions, in the matter of the enjoyment of human rights
and fundamental freedoms.
First, there is a mandatory affirmative injunction upon every state to grant
equality before the law and equal protection of the law. Second, there is a
further prohibitory injunction to prevent discrimination on any of the ten
grounds expressly stated. For instance, in Articles 2(1) and 26 of the ICCPR,
these are race, colour, sex, language, religion, political or other opinion,
national or social origin, property, birth or other status. Both injunctions, are
correlated but are independent human rights. They represent two sides of the
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same coin, emanating from the fundamental principle that all human beings,
"are born free and equal in dignity and rights", (Article 1 of the Universal
Declaration).
It is considered that the principle of "equality before the law", embodies Dicey's
concept of the rule of law, of the British jurisprudence, while the concept of the
"equal protection of the laws", represents the American constitutional doctrine,
with its wider e~alitarian dimensions, including the prohibition of
discrimination.1 2 It is well established, both in national and international
jurisprudence, that the general principle of equality before the law and equal
protection of the law, which embraces the principle of non-discrimination, do
not prevent a legitimate selection, or classification based upon some
differentia, which distinguishes persons or things left out of the group,
provided that such differentia, have a reasonable nexus, to the public interest,
sought to be achieved. The principle in substance, means that there should be
no differential treatment among equals, but it permits affirmative action, to
promote the equality of treatment.
The travaux preparatoires relating to the relevant provisions in both the
Covenants of 1966, make it clear that the formulation of the principle,
contemplates the adoption of positive measures by way of affirmative action in
favour of weaker sections of the community or disadvantaged groups.
The current position of the status of the principle in international law, is
explained in the well-known decision of the European Commission and the
European Court, in the Belgium Linguistic case. The rationale of the decision,
has been summed up by the European Court as follows:
"On this question, the Court, following the principles which may be
extracted from the legal practice of a large number of democratic
states, holds that the principle of equality of treatment, is violated if the
distinction has no objective and reasonable justification. The existence
of such a justification, must be assessed in relation to the aim and
effects of the measure, under consideration, regard being had to the
principles which normally prevail in democratic societies. A difference of
treatment, in the exercise of a right, laid down in the Convention, must
not only, pursue a legitimate aim: Article 14 is likewise violated, when it
is clearly established, that there is no reasonable relationship of
proportionality, between the means employed, and the aim sought to be
realized. ,,153
We now revert to the non-derogable aspect of the right to equality and non-
discrimination, in a time of emergency, as stipulated in Article 4(1), of the
ICCPR. The first point to be noticed is that the measures of derogation
involving discrimination, are forbidden only on six grounds, (race, colour, sex,
language or social origin), and not on ten grounds as mentioned in Articles
2(1) and 26 of the ICCPR. The drafting history, makes it clear, that originally in
1950, the delegate from Lebanon, included a comprehensive non-derogable,
non-discrimination clause, (covering the grounds in Article 26 of the ICCPR),
but this proposal was not accepted, because some delegates felt the need for
discriminatory treatment of enemy aliens, in wartime. However, in 1952, the
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differences were reconciled by restricting the scope of the clause, (for
example, by excluding "national origin" and also by using the word "solely").154
The acceptance of the principle of non-discrimination, as a peremptory
standard, beyond the permissible limit of derogation, of the guaranteed rights
and freedoms, even in a time of serious crisis, threatening the life of a nation,
seems to be a recognition, that this important principle, has acquired the
status of jus cogens. The view has been expressed, with which the writer
agrees, "that the principles of equality and non-discrimination are now
established parts of international customary law, and it would be difficult to
deny them the character of jus cogens, at least, as regards consistent patterns
of comprehensive violations.,,155
In the context of an emergency situation, it is important to notice that the word,
"solely", appears only in Article 4, of the ICCPR, but otherwise the non-
derogable right to freedom from discrimination, is identical to Article 27 of the
ACHR. The use of the expression, "solely", seems to be important and
appears to imply, that the only derogations prohibited under Article 4(1), are
those where the grounds listed, are the sole and exclusive reasons for the
discrimination.
Measures of derogation, which are directly aimed at suppressing the mischief,
but indirectly or incidentally affect, say, a racial or religious or linguistic minority
group, would not be prohibited. 156
It has also been suggested that, within the scope of a derogation clause, the
measures strictly required by the situation, might involve action directed
against, or specially affecting, a particular racial or religious group, for
example, for the purpose of quelling a riot. Such a measure, it has been said,
would not discriminate "solely" on the ground of race or religion, since it might
be strictly required by the situation. Such, is the prevailing interpretation of the
doctrine.157
Article 14, of the ECHR, which provides for non-discrimination, though wide in
scope, is not a non-derogable safeguard, covered by Article 15, of the ECHR.
It has been suggested by Questiaux, that the doubt about the non-derogable
character, of the principle of non-discrimination, would hopefully be resolved
by case law, in a favourable sense, under the European Convention. 158 The
author regrets, that although such an occasion did arise, in the case of Ireland
v UK, the response of the organs under the European Convention, was far
from favourable.
.(5.) NON-DEROGABLE RIGHTS AND FREEDOMS:
(5.1) The Principle ofemergency-proofnon-derogable rights:
The fifth condition, circumscribing the power to take derogatory measures,
requires that the legal system of every state, shall provide that the rights
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recognized as non-derogable, in international law, must not come within the
scope of permissible measures of derogation. In other words, the fact that
such rights cannot be suspended, even in a time of public emergency, for the
asserted objective of saving the life of the nation, is a measure of the
primordial significance of the non-derogable rights.
(5.1.1) The status ofnon-derogable rights in the European
Convention on Human Rights and Fundamental Freedomsj the
Intemational Covenant on Civil and Political Rights and the
American Convention on Human Rights: progressive
development:
Twelve such rights, are recognized in one, or the other, of the three regional
or international treaties:
(a) Right to life: ICCPR, Article 6; ECHR, Article 2; ACHR, Article 4.
(b) Prohibition of torture: ICCPR, Article 7; ECHR, Article 3; ACHR,
ArticleS.
(c) Prohibition of slavery and servitude: ICCPR, Article 8; ECHR, Article
4; ACHR, Article 6.
(d) Prohibition of retroactive criminal laws: ICCPR, Article 1S; ECHR,
Article 7; ACHR, Article 9.
(e) Right to recognition of legal personality: ICCPR, Article 16; ACHR,
Article 3.
(f) Freedom of thought, conscience and religion: ICCPR, Article 18;
ACHR, Article 12.
(g) Prohibition of imprisonment for breach of contractual obligations:
ICCPR, Article 11.
(h) Rights of the family: ACHR, Article 17.
(i) Right to a name: ACHR, Article 18.
0) Rights of the child: ACHR, Article 19.
(k) Right to a nationality: ACHR, Article 20.
(I) Right to participate in government: ACHR, Article 23.
It will have been observed, that the list of non-derogable rights - or what Mrs
Daes has described as "emergency-proor rights - has progressively
S2
developed from one treaty to another. Thus, the catalogue of those rights
under the Covenant, is somewhat longer than the Euro~ean Convention; the
American Convention provides for an even longer list. 1 9
The view has been expressed, that while the reasons for prohibiting
derogation from the Articles, specified in paragraph 4(2), of the ICCPR, were
not expressed, presumably, some were deemed too important, to permit
derogation even in an emergency, for example, the right to life. With regard to
some other rights, it appeared inconceivable, that any derogation would be
strictly required, even in an emergency, for example, the ~rohibition of
imprisonment for failure to meet a contractual obligation.1 0 Of these two, the
first one, (the right to life), is too fundamental, to permit derogation and seems
to be more consistent, with the intent of the draftsmen of the Convention.
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(5.1.2) Theoretical underpinnings of the concept ofnon-
derogable rights:
The concept of non-derogable rights, even in a time of emergency, has its
foundation in various legal theories. First, there is a consensus among jurists,
that the first four fundamental rights, common to all three treaties, (right to life,
prohibition from torture, prohibition of slavery or servitude and prohibition of
retroactive criminal laws), are recognized, as the basic minimum rights, and
hence, their non-derogable character, should now be regarded, as reflecting
general principles of law, recognized by the international community. Put in a
different way, these rights are recognized as having the character of
peremptory norms of international law, within the meaning of Article 53, of the
Vienna Convention, on the law of Treaties.162 Such rights are binding,
irrespective of any conventional obligation.
Second, it was also noted, that in a time of war, and even in the case of armed
conflict not of international character, Article 3, which is common to the
Geneva Conventions, 1949, on the humanitarian law of war, prohibits, "at any
time and in any place whatsoever", the infringement of a basic set of
principles, that are deemed inalienable, such as the prohibition of torture. It
has been suggested, that the rights considered as inalienable under the
Geneva Conventions, should apply a fortiori in the event of purely internal
disorders; otherwise it would be paradoxical, if the guarantees in peacetime,
were weaker than the guarantees in wartime.163
A third theory, suggested by Questiaux, is that the list of rights of absolute
inalienability, should be extended by reference to the American Convention,
which instrument, confers the most liberal guarantees. 164
This writer, respectfully agrees with this view and it is her understanding, that
the same view, is reflected in the ILA's Paris Minimum Standards. 165
In view of the experience gathered, and lessons learned, from states of
emergency, which occurred between 1966 and 1982, with distressing
frequency, the ILA Committee is of the view, that it is not only possible, but
absolutely imperative, to devise, in addition, to the rights already recognized
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as non-derogable in international law, some additional minimum safeguards,
for the protection of the individual, against abusive exercise of emergency
power, in certain defined areas.
One can contend, that the built-in principle in Article 4, of the ICCPR, which
requires identification of "other obligations under international law", to be
respected by the ratifying states, even in a state of emergency, is not confined
to merely conventional obligations, arising out of existing customary
international law. The expression should also cover those emerging norms, for
the protection of international human rights, which form a core of essential
values recognized as such, by the community of nations.
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(6.) THE PARIS MINIMUN STANDARDS: THE ILA'S DYNAMIC
MOSAIC OF SIXTEEN NON-DEROGABLE RIGHTS:
The ILA Committee, has been guided by the rationale of the International
Court of Justice, in the Barcelona Traction case,167 read in the light of its
Advisory Opinion on the Reservations to the Genocide Convention. 168
The principles which emerge from this rationale, are that, from the various
internationally recognized human rights, there are some very important basic
rights. Those rights, can be identified by the fact, that breaches of such rights,
are universally condemned, while the need for their protection is universally
recognized. The need for such protection, is based on the most important
elementary principle of morality, and has a purely humanitarian and civilizing
purpose.
In view ofthe importance of those human rights, the principles and rules
concerning their protection, may be considered as principles recognized by the
community of nations, as binding upon, them even without any conventional
obligation. Since all states have a common interest in their protection, they are
obligations erga omnes, that is, binding on all states, and also having the
status of peremptory norms, (jus cogens), in contemporary international law.
Such obligations, are not a closed chapter, and confined to the protection from
the crime of genocide, slavery and racial discrimination. The obligations, in this
area, are of a dynamic and developing character. These considerations, are
some of the ones, which have been followed by the ILA Committee, in its
formulation of non-derogable rights in Section C of its Paris report. 169
SECTION C: THE SOUTH AFRICAN SCENARIO: THE
APARTHEID ERA:
It is both common and respectable, for modern states, even democratic ones,
to adopt permanent statutes, which empower the government of the day to
take swift and effective action in times of crisis or emergency. While the
situations with which such legislation deals, often include natural disasters,
(such as earthquakes), and serious economic depression, my present concern
is with those emergencies, that threaten the safety of the state or the
maintenance of peace and order. The extreme danger that insurrectionary
groups may pose to the stability and welfare of societies, is tragically
illustrated by the destruction of the Weimar Republic by the Nazi movement.
Such historical precedents, remind us of the importance of giving govemments
the means of protecting the institutions of state, and the people against
insurrection, riot, disorder and revolution.
There is also the danger, much more common in our times, that societies may
be ruined not by "grave occasions", which threaten peace or stability, but by
their manner of responding to them. This is particularly the case when the
government makes the emergency permanent, no doubt a contradiction in
terms, but one, which is regularly encountered in practice. Though
democracies, may well be undermined by riot or revolution, they are just as
susceptible to destruction by being converted into permanent dictatorships, on
the pretext of the need to cope with a continuing crisis or emergency. David
Bonner, in his recent work on emergency powers, draws attention to the
danger of crisis government, leading to the installation of an authoritarian
regime and shows that, while this is typical of the Latin American experience,
there are instances of it occurring in Europe as well. 170
For this very reason, an expert on emergency govemment has said that "it is
temporary and self-destructive" and that "when the crisis goes, it goes".171
When the citizens of a country are "made to live as if in a perpetual state of
emergency,,172, we can be sure that the government is caught up in a
legitimacy crisis, on account of such factors as the denial of political rights,
discrimination and repressive policies. A legitimacy crisis is not a true
emergency but rather a fundamental malaise requiring political responses from
those in power.
Emergency rule by definition, qualifies or removes the basic freedoms of an
open society; and when a government seeks to avoid thorough-going reform
by instituting crisis government, the destruction of democracy is assured. In
countries like South Africa, where the roots of democracy were shallow, and
its realisation, only partial, the regular use of crisis powers tumed political
development decisively in the direction of authoritarianism and thereby,
undermined the prospects of a democratic resolution conflict.
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The Black people of South Africa, for the most part, encountered the security
system as a brutal and repressive institution designed to frustrate the
attainment of their legitimate social and political aspirations. The ruling Whites
perceived same system to be their country's salvation from evil forces bent
upon the destruction and take-over of the society. These immediate
perceptions, were being overshadowed, slowly, but steadily, by the realisation
that the "law and order" machine had generated, and was setting at large,
forces that could engulf and destroy the personal security and aspirations of
the members of all groups, within the society, whether Black or White, ruling
or dominated, majority or minority. The security system, in brief, had been
transformed into an institution destined to serve the interests of none of the
social segments of our society, and probably to undermine them all.
As a first task, this Section, therefore, seeks to explain the institution of
"government under law", that had been so disastrously destroyed in South
Africa. The story that unfolds, is of the displacement of constitutionalism by
ministerial fiat, as the principal mode of government in South Africa.
(1.) THE PUBLIC SAFETY ACT OF 1953:173
This law, which applied throughout the Republic and South West
Africa,174empowered the State President, to declare, by proclamation, in the
Gazette, that a state of emergency existed within the Republic or South West
Africa, (Namibia), or within any area thereof. 175 He may have issued such a
proclamation, if in his opinion, there was, on account of action or threatened
action, within the Republic of South Africa, (or Namibia), a serious threat to the
safety of the public or the maintenance of public order
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which could not be
brought under control, by the ordinary law of the land. 76
The power to declare a state of emergency, and to withdraw a proclamation
establishing it, was entirely within the discretion of the State President, and
was not subject to legal challenge in the absence of proof of bad faith.1n It is a
mind-boggling thought, that the courts were therefore precluded from
questioning the State President's belief that "ordinary law", (including extreme
measures for banning, indefinite detention and the like), were "inadequate" to
contain the unrest that led to the 1985 and 1986 declarations of an
emergency. An emer~ency could be made retroactive for up to four days prior
to the proclamation17 but this did not nullify the"nullum crimen sine lege"
maxim and an activity, which was not a crime on account of the retroactive
operation of the emergency.179 The proclamation of a state of emergency,
could not remain in force for longer than twelve months, but it may be followed
by another or other proclamations of emergency.180
The State President was authorised to proclaim regulations for any area in
which a state of emergency had been declared, and for as long as the
existence of the emergency remained in force. 181 The enabling provision
declared, that he may make such regulations as appear to him to be
necessary or expedient for maintaining public safety or public order, and
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terminating the emergency or dealing with circumstances pertaining to the
emergency. 182
Except for certain express limitations on this power, prescribed in the Act, 183
the State President's power to promulgate emergency regulations, was
expressed in the broadest terms, though it arguably goes too far to say, as the
court did in Rv Maphumulo184, that his authority was equal, to the legislative
power of Parliament.
This statement, has since been repudiated, by the Transvaal Court, in
Momoniat & Naidoo v Minister of Law and Order185, Goldstone J, pointed out,
that it was clear that, although legislation passed by Parliament, otherwise
than bona fide, was not susceptible to a declaration of invalidity, this did not
apply to subordinate legislation, even if made by the State President, under
the ample powers conferred by the Act. In two judgements186 of the Natal
Court, certain provisions of the emergency regulations, relating to the making
of subversive statements, and the seizure of newspapers, were struck down
as invalid, thereby laying to rest, the notion that the State President was on
par with Parliament, when he legislated under the powers conferred upon him,
by the Public Safety Act.
On what grounds may the validity of regulations made by the State President,
be impugned before the courts? In Momoniat &Naidoo, bad faith was
postulated, as a basis for a declaration of invalidity, but since the notion of
legislating in bad faith, (as opposed to giving a decision in bad faith), was an
awkward one, the Court adopted, as an alternative to mala fides, the
proposition that subordinate legislation was invalid, if the legislature could,
"never have contemplated, that such a measure, be countenanced".187
The test for determining what the legislature could not have contemplated was
unrelated, the Court said, to the subjective state of mind of the authority in
question, but was an objective one, to be determined according to the facts.
This approach was in reality, the test of unreasonableness, but, in view of the
wide powers to legislate, conferred upon the State President, it had to be
unreasonableness in so gross a form that it was beyond the intended powers
of the subordinate legislator.
In the first two Natal cases, referred to above, Metal &Allied Workers Union v
State President of the Republic of South Africa, Didcott J, acted on the basis
that, subordinate legislation which was vague and uncertain, (aspects of the
definition of subversive statements), or which goes beyond the objectives, for
which the State President may legislate, (the ban on seeing a legal adviser
without permission), was void and unenforceable. In either case, the ground of
invalidity was the ultra vires doctrine in terms of which, subordinate legislation
is invalid, if it was too unclear to be understood or if it strayed beyond the
objectives specified in the enabling legislation. If a regulation was ultra vires, it
was not saved even by the ouster c1ause,188 introduced in 1986, and designed
to prevent legal challenges to regulations issued by the State President or the
Minister of Law and Order.
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Subordinate legislation, could be made subject to a further limitation, in the
form of a presumption that Parliament was deemed, in the absence of a
contrary indication, to have preserved established constitutional principles and
the fundamental values of the common law. The effect of this limitation, would
be create a kind of implied bill of rights,189 enforceable against subordinate
law-making authority; but the Court in Momoniat &Naidoo, was not prepared
to go that far, since it held, that the State President could deprive detainees of
a prior right to a hearing, (audi alteram parlern), even though, the legislation
did not expressly authorise the withdrawal of this basic right
The Court did express the view, that had the State President abolished the
right to a hearing after a confirmation of a detention order, the regulation so
providing, would be ultra vires, as a grossly unreasonable exercise of power
that Parliament could not have contemplated. 190 It is arguable, however, that
the right to a hearing priorto being detained, is fundamental to our legal and
constitutional tradition, that it should have given way only, in the face of a clear
and irresistible statutory intention to abolish it. The following passage from H
W. R Wade's book on administrative law, is pertinent in this context:
"One of the law's notable achievements, has been the development of
the principles of natural justice, one of which is the right to be given a
fair hearing before being penalised in any way. These principles are
similarly based upon implied statutory conditions: it is assumed that
Parliament, when conferring power, intends that power, to be used
fairly and with due consideration of rights and interests adversely
affected. In effect, Parliament legislates against a background of judge-
made rules of interpretation, which place the necessary restrictions on
governmental powers, so as to ensure that they are exercised not
arbitrarily, but fairly and properly.,,191 (Emphasis added).
This passage shows that the courts could go further than the judges in
Momoniat &Naidoo, subject only to the condition that to afford a hearing,
would not frustrate the exercise of the admitted power to detain persons
without trial. It seems clear that recognition of the right of a detainee to make
written representations, (as distinct from an oral hearing), while involving the
authorities in more work and inconvenience, would not have caused a
breakdown in the administration of the institution of preventive detention. In
Omarv The Minister of Law and Order192, Friedman J, brusquely, (and
correctly, it is submitted), dismissed the inconvenience argument, by saying
that if fourteen days was too short to consider representations from detainees,
the State President should provide for a longer period.
Didcott J, in the Metal &Allied WorKers Union case, came close to basing the
.Court's decision on the invalidity of the regulation excluding the right to see a
lawyer without permission, on the fundamental nature of that right in our legal
system. Unfortunately, the finding was not explicit, on the acceptance of the
notion of an implied bill, and the regulation dealing with access to lawyers
foundered on the rock of overbreadth.
The possible grounds of a declaration of invalidity reviewed, above all,
appeared to be expressions of the ultra vires principle. A subordinate law-
giver, such as the State President, may have been said to act ultra vires,
when he made regulations which were vague or meaningless, grossly
unreasonably, contrary to the fundamental principles of the legal system or
executed in bad faith. There was persuasive authority for the view, that all the
traditional grounds of review, were to be subsumed under ultra vires;193 and
an important practical consequence of so doing, was that the ouster clause,
contained in the Public Safety Ace94, would not protect anything, that was to
found to be beyond the powers, conferred upon the State President.
If a declaration of emergency, is made retroactive, emergency regulations may
likewise, be made retroactive, to the date from which the emergency has been
declared to eXist;195 and although regulations are normally applicable only in
declared emergency areas, the State President could specifically declare, that
they were to be applicable outside such areas, if he deemed this necessary,
for dealing with the state of emergency. 196 Without prejudice to the generality
of the power, to make regulations, conferred on the State President, the Act
specificall~declared, that he may delegate authority to make orders, rules and
by-laws,19 provide for the imposition of penalties for breach of regulations, or
directions issued thereunder,198 and make different regulations for different
areas, or classes of persons. 199
In regard to delegation, the courts, had held that the power to delegate, may
not be sub-delegated except, to specified persons and the regulation
authorising the Commissioner of Police, to delegate the authori~ to make
orders to any person authorised by him, was declared invalid.2o The State
President, immediately thereafter, overcame these judgements of the courts,
by the retroactive promulgation of an amended regulation, which provided for
delegation to commissioned officers of the security forces.201 It was possible
that the specification of delegates in the amending regulation, was still not
specific enough.
Regulations, may further, make provision for the summary arrest and
detention of persons,202 and for such persons to be held anywhere in the
Republic, whether within or without an emergency area.203
The extreme power of the State President, to qualify or nullify the basic rights
of citizens, under the emergency rule, shines through the regulations
promulgated in aJJ three emergencies declared, since the enactment of the
Public Safety Act in 1953. The 1960 emergency regulations, have been
extensively surveyed in the literature,204 and will not be discussed here.
The reiulations promulgated under the emergency, declared on 21 July
1985,
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provided for detention without trial and access, conferred legal
immunity on officials, (including the police and defence forces), for bona fide
actions taken during the emergency, authorised extended powers of search
and seizure, made provision for censorship over emergency reports, created a
broad crime of threatening to inflict harm, hurt or loss upon any person and
authorised the use of force as an officer, "deemed necessary", to remove or
otherwise act against persons, who had failed to respond to an order to
proceed, to any place, or to desist from specified conduct.
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Rules made in terms of delegated authority, granted by the regulations,
provided inter alia, for the treatment of detainees, curfews in prescribed areas,
control of movement into areas and the prevention of educational boycotts.
When the third emergency was declared on 12 June 1986, the regulations
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promulgated by the State President, sought to vest the state and its agents
with totally lawless power. The 1985 emergency regulations, were
substantially re-enacted, but they were beefed up, by a mind-blowing criminal
prohibition on the making of "subversive statements", by a prohibition on the
making, without permission of visual or sound reproductions of unrest
activities, or security force actions to contain them, and by conferring, on the
Minister of Law and Order, the arbitrary power to seize publications, and to
abolish the right to publish.
The main purpose of the Public Safety Amendment Act of 1986, was to
introduce a lino hassle" emergency power. As the memorandum
accompanying the preceding bill frankly admitted, the declaration of a state of
emergency by the State President "has far-reaching consequences for the
Republic". The amending Act, aimed to eliminate, or to mitigate, the impact of
those consequences, which had hitherto constituted the most effective
restraint on the use of emergency powers, by authorising the Minister of Law
and Order, (who replaced the Minister of Justice, as the responsible Minister
under the Act), to declare areas to be unrest areas, and to apply, in those
areas, such regulations as he deemed necessary, to control the situation?07
The declaration was effective for three months, (unless withdrawn at any prior
time by the Minister), but may be renewed with the consent of the State
President.
The Minister was granted a power to make regulations for unrest areas, which
was broadly equivalent to the State President's legislative authority under the
Act. Both the declaration, of an area as an unrest area, and the framing of
regulations for such an area, were stated to be within the subjective discretion
of the Minister, the exercise of his powers, being made dependent, in the first
instance, on his opinion, and in the second, on what appeared to him, to be
necessary or expedient. In an attempt to limit further the jurisdiction of the
courts, over emergencies, a provision of the Act declared that the courts were
to have no jurisdiction over declarations of emergencies or states of unrest, or
over regulations made pursuant to them.
It appears to have been the objective of the 1986 amendments, to make the
State President an absolute despot, in respect of national emergencies and
the Minister of Law and Order, lower-ranking, but an equally absolute despot,
over micro-emergencies. Although the courts, as shown earlier, had never
demonstrated any eagerness, to question the proclamation of the emergency
itself, and were equally unlikely to pronounce on the decision to proclaim an
unrest area, the ouster clause, did not appear to take the matter any further,
and the courts continued under the macro-emergencies, to test regulations for
compliance, with the ultra vires doctrine, either in its pure form, or in the form
of its prohibition on vague or grossly unreasonable, subordinate legislation.
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As the Eastern Cape Court said in United Democratic Front v The State
President,208 its jurisdiction to decide whether a regulation had been lawfully
made in terms of the Act, was not extinguished by the ouster clause. Of
course, the extent of the court involvement, depended on judicial attitudes,
and the outcome of the conflict, between an emphasis on power, as
represented by the Natal full bench, in Kerchoff v Minister of Law and
Order,209 and an emphasis on the limitation of power, as expressed by the full
bench in Tsenoli v State President of the Republic of South Africa,21 0 was
crucial to the future role of the courts, in emergency government, whether of
the macro or micro type.
(2.)THE BANNING OF MEETINGS:
The most extensive controls in South Africa over meetings, processions and
assemblies, were in the Internal Security Act of 1982, which authorised both
the Minister and a magistrate to impose bans. In the case of ministerial bans,
the Act drove the proverbial coach and horses, through the rule of law. The
grounds on which the Minister could act, were nebulously stated-he must
deem it necessary or expedient to act in the interests of state security, the
maintenance of public peace or order, or the prevention of inter-group hostility.
The wording of the Act seemed designed to ensure, that the courts had no
power, to review the grounds upon which a ban was imposed,211 and the
procedure by which the order was made, was simply one of ministerial fiat.
Not a single principle or procedure, of the rule of law, was left intact by this
provision for ministerial banning. This was all the more alarming, because
there was no limit on the scope of the Minister's power, and he was virtually
authorised to abolish the right of assembly on public and private premises in
South Africa. Since the Minister's power, was specifically declared to rest
upon his opinion, his decision to act, was-for practical purposes,
unchallengeable. A.. person who was served with a notice prohibiting him from
attending public gatherings, was thereupon effectively silenced, since no
person could, except with the consent of the Minister, or for purposes of
proceedin~s'ina court of law, reproduce or make known, anything he had said
or written. 12
The provi~i6ns of the regulations concerning meetin~s and gatherings
empowered a magistrate or commissioned officer,21 to prohibit either
generally, or specifically, gatherings or processions, of more than a number of
persons specified, by the magistrate or officer, in any area.214
A "public gathering" was defined in the Act as, "any gathering, concourse or
procession in, through or along any public place, of twelve or more persons
having a common purpose, whether such purpose be lawful or unlawful".215
Public place was defined as, "any street, road, passage, square, park or
recreation ground, or any open space", to which all members of the public
habitually or by right, have access."216
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From the wording of the provision, it is plain that Parliament conferred upon
the Minister, an absolute administrative discretion, to impose a prohibition on
meetings. If the Riotous Assemblies Act and the Suppression of Communist
Act are read together, it becomes plain that the Minister was unrestricted in his
power to control meetings of all kinds. He had exercised this power on several
occasions, for example, to ban, for several years, gatherings on the Grand
, Parade in Cape Town and on the City Hall steps in Johannesburg.
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power, could have been exercised, at any time without a prior declaration of
an emergency.
Certain categories of gatherings or processions, were excluded from that
power, for example, those connected with religion, instruction im~arted under
any law, funerals, statutory bodies, entertainment and weddings. 18 It was
offence to be present, or take part in a prohibited gathering, unless the
accused was not voluntarily present, or did not know, (or could not reasonably
have known), that the gathering was prohibited.219
The magistrate or commissioned officer, if of the opinion, that the presence or
conduct of any person or persons was dangerous, may order such person, (or
persons), to proceed to some other place, or to desist from that conduct.220 If
the order was not obeyed forthwith, force may be used to implement the order,
even if death resulted therefrom.221 It was clearly possible, for the officers
concerned, to disperse meetings or processions under that power. The
condition upon which the exercise of the power depended, was the officer's
opinion that the danger existed, not the objective state of affairs.
It is clear that, at the magisterial level, the banning power was more
circumscribed. The magistrate could only act, if he had reason to apprehend,
that the public, would be endangered by the meeting or assembly, in question.
In this instance, the basis for the prohibition was specified with reasonable
clarity. However, while some courts had been prepared to review the
magistrate's reasons for acting, others had decided that a bona fide decision
by the magistrate, made without ulterior purpose, was not subject to challenge
in the courts.
If this second approach was adopted by the Appellate Division, rule-ot-Iaw
controls would in practice tall away, even in respect at magisterial bans. While
magistrates could ban, only in their own districts, this absence of external
control was disturbing, in view of the frequency of such bans, in all the
metropolitan areas of the Republic. Unfortunately, magistrates did not enjoy an
independent status and were civil servants, subject to instructions from the
Government.
(3.) THE DETENTION OF PERSONS AND THE BANNING OF
INDIVIDUALS:
Under all three emergencies, the security forces had been given the power to
detain without trial. During each emergency, the authorities employed this
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power to detain on a mass scale. Over eleven thousand persons were
detained during the emergency in 1960,222 eight thousand during the 1985
emergencj23 and a number believed to be in the region of eight thousand for
224
the first two months of the 1986 emergency.
Massive detentions, were facilitated by the arbitrary nature of the detention
power. Regulation 3,225 provided for an initial detention of fourteen days, at the
instance of any member of the police or defence forces and thereafter, by
written notice, signed by the Minister of Law and Order, for a further detention,
for as long as he determined. Following a decision by the courts, that the
corresponding Regulation, of the 1985 emergency, required the Minister to
afford the detainee, a hearing before extending the detention,226 this
"obstacle", was swiftly removed by retrospective amendment, and the 1986
Regulation, also put the matter beyond doubt, by declaring that the Minister,
may extend the detention, without giving notice to the detainee, and without
affording a hearing.
According to Momoniat &Naidoo v Minister of Law and Ordefl27, the detainee
was entitled to be heard, afterthe extension of his detention, and any
regulation purporting to deny, or frustrate the exercise of that right, was
invalid. The Court, in Cameron Bill v Minister of Law and Order, an unreported
judgement, followed that ruling, and amplified it, by declaring that the detainee,
for the purposes of making written representations to the Minister, was entitled
to consult a lawyer, to demand an outline, of the reasons for his detention and
to adequate time, to prepare his submissions.
To the extent that the Regulation empowered the authorities, to refuse access
to a lawyer, for the purposes of preparing written representations, was ultra
vires the authority of the State President, and therefore invalid.228 The
recognition, of the right to make submissions, after the Minister had decided to
extend a detention, was no doubt, better than having no right at all; but as
suggested earlier, there were persuasive arguments for the proposition, that
the State President did not have the power, to abolish the prior right to a
hearing, and this proposition, should have prevailed before the Appellate
Division.
The language of the Regulation, conferring the power to arrest and detain, and
authorising the Minister to extend a detention, was subjectively phrased and
that meant, according to the dogma at the time, that the courts did not
generally investigate, the merits of the decision to arrest and detain or, to
extend detention. Discretion that may have been exercised subjectively, could
not be challenged on the basis that it was unsupported by relevant facts; it
could only be challenged on the ground, that it was influenced by bad faith,
improper motives or legally irrelevant considerations.
In Krish Naidoo v Minister of Law and Order, an unreported judgement,
Jennett J, upheld a detention order, which he conceded, was based on facts
that were open to doubt, because, "it has been established that Petzer, (the
police officer), held the requisite opinion, whether rightly or wrongly". A
detainee, who sought to have a detention order, set aside by the courts, on
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the ground that there was no justification for it, therefore, had the formidable
task, and perhaps hopeless mission, especially where the detaining authority,
provided plausible reasons for linking the detainee with unrest or disorder, and
had not disclosed an improper motive, or purpose in effecting the arrest or
detention.
Where detainees had managed to secure their release by court order, the
arresting official, had generally acted, so as proclaim a reliance on improper or
irrelevant considerations. This was true, of the arrest and detention of a nun,
after she had objected to a police assault, upon a young man in a Black
township, and of the detention of a journalist, whose professional occupation,
appeared to be the sole reason, for the decision to take him into custody.229
The regime, provided for detainees, by Regulation 3, read with the rules for
the treatment of detainees, promulgated by the Minister of Justice,23o was one
of exceptional severity. The detention was incommunicado, and visits could
only take place with official permission?31 There was a specific right to
interrogate detainees,232 and this probably explains why there had been so
many allegations of ill-treatment and torture, since the promulgation of the
1985 and 1986 emergencies.
Where assault, torture or other forms of maltreatment were alleged, the court
could grant a restraining order, on the authorities, and did grant a provisional
order, against the security forces in the Eastern Cape, in October 1985,
following the startling revelations, made by a young district surgeon, Dr Wendy
Orr, who placed her observations, on the condition of detainees examined by
her, before the court, on affidavit. Dr Orr, was shortly thereafter, prevented
from seeing detainees and similar applications to court, could founder,
because there were few Wendy Orrs, in strategic positions in the Government
service.
Several such applications succeeded, however, before the Natal Court. The
rules governing detention, also provided, for strict control over
communications, with outside persons by letter,233 and made detainees guilty
of an offence if inter alia, they sang, whistled, or made unnecessary nOise,
caused discontent or agitation among fellow detainees, or were insolent or
disrespectful towards prison employees, official visitors or the police.234 These
prohibitions, made it surprising, that the fact of the detainee's existence, had
not been declared criminal and punishable.
Finally, it was an offence to disclose the names or identities of detained
persons, without the consent of the Minister or a person authorised by him.235
If the authorities so decided, detentions could be kept secret, until the names
of detainees were tabled in Parliament, in terms of the Act.236 The prohibition
on disclosing the identities of detainees, introduced into South Africa, the
phenomenon of "Ios desaparecidos", surely one of the marks of a police state.
The way was then paved, for the permanent destruction of personal freedom.
The process for banning individuals, violated the legality principle, in the same
way, as the detention regulations, and ministerial proscriptions of
organisations. In brief, the criteria for banning an individual, were broad and
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unspecific, (activities which endangered the security of the state, or the
maintenance of law and order), the possibility of court intervention, was
negligible, (because of the judicial attitude, to subjective discretion clauses),
and the procedure for reviewing banning orders, was ineffective, because the
Chief Justice, to whom the matter was referred, when a review board
disagreed with the Minister's decision, had strictly circumscribed power to
interfere.
The case of Nkondo & Gumede v Minister of Law and Orde?37, had
introduced an important due process element into the banning procedure
since, in terms of that decision, meaningful reasons had to be given for
banning an individual. Past banning orders, which were not accompanied by a
proper statement of reasons, appeared to be invalid. Nevertheless, the due
process violations remained disturbing, despite the improvement just
mentioned, and the possibility of a court reviewing the grounds for a banning
order, was remote.
(4.)EMERGENCY CRIMES:
The emergency regulations created many offences, of which only a few, will
be analysed in this section. It was offence to print, distribute or convey, to any
other person, any subversive statement, whether such statement was verbal
or written?38 A subversive statement, was defined as one, which was
calculated, or was likely to have the effect, of subverting the authority of the
Government, of .inciting any person, (or persons), to resist or oppose the
Government, a Minister, or any official, in connection, with measures
concerned with the emergency, public safety, or the application of the law, of
creating hostility between different sections of the Republic, or of creating
panic, alarm or fear among the public, or a section of the public.239
Though it was a defence, to show that the statement was, "a true and
complete narrative", the prohibition on subversive statements, clearly made
punishable, almost any critical comment, on the Government, during the
emergency. It was enough, that the statement was likely to have the effect of
causing any other person, to oppose an official of the Govemment.
A person who verbally, or in writing, and directly or indirectly, threatened to
inflict harm, hurt or loss, upon any other person or his property, was guilty of
an offence.24o The regulation, did not prescribe the requirement, that the threat
had to be wrongful, or that it had to relate to the emergency, or to public safety
or, order. As it stood, almost any threat to any other person, even if lawfully
made, was a criminal offence.24
The Court could have imported the requirement of wrongfulness, but even
then, the range of prohibitions was incredibly wide. However, if the element of
wrongfulness was intended, it would have been expressly prescribed. It seems
likely therefore, that the prohibition, was as broad, as it appeared on its face.
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A person who did any act, (including the uttering of words or sounds), which
was calculated, or likely to have the effect of preventing, interfering with, or
disturbing any lawful gathering or procession, was guilty of an offence.242 Any
person, who, by words or conduct, indicated approval of such an act, was also
guilty of an offence. These prohibitions, were wide enough to cover, hecklers
at a meeting, to cite only one possible example. A person who contravened
these provisions, and who could not prove, that he was not acting in
prosecution, of a common purpose at the time, was found guilty of any offence
with which he was charged, arising out of any act, done at a lawful ~athering
or procession, whereby physical injury was inflicted on any person. ~3
The purpose of this provision, was apparently to make a person who, in
concert with others, disturbed or interfered with a meeting, criminally
responsible for any injury caused at the meeting, even if no such charge could
be sustained at common law. Thus, if two persons decided to heckle a
speaker, and in an ensuing scuffle, someone was seriously injured, they may
be charged with attempted murder, (or assault with intent), and if so charged,
was found guilty even if, they were not responsible for the injury.244 The
provision carried the versari principle to incredible len~ths.
The section of the Regulations dealing with offences, 4J5 created a battery of
crimes which will not be analysed here. It is sufficient to state, that one or
more of these offences, were excessively broad, for example the provision
which made it criminal, to threaten, that a person who took up, or failed to take
up a certain attitude, would suffer disadvantage or inconvenience.246
(5.) THE SUPPRESSION OF PUBLICATIONS AND
ORGANIZATIONS:
A great number of the security-law provisions, that have featured in the
discussion so far, affected freedom of expression and information. Some of
those provisions, such as banning and detention, tended to restrict the right of
expression directly. Even to the extent that it remained possible, for a person
in detention or under a banning order, to continue to write or speak freely, the
exercise of that right was inhibited or "chilled" by the imposition of a detention
or banning order.
If, as frequently happens, the victim of a detention or banning order was a
journalist, the consequences for free speech were much more serious. There
were other provisions of the security laws, which had a direct effect on speech
and information. Examples were, the banning of publications and the silencing
clause that came into operation when an individual's name was entered on the
consolidated list. In addition, many of the security crimes, directly curtailed the
freedom of speech. The multifarious restrictions on speech and information,
both direct and indirect, that flowed from the security provisions, did not come
near to exhausting the restraints on these rights, imposed by the security
system.
The notion of a free press in South Africa, had strong mythical elements about
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it. The power to ban newspapers existed and had been widely exercised.
Newspapers, like everyone else, had to avoid contravention of the excessively
wide security crimes, or the publication of speeches and writings by listed
persons, to cite but two examples, of restraints on the press. In addition to all
the other restrictions, there was a security-law restraint on the registration of
newspapers, which was not widely known and understood within the country,
let alone by persons abroad.
This restraint, embodied in a provision of the Internal Security Act of 1982,247
enabled the Minister of Law and Order, to make the registration of a
newspaper conditional upon the deposit, with the Minister of Home Affairs, of
an amount of up to R40 aaa, as a kind of guarantee, of good behaviour. If the
newspaper, was thereafter banned, under the Act,248 the deposited amount
would be forfeited, unless the Minister of Law and Order directed otherwise.
It was illegal to print or publish a newspaper in South Africa, unless that
newspaper had been registered.249 The requirement of registration applied to
all newspapers, published at intervals of not exceeding one month, which
consisted substantially of political or other news, or of articles related thereto,
or to other topics, prevalent at the time.25o
Until the security-law intrusion, into the registration process, freedom to
establish newspapers, was guaranteed by an obligation imposed on the
Minister, to register a newspaper, if the applicant complied with the prescribed
formalities, and did not choose, for the newspaper being registered under a
name that was the same as an existing one, or so similar, as to be calculated
to deceive.251 Registration was, therefore mandatory, and the freedom to
publish was guaranteed by the Act.
Security legislation had limited this freedom drastically.252 The Internal Security
Act, of 1982, declared that no newspaper, shall be registered, unless twenty-
one days had elapsed, since the submission of the application for registration,
and unless the proprietor of the newspaper, deposited with the Minister of
Home Affairs, a deposit of not exceeding R40 000, which the Minister of Law
and Order, could require from the proprietor, within the prescribed period of
twenty-one days.253 The latter Minister, could insist on such a deposit,
"whenever he is not satisfied" that a ban on the news~aper, "will not at any
time become necessary" under the banning provision 54 of the Act.255 In less
circuitous language, the Minister could demand a deposit, if he believed that it
might be necessary to ban the newspaper at some future date. If the Minister
did not ban the newspaper, the deposited amount, (together with any interest
not paid to the proprietor),256 was forfeited to the State, unless the Minister
decided that a portion of the money should be refunded.257
Newspapers arready in existence, when the deposit requirement was
introduced, could not be subjected to that Damoclean form of press contrOl,
unless their registration lapsed. The Internal Security Act, of 1982,258 declared
that, unless the Minister of Home Affairs, with the concurrence of the Minister
of Law and Order, decided otherwise, the registration of a newspaper lapsed,
if printing or publishing, was not commenced within one month of registration,
or was suspended, at any time for a period exceeding a month,259 or if the
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newspaper changed hands. If any of those events occurred, the right of the
newspaper to continue publishing, could be made subject to a deposit of up to
R40000.
If the range of persons affected by the crime is stunning, the scope of the
definition of a subversive statement can only be described as stupefying. The
State President, was authorized by the Public Safety Act, to prohibit, by notice
in the Gazette, and in a newspaper circulating in the area concerned, the
publication of any "documentary information", which in his opinion, was
calculated to engender feelings of hostility, between the European inhabitants
of the Republic, and any other section of the public.
26o
"Documentary
information" meant any "book, foreign magazine, pamphlet, manifesto, foreign
newspaper, hand-bill or poster, or any article or advertisement, cartoon,
picture or drawing in any periodical or newspaper" ?61
Severe penalties, in the form of a fine not exceeding R20 000, or
imprisonment not exceeding ten years, (without the option of a fine, if so
decided by the court), were provided for persons convicted of committing the
offence just described?62 It is no exaggeration to say, that press freedom, in
relation to the security situation, had been brought to an abrupt end by these
measures, in that, they had made it impossible, for the media to present
independent information and comment about unrest and disorder in the
country, and about the activities of the security forces.
Local newspapers and magazines, were exempt from a total ban, but the
State President was empowered to ban articles, "advertisements and
cartoons", and pictures or drawings appearing in them. Unlike the "racial
hostility" clause of the Bantu Administration Act, there was no requirement that
the writer must have intended to engender racial hostility. It was sufficient to
show, that the likely effect of the publication was to create feelings of hostility
between the groups mentioned. The Court held in Du Plessis v Minister of
Justice263, that the purpose of the provision was to prevent the creation of race
hatred between the European section of the population, and any of the
sections of the non-European population.
When the State President had prohibited a publication, the Minister was
required to send to the editor, or to any other person responsible for the issue
of the publication, a copy of the notice of prohibition.264 Any person affected by
the prohibition could, within fourteen days after the first publication of the
notice, apply to the Supreme Court for an order setting the prohibition aside.265
The applicant for such an order, was required to show that the "documentary
information" was not of such a nature, that feelings of hostility would be
engendered by its publication. In Du Plessis v Minister of Justice,266 the Court
set aside a prohibition, because it was satisfied that the publication in
question, was an attack upon the Government and its policies, not upon any
particular section of the inhabitants. This judgement illustrated the value of the
judicial control which had been retained for prohibitions on publications under
the Act, but dropped in respect of bans on publications, under the Suppression
of Communism Act.267
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The power to ban under the latter Act, was wider because it could be
exercised in respect of any publication and because there was no judicial
control. The fact that there was unrestricted power to ban under the
Suppression of Communism Act, considerably diminished the significance of
judicial control over prohibitions under the Riotous Assemblies Act.
Moreover, the Minister was granted the further power, without giving notice or
affording a hearing, to ban publications, including future editions of periodical
publications, such as newspapers, if of the opinion that the publication in
question contained any matter of a subversive nature.
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After an order of this
kind had been issued, it was an offence to make, write, import, print, publish,
distribute or possess the publication, or to be in any way involved in such
activities. In addition, the Minister, (or a commissioned officer), could order the
seizure, forfeiture and disposal of publications affected by the banning order.
In a nutshell, the Minister was granted the power, (to be exercised according
to his subjective discretion), to shut down newspapers and, indeed, the entire
press in the Republic.
The Section of the Act, dealing with publications, also authorized the Minister
of Justice, to prohibit a person, by notice sent to him, from being within an
area specified in the notice, and for a period specified therein, if the Minister
was satisfied, that the person concerned, was promoting feelings of hostility,
between the European inhabitants of the Republic, and any other section of
the inhabitants.269 The wording of the provision, showed that judicial control
was excluded, since the Minister was authorized to act, if he had formed the
requisite opinion.
It was, in fact, the corresponding provision of the old Act,270 which led to the
Appellate Division to declare in Sachs v Minister ofJustice, 271 that,
"Parliament may make any encroachment it chooses upon the life, liberty or
property of an individual subject to its sway". Since the Act declared,272 that a
person affected by a prohibition, could ask for reasons after the notice had
been served on him, the audi alteram partem rule was excluded by
implication.273 The Minister, could also exercise the power to exclude persons,
from specified areas under the Suppression of Communism Act,274 in terms of
which, he was also not accountable to any other person or body.
A person debarred from specified areas under the Act, committed an offence if
he failed to comply with the Minister's notice, and could be removed from the
prohibited area by the police.275 The Minister could authorize the payment of
expenses
i
and a subsistence allowance to a person whom he debarred from
any area. 76 This discretionary power, to the Minister, to provide financial
assistance to persons debarred from entering areas, was an indication of the
possible drastic consequences of an order. It is clear that these prohibitions,
were the stuff of the siege society and the police state.
Apart from having the power to suppress publications, the Minister of Justice
was also empowered, to investigate any organization which he suspected "is
in any way connected with any matter relating to the state of the emergency"
by requiring the examination of any person by a magistrate.277 He may further,
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by notice in the Gazette, direct any association, corporate or unincorporated,
to discontinue its activities.278 Failure to comply was an offence.
279
Any person
who thereafter, promoted or took part in the affairs of the association, was
guilty of an offence.
The Minister also had wide powers, under the Regulations, to ban publications
or to prohibit any person or association of persons, from publishing material
deemed by him, to be subversive.28o The Regulations were so worded, that
the exercise of the Minister's powers against an organization or publication,
was not subject to judicial control. For practical purposes, his discretion was
absolute.
(6.) THE POWERS CONFERRED UPON THE POLICE:
The police were given extensive powers of search and seizure, by the
Regulations.281 The Regulations provided for a power to enter premises, to
search such premises or any person, and to seize property therein.282 This
power, could be exercised without a warrant, at any time and the officer
effecting entry, was given the very broad power to take such steps as he
deemed necessary for the maintenance of order, the safety of the public or the
termination of the emergency. The subjective power to determine the steps to
be taken, was of questionable validity.
The right to use force, including lethal force, was freed from virtually all
controls, or restraints, by a provision of the emergency Regulations,283 which
authorized a commissioned, warrant or non-commissioned officer, who had
formed the opinion, that the presence or conduct of any person or persons, at
any place, may endanger the safety of the public, or the maintenance of public
order, to order the person, (or persons), in question, in a loud voice, in both
official languages, to move elsewhere, or to desist from the conduct in
question and, if the order was not obeyed forthwith, to use such force, as he,
under the circumstances, may deem necessary, to prevent the suspected
danger.
The most disturbing feature of this clause, was the subjective nature of the
discretion conferred, on what could have been a low-ranking member of the
police or defence force. The right to order other persons to leave or to desist
from specified conduct, was conditional upon the opinion that they may
constitute a danger, not upon their actual conduct and its context. Once that
order had been given and disobeyed, the extent of the force that could be
used depended upon the subjective judgement of the officer in question, not
upon the nature and extent of the threat.
This may be contrasted, with the right to use force in non-emergency
situations, where the law requires a degree of correspondence, between the
extent of the force that is used, and the objective to be achieved. The use of
force under the emergency law, was legally divorced from the surrounding
circumstances and conditioned entirely on belief, however little, that belief
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corresponded to reality.
A further disturbing feature of the law, was that in a multilingual country, the
announcement preceding the use of force, was required to be in the official
languages, and not in the language or languages of the majority of persons in
the area concerned.
There appears little doubt, that the force, which could have been used, under
the emergency Regulations, included the killing of persons. For this reason,
the courts should have been willing, and even ready, to judge the bona fides
of an officer's use of lethal force, by external facts. Where killing appeared to
have been clearly unnecessary, to ward off the suspected danger, a finding
that force was used in good faith, should not have been made. Though good
faith was presumed,284 unless the contrary was shown, the proof of facts that
threw serious doubt on the good faith of the officer in question, should
generally have been sufficient to discharge the onus. Assuming that the
indemnity clause of the Regulations was valid, it would only have validated a
use of force which complied with all the conditions of the Regulations, and
which the court found to have been used in good faith.
In addition, the Commissioner of Police, could issue orders, inter alia, for the
control of traffic, the closing of industries, the removal of the public from or to
any area, the control of essential services, the occupation of streets and public
places and for all other matters deemed by him, to be desirable, for ending the
emergency.
It is also disturbing to note, that informing and spying, were extremely
prevalent as to have become a disease in South Africa, at the time. Police
spies and informers had been uncovered on university campuses, in political
organizations, in Black communities and in churches. The extent of the
penetration, was well illustrated by the discovery, that several police informers
were simultaneously members of the student representative council, at the
University of the Witwatersrand, thereby making the rolice component of the
council, a substantial voting block, if not a majority?8
It is not just the prevalence of undercover operatives that disturbs, but also the
nature of their mandate, which required them to report on political dissent,
irrespective of whether it related to a crime of either a subversive or non-
subversive kind. They had been used, for example, to monitor the activities, of
the eminently respectable Lawyers for Human Rights organisation. A large
part of their general business, was to monitor anti-Government opposition.
Sometimes, the information so gathered, was used for crude intimidation, as
when parents of dissenting stUdents, were anonymously given information,
about the "dangerous" political activities, in which those students were
indulging on the campuses. Information of a similar kind, passed on to
employers, resulted in the firing of workers.
There was a total absence, of both legal, and political control over the use of
spies and informers in South Africa. The common law was unlikely to be of
much assistance to a victim of undercover operations. While the persistent
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shadowing of a person could have been actionable, as an invasion of personal
rights,286 undercover operatives did not usually follow or observe the victim in
an obvious way. If confidential papers and documents were removed or
copied, there could have been an action;287 but a removal of papers was not
an inevitable feature of informing or spying. Was the act of spying itself, an
actionable invasion of personal rights? Where the informing involved reports
on what was said in a university classroom or open meeting, there seemed to
be no invasion of personal rights, such as privacy.
It was possible however, that persons who participated in confidential
meetings, may have had an action if their private discussions were carried
elsewhere.288 But even if there was, a common-law remedy, its scope was
unclear and, in any event, it would not have provided a really effective method
of controlling unjustified spying.
Even such limited freedom, as the law permitted, in South Africa, was being
snapped away by the pernicious use of undercover operatives. It is difficult to
imagine a more all-embracing grant of power.
(7.) PROCEDURAL AND EVIDENTIAL MATTERS:
There were numerous provisions in the Regulations, which altered the
established procedures, by reversing the onus of Eroof of certain matters, or
by creating presumptions. One of the provisions,2 9declared, inter alia, that
any account or document found upon any premises, land or place, occupied
by the accused, was admissible in evidence against him, as an admission of
the facts set forth therein. The possibility of an accused being "framed" under
such a provision, was real and frightening.
(8.) INDEMNITY AND THE EXCLUSION OF THE ~URISDICTION
OF THE COURTS:
The 1986 emergency Regulations, incorporated a provision which sought to
indemnify the security forces and certain named officers of the State, from civil
or criminal liability, for actions taken in good faith, in the course of their
emergency duties and functions.29o The combined effect of this Regulation, (if
valid), and the censorship Regulations considered above, was to free the
security forces in advance of action taken by them, from both legal and public
accountability.
Such immunity, was disturbing, in the light of the ominous development in the
Eighties, of an increasingly lawless police power, in the State. There appeared
to be enough evidence, to convince an objective observer, of the unrest in
South Africa, that the police "eliminated" troublemakers, by shooting, and that
they supported, or turned a blind eye to vigilante attacks on activists,291 and
that torture was widely practiced on detainees.
The growth of official lawlessness, made the scope and validity of the
72
indemnity Regulation, an issue of the highest importance. The validity of a
similar indemnity, enacted as a part of the 1960 emergency Regulations, was
questioned before the Court in Mawo v Pepler NO,292 but it was unnecessary
for the resolution of the case, to pronounce on this question. Although the
presiding Judge declared obiter, that he was "far from holding" that the
indemnity clause was invalid, it was arguable, that it was a grossly
unreasonable exercise of rule-making authority. Whether this was so,
depended on the scope of the indemnity provision as determined by judicial
interpretation; and the first point to be made, is that it was not as wide as it
was generally assumed to be.
The indemnity, covered only acts "in good faith advised, commanded, ordered,
directed or performed" in the carrying out of duties, the exercise of powers or
the performance of functions" in terms of these regulations". It follows that, it
did not exempt members of the police or defence forces, or the other persons
specifically mentioned, from legal liability for actions performed, under the
authority of any law, other than the emergency Regulations.
If, for example, the police had acted in terms of the general powers derived
from the Police Act of 1958, the indemnity was not applicable. Moreover, only
bona fide acts were covered, and the indemnity was applicable, if the official in
question, was proved, to have acted in bad faith. It is by no means clear,
however, what bona fide meant in that context. Did an official who knew that
his actions were illegal, but honestly believed that they were necessary to deal
with the unrest situation, act in good faith? Could an official be said to have
acted in good faith, if what he had done, was strictly not necessary for the
suppression of the unrest?
There is English authority, for the proposition, that there is a general
presumption, against the indemnification of acts, not necessary for the
suppression of rebellion, but also for the proposition, than an indemnity may
be wide enough, to protect acts, which an official knew to be illegal, but which
he genuinely believed, were necessary, to cope with the emergency
situation.293 Though the indemnity Regulation, enacted for the 1986
emergency, was framed in wide terms, the courts should have insisted on the
requirement, that the officials in question, should have entertained the honest
belief, that their actions were lawful. If this was not made a requirement, for
the operation of the indemnity clause, the torture of a detainee, to discover the
location of a cache of weapons, would have been protected, if the interrogator
genuinely believed, that his actions were necessary, to ensure the safety of
the public, or to bring the unrest situation, under control.
There were several other factors, which appeared to limit the invocation of the
indemnity provision. It had been suggested, for example, that it affected only
criminal prosecutions on the authorities, and delictual actions against them,
and that actions in contract, or to determine the ownership of property, were
left untouched by its provisions.294 The indemnity could not be invoked,
moreover, in criminal prosecutions of individuals, under the emergency
Regulations.
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Moreover, only actions falling within the scope of official duties,
were protected. Finally, the indemnity could not operate, so as to bar an
inquiry, into the validity of the regulations themselves.
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Notwithstanding these apparent limitations, on the potential scope of the
indemnity clause, it might have had the effect of legalising, (and it is
submitted, that it did), extreme invasions of citizen rights. The Commissioner
of Police, was granted the power, under the emergency Regulations, to issue
orders inter alia, "relating to any other matter, the regulating, control or
prohibition of which, in his opinion, was necessary or expedient, with a view to
the safety of any member, or members of the public, or the maintenance of
public order, or in order to terminate the state of emergency ... ".297
Prior to the shootings at Langa, investigated by the Kannemeyer Commission,
all Divisional Commissioners of Police, received a telex which contained the
following instruction:
"When acid and/or petrol bombs are thrown at police vehicles, private
vehicles and houses, efforts must be made, in all circumstances, to
eliminate those who are guilty. "298
If this instruction had been issued, as an order, by the Commissioner of Police,
prior to the declaration by the Court, in Natal Newspapers (pty) Ltd v The
State President,299 that the conferral, upon him, the blanket power, to make
regulations, was invalid, it seems that it would have been protected by the
indemnity, (together with any action taken under it), since the Commissioner,
at that stage, could have genuinely believed, that such an order, was
necessary, for the protection of the public, or the maintenance of law and
order, and that it fell within the wide powers, accorded to him, by the
Regulations. Moreover, if the Regulations were amended, so as to grant the
Commissioner, a narrower power to make orders, for the protection of the
force or the public against terrorist acts, he could have, again formed the bona
fide belief, that an order, for the elimination of throwers of petrol bombs, was
both necessary and lawful.
There are strong grounds, for believing, that an indemnity, that purported to
immunise such conduct, was ultra vires, either on the ground that it was a
serious interference with Court jurisdiction, 300 or on the ground that its
enactment, was unreasonable conduct, which could not have been
anticipated, by the legislature, as a valid exercise of subordinate law-making
authority. The effect of indemnity clauses, (as distinct from ouster clauses
which are inoperative, where an official has acted illegally), is to validate
conduct, that would otherwise, be illegal and, being only indirectly related, to
the task of restoring law and order, their creation should generally be a matter
for Parliament, and not for inferior law-making authorities, to whom Parliament
has clearly, not delegated this specific power.
The nature of indemnity clauses, cautions against a judicial policy, of inferring
parliamentary delegation, of the power to enact them. Dicey wrote as follows,
on the subject of Indemnity Acts:
"... of all laws which a Legislature can pass, an Act of Indemnity is the
most likely to produce injustice. It is on the face of it, the legislation of
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illegality; the hope of it encourages acts of vigour, but it also
encourages violations of law and humanity. The tale of Flogging
Fitzgerald, in Ireland, or the history of Governor Eyre in Jamaica, is
sufficient to remind us, of the deeds of lawlessness and cruelty, which
in a period of civil conflict, may be inspired by recklessness or passion,
and may be pardoned, by the retrospective sympathy or partisanship, of
a terror-stricken, or vindictive Legislature.,,301
Considering that Dicey, was discussing a retrospective indemnity law, and not
one which sought to free the authorities, in advance from liability for illegal
actions, our courts should have insisted that indemnities, were a matter for the
highest legislative authorit~, (as in the case of Section 103ter(2) of the
Defence Act 44 of 1957).3 2 The Public Safety Act, did not clearly and
unequivocally delegate the power to create indemnities to the State President,
and his attempt to do so, should have been declared, to be ineffective.
(9.) GENERAL COMMENTS ON THE PUBLIC SAFETY ACT:
The starting point, of any critical discussion of an emergency powers law, is
the recognition, that every state should have the power, to act swiftly and
effectively when its safety is threatened. "Those republics which in time of
danger cannot resort to a dictatorship, will generally be ruined when grave
occasions occur."303
It is better, that a government resort to drastic powers, for strictly limited
periods, than that, it legislate a permanent emergency, into existence.304 But
even if full allowance is made, for the necessity of retaining a reserve power to
put down threats against the basic order, it is arguable, that the provisions of
the Public Safety Act went too far.
The foregoing resume of the Act, and the Regulations promulgated under it,
during the 1960 emergency, has shown that there was too little parliamentary
control, virtually no judicial control, and an unnecessarily wide delegation of
authority to the executive. So far as parliamentary control is concerned, the
provisions of the British Emergency Powers Act 1920,305 make a useful
comparison. If the British Parliament is not in session when the emergency is
declared, it must be called into session within five days of the emergency
proclamation.306 There was no corresponding duty, to summon Parliament in
the Public Safety Act. The British Act requires emergency regulations to be
laid before Parliament, as soon as they are made, and stipulates that they
lapse after seven days, unless both Houses pass a resolution for their
continuance. 307 The corresponding South African provision, made emergency
regulations effective until the end of the current or next ensuing ordinary
session of Parliament, or until either House passed a resolution, disapproving
of them.308
Judicial control over the declaration and continuance of an emergency, was
excluded by both the British and South African Acts, whereas it is retained by
the American Emergency Detention Act. 309 While it may, perhaps be
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recognized, that the executive and Parliament should have had control, of the
declaration and duration of an emergency, the relegation of the judiciary under
the Public Safety Act, to a position of total impotence, in respect of the
conduct of the emergency, seemed neither necessary, nor desirable.
When a court judgement had demonstrated, that some shred of judicial control
remained, the Regulations were immediately altered, to exclude the jurisdiction
of the courts. Considerably more judicial supervision, over the conduct of the
emergency, was retained under the British Act by reason of the narrower
power, of the executive to make regulations,310 and the express provision, that
no regulation "shall alter any existing procedure in criminal cases, or confer,
any right to punish by fine, or imprisonment without trial". 311 The Act, does not
suspend the writ of habeas COrpUS,312 as was the case in South Africa. Even
when allowance was made for the different social and political conditions, in
the two countries, it is difficult to justify the total surrender of authority, to the
executive, in the Public Safety Act.
The reader, who is inclined to defend laws like the Public Safety Act, by
reference to similar legislation elsewhere, might well be consoled by the
stringent provisions of the Civil Authorities, (Special Powers), Act, (NI), 1922
of Northern Ireland. That measure, delegated to "the civil authority", (the
Minister of Home Affairs), almost unlimited power for preserving peace and
maintaining order. 313 This power had been used to detain persons without trial
and to create sweeping offences.
However, considerable caution, must be exercised in using the legislation in
Northern Ireland, as the basis of a blanket justification of the South African
legislation. In the first place, justifying a law by the worst example that can be
found elsewhere, is a dubious exercise. Secondly, the Special Powers Act in
Northern Ireland, must be seen against the background of the strife in the year
that it was introduced, (230 people were killed and property worth 3,000,000
pounds were destroyed),314 and the serious unrest in that count~ ever since.
Finally, lawyers in Northern Ireland have been critical of the Act, 15 and their
opposition had led to considerable moderation in the application of the law. All
these factors, must be kept in mind, in any comparison of the Northern Ireland
and South African legisJation.
It may therefore, be declared, by way of summary, that though a measure like
the Public Safety Act, should certainly find a place on the Statute Book, an
analysis of the actual terms of that measure, demonstrates that it was
fundamentally defective in a number of respects. Provision for more
parliamentary and judicial control should have been made, without destroying
the effectiveness of the Act for dealing with threats to public order and safety.
(10.) THE DEFENCE ACT OF 1957 AND THE POLICE ACT OF
1958:
There are certain provisions of these two Acts, which became relevant upon
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the declaration of an emergency. In terms of the Defence Act, both the
Permanent Force and the Citizen Force, could have been employed in the
prevention or suppression of internal disorder, or for the preservation of life,
health or property.316 The State President was authorized to mobilize the
Defence Force, or ant part thereof, by proclamation in the Gazette, for the
purposes of dealing with an emergency or with internal disorder.
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Provision
was made, for the rapid mobilization by the Minister, where in his opinion,
there was insufficient time for the more protracted procedure of mobilization,
by proclamation, to be followed. 318 Mobilization by the Minister, was for a
limited period only, and had to be followed by a proclamation, if the Force was
required for a lengthy period.
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The Act, provided for expedient methods of notification to persons called up
for service in an emergency.320 The State President, could authorize the
commandeering of property, or the take-over of transport systems, during
operations to prevent or suppress internal disorder.32 The Act, also declared
that the Minister, could order the evacuation of persons, or the assembly of
persons in a particularElace or building, during operations for preventing or
suppressing disorder.3 An order for the assembly of persons in a particular
place, could not remain in operation for more than four days.
The Police Act, authorized the use of the Police Force,323 by direction of the
State President, in the event of an emergency.324 While so employed, the
Police Force, fell under the laws govemin~ the discipline, command and
control of the permanent defence forces.3 5
(11.) THE CIVIL DEFENCE ACT OF 1966:
This Act, was linked with the Public Safety Act, in that, it was enacted to
"provide for the protection of the Republic and its inhabitants, in a state of
emergency".326 However, though a "state of emergency", as defined in the Act,
included an emergency, declared under the Public Safety Act, and a "time of
war", as defined in the Defence Act,327 it also included "internal riots" or "any
disaster" which the Minister,328 had declared to be a state of emergency, by
notice in the Gazette. 329 "Disaster" was defined, as including "an act of God,
the influx of refugees into the Republic and any form of sabotage, as defined
in Section 21 of the General Law Amendment Act, 1962, (Act No. 76 of
1962)".330 In view of these wide definitions, the Minister's power to declare an
emergency, was practically unlimited.
The Act, conferred certain powers upon the Minister, to enable him to take
measures, other than those prescribed in the Public Safety, Defence and
Police Acts, for providing the population with the "greatest possible measure of
protection and assistance" and for combating civilian disruption during a state
of emergency.331 With these objects in mind, the Minister was authorized, to
take such steps, as he deemed necessary, with regard to fire-fighting, rescue
and evacuation work, shelters, medical treatment and health services,
emergency housing, food and clothing, readjustment of communities and
individuals, the maintenance of essential services and the protection of
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essential industries and places, transport and communications, the
continuation of national and local government, and any other matter, which the
State President could designate in the Gazette.332
Without prejudice, to the generality of these powers, he could direct persons,
to furnish him with all kinds of information,333 direct persons to surrender
property, (including land and buildings), and, if he considered it necessary, in
the public interest, direct the management of any industry or service, which he
considered essential, to take such steps as he may prescribe, with reference
to the detailed objectives specified above,334 or to the continuation of the
industry or service.335 Since it was especially provided, that the power to
demand the surrender of property, shall be exercised only during a state of
emergency, it followed that all the other powers, could be exercised at any
time, without reference to a declared emergency.
The powers to demand information, and to direct the management of essential
industries or services, to take such steps as he could prescribe, were
especially wide. Though the surrender of property during an emergency, was
subject to compensation, there was a broad indemnity a~ainst claims for loss
and damage, arising out of the administration of the Act. 36 All the above-
specified powers, could be delegated by the Minister, to any person in the
service of the 5tate.337 It was also provided, that if any person failed or
refused to carry out any act, after a written direction from the Minister, he, (the
Minister), could have such act, performed and thereafter, recover the cost
from the person concerned.338 .
The Act, provided for both, the voluntary and compulsory training of persons,
for any of the purposes of the Act. All persons between the ages of 17 and 65,
except those falling within certain exempted categories,339 were liable to be
conscripted for training.34o This conscription, was not independent on the
declaration of an emergency, and could therefore, take place at any time, in
accordance with regulations, prescribed by the Minister. Employers were not
obliged to pay wages to a person called up for training, but committed a
criminal offence, if they, in any other way penalized a trainee or attempted to
frustrate his training.341 The State President was authorized to establish
institutions for training, which took place in accordance with regulations
prescribed by the Minister.342 Persons, other than those falling within certain
exempted categories, could volunteer for training.343
During an emergency, persons acting in execution of duties, under the Act,
could break into premises, if they believed on reasonable grounds, that this
was necessary for certain purposes, including the preservation of life or the
prevention of injury to persons or animals.344 Any person, employed at any
place, in respect of which the Minister has directed protective action, could
arrest and search any person entering or attempting to enter such place,
without the authority prescribed bl the Minister, and could seize anything, in
the possession of such person. 34 This extensive power, was not confined to a
time of emergency. Criminal penalties, were provided for persons who, inter
alia, hindered the administration of the Act, or who, without reasonable cause,
failed to comply with certain directions under the Act.346
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The Minister, had the power to make regulations, with regard to any matter
prescribed in the Act, and such regulations could prescribe punishments not
exceeding those prescribed in the Act. 347 The regulations had to be tabled
before Parliament, and lapsed if not approved by Parliament by the end of the
session, in which, properly tabled, or if expressly disapproved, by the
resolution of either House.348 The State President, could, by proclamation,
declare any or all of the provisions of the Act, applicable to South West
Africa.349
In terms of the Civil Defence Act of 1977,350 Provincial Councils, could make
ordinances relating to civil defence, for the purpose, inter alia, of combating
civil disruption during a state of emergency, declared under the Public Safety
Act. 351 All four provinces had enacted ordinances in terms of this power.352
The Minister of Defense, also had the power, under the Civil Defence Act to
declare a state of disaster, for the purpose of adopting extraordinary
measures, to protect the public and to combat civil disruption.
A disaster, was defined in the Act, as including the consequences arising out
of terrorism.353 The declaration of a state of disaster, did not appear to confer
any further emergency powers on the authorities, but rather to have the effect
of activating the provisions of civil defence ordinances, and of putting civil
defence organisations on the alert. It did, however, enable the Minister of
Defence, to take over the powers or duties, imposed or conferred by the Act
and the ordinances.354 Finally, the State President had extensive powers of
legislation over Black areas, and those were often used to impose emergency
rule, within such areas.355
(12.) COMMENTS ON THE CIVIL DEFENCE ACT:
Civil Defence legislation, is obviously a necessity in the modem age. For this
reason, no objection to the enactment of Civil Defence legislation, can be
made in principle. Nevertheless, the terms of the South African legislation may
be criticized. Far-reaching powers, could be exercised under the Act, in
peacetime and without declaration of a civil defence emergency. In this
respect, the blanket conscription provision, and the powers, which the Minister
could exercise over industries, stand out. Unlike its American356 and British357
counterparts, which are oriented towards hostile attack, the South African
legislation was related to all kinds of emergencies and disasters, from the
most serious, (such as war), to the most minor, (such as local disturbances).
The invocation of such extensive powers, should not have been authorized for
any intemal or local disturbance. The words "Civil Defence" are something of a
misnomer, in relation to an Act, which was, in large measure, concerned with
. internal security.
(13.) THE RIOTOUS ASSEMBLIES ACT OF 1956358:
The provisions of this law, were concerned more with local disturbances and
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disorders and may be regarded as supplementary to the common law powers
of martial law. They fall into two categories, namely, the control of gatherings
and the control of publications, which have been dealt with already.
(14.) COMMENTS ON THE RIOTOUS ASSEMBLIES ACT:
The provisions3590f the Act discussed in this section, are much in excess of
those required, to deal with local disturbances or riots. This remark applies
with particular force to the Minister's power to impose a blanket ban on
gatherings, to silence persons who were prohibited from attending gatherings,
and to debar persons from entering specified areas.360 These powers, were all
the more draconian, when it is considered that they could be exercised in
peacetime, without declaration of an emergency, and that there was no
independent check on the abuse of the Minister's authority to act.
The Minister could act without prior notice, and could withhold the reasons for
the action taken by him. A person affected by one of the drastic orders,
authorized by the Act, could not have them set aside, no matter how strong a
case he had.
The authority to prohibit particular gatherings, was also within the entire
discretion of the magistrate, or the Minister. While the need to prevent
meetings, which are likely to be violent, ought to be recognized, there should
have been more effective, independent control, to ensure that gatherings were
not prohibited, because the groups planning to hold them, were disfavoured by
the authorities, or because there were not willing, to protect persons planning
to gather peacefully, from attacks, by others who disliked their purposes. The
power to prohibit meetings, should have been vested in a judge of the
Supreme Court, who should have been required to hear evidence satisfying
him, at least prima facie, that violence which the police could not prevent, was
likely to break out.
(15.) THE GENERAL LAW FURTHER AMENDMENT ACT OF
1970361 :
Towards the end of 1970, mainl~ as a response to student processions, in
Johannesburg and Cape Town, 62 Parliament included a Section363 in this Act,
which declared that, whenever a local authority,364 was given permission to
organize or hold a procession, that had been granted, in terms of any law
requiring such permission, the permission was deemed not to have been
granted, unless the magistrate of the district, in which the procession was to
be held, also gave his permission. The magistrate, could withhold permission
only if, "he has reason to believe", that the holding of the procession, could
endanger the maintenance of law and order.
The provision, effectively withdrew control over processions, from local
authorities by subjecting their approval, to magisterial veto. From the language
of the Section, particularly the words, "if he has reason to believe", it appeared
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that the veto could not be exercised arbitrarily, but only if there were facts
which justified the apprehension of a threat, to law and order. Theoretically,
therefore, the magistrate was subject to the control of the courts. It is
submitted, that the magistrate would not have been correct, in withholding
permission, if the danger to the maintenance of law and order came, not from
persons taking part in the procession, but from groups hostile to the
procession, unless he was satisfied, for good reason, that the authorities could
not control such groups. The magistrate should have been prepared to
enforce this principle, consistently and fearlessly.
(16.) AN OVERVIEW OF THE EMERGENCY LEGISLATION IN
SOUTH AFRICA:
There is something decidedly artificial, about discussing emergency legislation
and the rule of law in South Africa. "Ordinary" and permanent legislation, had
brought about a ninety-percent destruction of the rule of law, and put the
country into a permanent state of emergency.
When, on top of this, an emergency was declared under the Public Safety Act
of 1953,365 the tattered remnants of the rule of law, were stripped away for the
duration of the crisis. Under the 1985 emergency, the security authorities,
assumed a number of additional powers, in particular, the power to detain with
greater freedom, on a mass scale, to impose curfews and drastic limitations on
movement, and generally, to act as they wished, without being answerable to
the courts, for anything that could not be proved, to have been done mala fide.
This last power, brought into effect by the indemnity provision of the
Regulations, enabled the police and military authorities, in the language of the
notorious instruction sent to the Port Elizabeth police prior to Uitenhage, to
"eliminate" the law-and-order troublemakers. When the law enabled the
security forces to mete out their own version of street justice, it seems bizarre
to talk about the requirements of the rule of law.
Under the nation-wide emergency, declared on 12 June 1986, the State
President promulgated regulations, which purported to strip away the last
vestiges of security force legal and public accountability, that remained under
the previous emergency. In a Regulation, subsequently held to be partly
invalid, the publication of subversive statements, was prohibited, such
statements, including those that were expressed to another person, and had
the effect, of causing hostility towards "any section of the public or person or
category of persons" or of "weakening or undermining the confidence of the
public, or an~ section of the public, in the termination, of the state of
emergency". 66
Other Regulations,367 imposed a system of total censorship over the
emergency, including the conduct of the security forces. Most newspapers
published little more than the "ministry of truth" announcements, that came
from official sources. The methods used by the security forces thereafter,
ceased to be a part of public knowledge, but occasional private reports and
court judgements, (such as the one ordering the release of a nun, from a
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detention that took place, when she attempted to prevent a member of the
security forces, from assaulting a young man), suggest that advantage was
being taken, of the charter for lawlessness and secrecy, that was ironically
known, as emergency law.
Moreover, the Minister of Law and Order, had the power to declare
emergencies on a local basis, and to make regulations similar to those that
were put into effect in the 1985 and 1986 emergencies.368 The exercise of his
power, signaled the final internment of the principle of government under law,
in South Africa.
The combination in South Africa, of permanent and temporary emergency
measures, was therefore, fatal to the rule of law in any meaningful sense. It
was also politically foolish. One of the reasons for retaining some rule-of-Iaw
restraints, under the emergency government, was to limit the social damage of
security operations. The indiscriminate use of police power, during the 1985
and 1986 emergencies, had achieved the opposite by fuelling conflicts,
increasing grievances and resentments, and broadening the already
dangerous gulf between the security forces and the Black people of South
Africa. Even if order was restored in the short term, the chances of future
peace and accommodation had been gravely harmed, by making the security
authorities in South Africa, unaccountable to the law.
(17.) THE SECURITY SYSTEM - A POLITICAL ASSESSMENT:
(17.1) Democracy and the Rule ofLaw:
The rule of law, appears to be related to democracy in several ways. It is
related positively, as an institution designed to protect certain basic
democratic rights, of the citizen, such as freedom of the person, of expression,
of movement and assembly, and of association. The other side of this
relationship, the negative aspect, is that the rule of law, has always been
understood as an institution, which limits state power. The rule of law, as a
"weapon against the growth of state authoritarianism" and "an inhibition on
state power",369 indirectly furthers the democratic style, of the management of
society.
Another way, in which the rule of law furthers democracy, is "to bridge the gap
between the legal doctrine of parliamenta~sovereignty and the political
doctrine, of the sovereignty of the people". 70 It achieves this accommodation,
by requiring statutes to be interpreted, wherever possible, in accordance with
"general notions of fairness and justice ... ,which are taken for granted in the
community".371 It follows, that every violation of the rule of law in South Africa,
weakened the democratic elements, in conflict resolution, and had taken the
society, a step nearer, to a system of state absolutism.
Democracy, had never achieved anything more, than a partial recognition in
South Africa. The adoption of the Westminster system of government, in the
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Cape Colony and Natal, and the subsequent acceptance of the Westminster
style of govemment, at the time of union, provided some justification for the
title democracy. However, Black participation in the Westminster system, was
at best, nominal and was reduced and finally eliminated, after union.
The Republic of South Africa Constitution Act of 1983, while providing for the
involvement of Indian and Coloured persons, in central decision-making, set
the.seal on the constitutional exclusion of Blacks, with terrible consequences,
that are still visible almost daily, in the townships of South Africa. Reform talk,
about Black involvement, at all levels of political decision-making, was not
matched by any action, and in any event, even talk envisaged, little more, than
Black membership of the President's Council, and the creation of a politically
impotent National Council, a body with disturbing similarities, to the "toy
telephone" Native Representative Council, that failed in the early Fifties. The
denial to the Black majority, of the right to vote for members of, and hold office
in, the central institutions of government, was incompatible with all forms of
democracy.
When the new Constitution replaced the Westminster system, with a
presidential one, the greater part of govemment, in the Westminster tradition,
had already been eroded. Because the Westminster system, in South Africa,
was steadily drained of its contextual lifeblood, it became, even within the
limits of White politics, one of "unrestrained majoritarianism", without the
compensation, of the alternation of parties, that was a feature of its operation
elsewhere. 372 Repeated assaults on the rule of law, and the associated
liberties of person, speech, movement, assembly and association, reduced the
extra-parliamentary side of democratic freedom, to a state of extreme
debilitation, even for White voters.
Extra-parliamentary organisation, association and dissent were seriously
limited, by detentions and bans of all kinds, (bans of individuals, organisations,
assemblies and publications), imposed by arbitrary executive decrees. The
power of the executive, grew ominously, while that of Parliament and the
people waned. As important aspects, of democratic freedom for Whites, went
by the board, the result of the destruction of the rule of law, became
catastrophic for Blacks who, already deprived of formal participation in the
political system, now lost the remaining freedoms, that we associate with
democracy. The outcome, has been called a racial 0ligarchy373 or alternatively
a limited democracy, for Whites with political tutelage, for Blacks. 374
The process by which civil rights had been weakened, to the point of
extinction, had most commonly consisted, in the transfer to the executive
officers, of the power, virtually unrestrained by law, to withdraw or suspend
their operation, either generally, or in relation to specific individuals or groups.
Every one of the basic civil rights, had been affected in this way. Freedom of
the person, ceased to exist, when the Minister was given unqualified power to
detain. The banning of individuals, nullified their freedom of movement,
expression and association. The right of assembly, had long been a civil liberty
casualty, by reason of the nationwide ban on almost all, outdoor meetings, and
on many indoor ones as well. Freedom of association, had suffered grievously,
by the banning of over thirty organisations, including the principal Black
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political organisations.
The executive withdrawal, or suspension of basic rights, was regulated neither
by clear statutory guidelines, nor by effective judicial supervision. This meant
that an executive officer, usually the Minister of Law and Order, was free to
determine who may participate in the political process, and thereby to alter the
rules of the game, to the advantage of his own party. The Minister, or the
other officers, acting under the direction of the executive, were not
independent and dispassionate observers, of the political process; they were
active participants, with a stake in the outcome, of the contest. The danger to
democratic freedom, that is inherent, in authorising a participant to draw the
line between subversion and legitimate dissent, was well captured in
Commissioner Gilbert's dissenting opinion, on the emergency power
recommendations, of the McDonald Commission, in which he said:
"Because insurrection and dissent are both expressed through
confrontation with existing authority, such actions, leave themselves
open to abuse by that authority. In either case, the existing authority,
tends to react against the aggressor, by adopting a posture of self-
justification. To sum up, it is not unfair to say, that the existing authority
is both party and judge in its confrontation, with the dissenter, whether
he be legitimate or insurrectiona!. It must be recognised, that such a
situation easily lends itself, to vengeanCe and to the abuse of power. ,,375
The removal of rule-of-Iaw controls, from security legislation, meant that the
circumstances, in which civil rights could be withdrawn, or suspended were
determined by an interested party and, as a direct result of that uncontrolled
power, security-law measures had been used to control opposition, as much
as subversion. Expressed differently, security laws, placed the ruling party in a
position to make its own determination, of what was legitimate political
opposition and what was subversion, and thereby, to control opposition to
itself, and its policies. This flows directly from the fact that, subversion is
defined not by law, but by the party in power. Of course, the government,
denied that security law had been misused in this way, but the evidence was
overwhelming, against the acceptability or even honesty of such denials.
Part of the evidence, was to be found in the actual wording of security
legislation. The crime of subversion, punished those who sought to achieve
any kind of change in South Africa, by various means including, for example,
means which impeded or endangered the free movement of traffic. It is
obvious, that a programme of political protest marches in a city, would impede
traffic and therefore led to a prosecution for subversion. When a law, was
expressly directed at extra-parliamentary dissent, the government that enacted
it, could hardly be heard to say, that the law was not being used to control
opposition. Where security Jaws, did not, in so many words, penalise
campaigns against the government and its policies, they were vague enough,
to permit their use for that purpose. Many security crimes in South Africa, were
so vague and elastic, as to make the following remarks, apposite to these
laws:
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Uln a legal system, in which the rules of criminal law, are so loosely
defined, that it is difficult to say, in given cases, what specific acts, if
any, constitute a breach of them, innocence and guilt lose precise
. d f ,,376meantng, as oes proo .
Where innocence and guilt have lost precise meaning, the use of the law for
partisan purposes, is a predictable consequence. This is doubly true, of
vaguely defined powers of detention, banning and the like. Because the
grounds upon which the Minister, or other executive officers, could detain or
ban, were not clearly stated, and because they were subject to no effective
external control, in the exercise of those powers, these officers could use
them, for any purpose they chose; and prominent among those purposes, had
been the control of opposition, to the party in power, and the policies for which
it stood.
Under such powers, insurrection and dissent, had lost all meaning, thereby
making possible, the removal of democratic rights, from the opponents of
government. Anyone, who has followed the pattern of individual banning, in
South Africa, will know that many of the victims, were nothing more, than
active opponents of apartheid. The same is true, of the many banned
organisations, of which the South African Defence and Aid Fund and the
Christian Institute, are obvious examples. The most telling evidence, however,
is to be found in the simple fact, that almost every individual or group, that was
active in opposition to apartheid, sooner or later, came into conflict with the
provisions of security legislation. Black South Africans in particular, had learnt
that actively opposing apartheid, even by means that were non-violent,
inevitably lead to personal experience with the whip, the bullet, a banning
order, the criminal court or the detention cell. Opposition and subversion, were
no longer distinguishable in South Africa.
It follows, that a major interest which "security" laws were intended to further,
and did actually further, was the suppression of opposition - particularly Black
nationalist opposition - to the ruling party and its policies. Even when the laws
were invoked against those engaged in violence or insurrection, their
legitimacy, was weakened, by the fact that the subversive conduct, was due in
part, to the denial of other means, of opposing the system. The existence of
these laws, and the manner of their use, is in fact one of the main grounds, for
labelling the mode of conflict regulation in South Africa, to be coercive. Conflict
regulations, in divided societies, may take one of two basic forms - democratic
or unilateral. 377 The unilateral, (domination or coercion) model, fitted the South
African institutions, particularly the legal institutions, like the proverbial glove. If
it were otherwise, the security system, would manifestly have had different
objectives.
It is significant, that the Rabie Commission in South Africa, presented no
framework of values, within which, security legislation, should be required to
operate, in South Africa. Apart from an occasional, and usually passing
reference, to the need for overall reform,378 the need to limit restrictions on
individual rights,379 to those that are absolutely necessary, and a fairly derisory
reference to the rule of law,380 the Commission's approach was essentially
non-normative. It declared, in fact, that its enquiry was to be, essentially a
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legal or judicial one and rejected the suggestion, that it should enter upon "the
political terrain".381 It is ludicrous to imagine, that a desirable security policy,
can be formulated without a political and, indeed sociological, analysis. One
cannot provide satisfactory answers, to a meta-Iegal question through
formalistic legal analysis. However, the Commission's reluctance, was
humanly understandable.
Deeper analysis, would have shown, the South African security system, to be
precisely one, that permitted its governors, to violate democracy, in the course
of protecting its requisites, from alleged opponents. The fundamental purpose
of the violation, moreover, was not to secure democracy, but minority control.
Normative analysis by the Rabie Commission, would also have revealed, that
security legislation, would have had to be totally transformed, not just tinkered
with, as the Commission's report recommended, to make it a vehicle for
democratic conflict resolution.
The progressive eradication of democratic rights, under the guise of law and
order, was accompanied by a phenomenon, that was perhaps, even more
ominous - the weakening of civil authority, over the security forces, of the
Republic. As I noted earlier, the decline of parliamentary authority, and the
enhancement of executive power, was given further impetus, by the creation
of a presidential executive, under the 1983 Constitution. This process of the
accumulation of executive authority, was accompanied, for some time, by a
parallel movement - growing security-military influence, over fundamental
political decisions, in South Africa. The security establishment, as Kenneth W
Grundy observed, "has positioned itself at the center of power".382 This second
movement, was a direct consequence, of the militarization of the society and
the semi-war footing, on which it had been placed, to meet the so-called "total
onslaught".
Within a short time, the two movements began to converge, as it became
evident, that the State Security Council, a body in which the security/military
establishment, was heavily represented,383 was impressing itself, powerfully
on the decision-making of the constitutional executive.384 Signs of the formal
ascendancy of the security establishment, over the civil authorities, had been
accompanied, by instances of independent and sometimes rebellious actions,
by that establishment.
Though the full story, behind some of these actions was not known, and could
not be revealed, by the actors, on account of the secrecy laws, there was
enough to indicate, that the security establishment, was a semi-independent
authority, in the State, and only partly subject to civil control. Defence
department support, for the Renamo resistance movement in Mozambique,
. afterthe Nkomati Accord, between the two countries, is one example. The aid
given to Renamo, euphemistically described as humanitarian,385 included the
building of a landing strip and massive amounts of medical supplies.386
Subsequent govemment explanations, that the aid was exclusively designed
to bring about peace, between Renamo and the Frelimo govemment in
Mozambique, will impress only the extremely gullible observer, of Southern
African politics.
&6
Another example, is provided by the abortive attempt, in November 1981, of a
group of mercenaries, under the command of Colonel Mike Hoare, to
overthrow the government of the Seychelles. Though in camera hearings,
deprived the general public, of knowledge of defence force involvement, in the
attempted coup, it appears from the judgement, given by the trial judge, that
there was definite support, for the mission, by high-up members of the
military.387 Involvement of members of the National Intelligence Service,
although not capable of definite proof, also seems clear. It is hardly credible,
that this foolhardy enterprise, so damaging to the country's foreign relations,
could have had cabinet approval, and it must seem as a frolic, which received
clandestine backing, from the military establishment.
A third example, of the weakening of civil authority, over the security
establishment, is that of police behaviour, towards the opponents of the
government. Despite ministerial declarations, condemning torture and the
enactment of codes, of conduct, designed to protect certain detainees, it is
clear that the torture and physical abuse, of political detainees, by the police,
was rife. Direct evidence, of physical assaults, on detainees, was provided by
Dr Wendy Orr, a district surgeon in Port Elizabeth, in a court application, to
interdict the authorities, from illegal treatment, of certain detainees, in that
region.388 Court orders, to restrain the police, from assaulting or torturing
detainees, were becoming almost commonplace. 389 Police behaviour in
controlling unrest in the townships, both within and outside emergency areas,
had been blatantly lawless. Reports of unprovoked and unnecessary
shootings, were widespread and many of these reports, appeared to be
credible.
There can be no dispute, about the instant street justice, administered by the
police, when they shot and killed, alleged390 stone-throwers, in the notorious
"Trojan horse" episode, in the Cape Township of Athlone, in October 1985.391
These, and many other similar incidents, present a picture of a police force,
acting in a lawless and uncontrolled manner; and the heavy censorship,
imposed in emergency areas, was the response of a government, unable to
discipline its police force, and therefore compelled to limit, the immeasurable
damage, to the country and its economy, of such brutal repression, by
throwing a blanket of secrecy, over the application of emergency powers.
When one takes into account, the immense harm that the security forces have
inflicted on their own country, under emergency rule, it is hard to believe that a
government, that could have controlled them, would not have done so.
I may conclude, that the destruction of the rule of law, by security legislation,
has had, disastrous consequences, for democracy in South Africa. Security
legislation, had drastically limited the democratic rights, of White South
Africans, and abolished the remnants of democracy, that were available to
Blacks. It had turned conflict resolution, decisively, towards the domination or
coercion model. Finally, by freeing the military/security establishment, from the
restraints of the rule of law, security legislation, had gravely weakened control,
by the authorities, in the State.
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(17.2) Democracy and Civilised Values:
Democracy, implies a commitment to standards of civilised behaviour, that
extend beyond the recognition, of formal political rights. It requires,
governments to observe, at least a minimum standard of decency and
humanity, in the treatment of their subjects. The commitment to civilised
values, distinguished democracies in the Western tradition, from the so-called
totalitarian democracies, in the East, in which the subjects, to use Arthur
Koestler's telling image, may be treated as no more, than sacrificial rabbits.
There were certai'n provisions of the South African security system, which
violated the commitment to decent values, and standards of official behaviour.
These measures, made it impossible, to accept the claim of the authors of
security legislation, that its purpose, was to uphold the very standards, that are
under discussion. One does not uphold standards, by denying them. Two
features of security law in particular, stand out, as blatant violations of the
State's obligation, to maintain acceptable standards of humanity: the provision
for indefinite detention, of suspects in solitary confinement, and the exemption
from legal controls, granted to the security forces, under emergency law.
No doubt, a case can be made out, that other provisions of security law, also
denied legitimate expectations, to civilised treatment. However, these other
examples, are more contentious, and the ensuing discussion, will focus on
branches of the subject's right, to decent treatment, that is clear and
indisputable.
Even if we grant the State's right to hold suspects for questioning, there is no
case, in a civilised community, for the institution of indefinite detention, in
isolation and without adequate court control. The medical evidence reviewed
earlier, has shown that lengthy incommunicado incarceration, is in itself, a
form of cruel and inhuman treatment, that frequently results in permanent
psychological damage, mental derangement or suicide. It was also a
foreseeable and predictable consequence, of freeing the interrogators, from
legal controls, that the detainee, would have been subjected, to illegal
treatment in the form of assault, torture, and the like.
The shock waves that reverberated around the world, following the
horrendous treatment, and the death of Steve Biko, had not put an end, to the
torture or abuse of detainees. In one of the more recent cases, a detainee was
made to kneel on the floor, with a pistol against his head, and was then shot
and killed in circumstances, that may never fully be known. 392
The continuation, of the practice of torture, even after the enormous damage,
to South Africa's standing, in the world community, caused by the Biko affair,
and the Government's subsequent claim, that it did not sanction such
behaviour, illustrated, that maltreatment of detainees, was a built-in feature, of
incommunicado incarceration, and that a government which continued to
make use of this diabolical institution, could not be too serious, about
eliminating the abuse, of detainees. The treatment of Dr Wendy Orr, who was
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removed from all contact with prisoners, after bringing the court's attention to
the systematic ill-treatment of emergency detainees, spoke volumes, about the
Government's attitude, to these practices.
As pointed out earlier, under the emergency regulations, promulgated at the
time of the declaration of emergencies, in July 1985 and June 1986, members
of the security forces, were exempted from civil and criminal accountability, for
any action taken in good faith, (which is presumed until the contrary has been
proved), in the course of exercising emergency powers, in dealing with the
unrest situation.393 It is one thing, to free members of the military and the
police from legal accountability, by the Indemnity Act, passed at the end of an
emergency, but quite another, to dispense with legal controls, at the outset.
The latter, was a statutory licence to the security forces, to act as they
believed fit, and it was one, to judge by the reports of police misbehaviour, that
were pouring in, that had not been neglected. The indemnity clause, was a
recipe for uncivilised behaviour, and one that had no place in a country, that
was constitutionally committed to "Christian values and civHised norms".
(18.) THE EFFICACY OF THE SECURITY SYSTEM:
A normative analysis, of the South African security system, illustrated that it
was irreconcilable with democratic values and civilised behaviour. The State,
to adapt the words of Paul Wilkinson, had pushed itself "into authoritarianism,
and hence, into denying its constitutionalism, into dropping all humane
restraints and checks on power, and ultimately, into becoming a paramilitary or
police state, a mirror image, of the terrorism it was supposed to be
defeating.394 The only remaining claim, that could conceivably be made for the
security system, is that it was an effective instrument for securing peace and
stability in the country. If, in addition to its violation of democracy and civilised
standards, it failed to pass the test of effectiveness, there was literally nothing
to support the retention of the security system.
The foundation stone of the security system, was laid in 1950, when the
Suppression of Communism Act was passed. In that year, according to a
report ofthe South African Institute of Race Relations, the only signs of
political "trouble" were a one-day strike and a mass protest meeting, against
the policy of apartheid.395 In the ensuing three decades, the ruling National
Party, secured the passage through Parliament, through the battery of
Draconian laws, that constituted the security system, in consolidated form. 396
The description of the unrest situation, by the Institute of Race Relations in
1984, after over thirty years of drastic "law and order" medicine, made an
illuminating comparison with the troubles of 1950. In 1984, the Institute
reported, 175 people were killed in unrest-related incidents and 58 incidents of
guerrilla insurgency took place.397 The death toll for 1985 stood at almost
900
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and the killings had not abated in the first half of 1986.399 These grim
statistics, are only a part of the general picture of 1984, 1985 and 1986 which
was one of riots and bumings, boycotts and strikes, and bombs and bullets.
The tragic growth of political violence and disorder, after three decades of
Draconian taw enforcement, makes it impossible to present the security policy,
as one of South Africa's success stories. In fact, disorder had increased, in
direct proportion to the application of harsh security measures.
Quite obviously, the security system had failed, in the sense that it had neither
eliminated unrest, nor even contained it; but, more seriously, it was
susceptible to the additional criticism, that it had contributed to political
disorder. The Government, even from within its own ranks, was reminded, that
drastic measures could be ineffective and counter-productive, in the longer
term,4oo but continued to act, as though the iron-fisted application of security
legislation, had not added to the problem.
Police action during the 1976 disturbances, provided us with a clear instance,
from which the authorities appeared to have learnt nothing, of a direct
connection between security operations and increased, (rather diminished),
violence and terror. When in that year, the full force of the security arm of the
Government was turned on the Soweto school demonstrators, an unknown,
but large number, (probably in the region of three thousand), became enforced
refugees from their own country. It was inevitable that these refugees would
become conscripts into the guerrilla movement and many had returned to
South Africa, as trained fighters.
The steady growth of incidents of insurgency since 1976,401 was no
coincidence and a similar growth, was predicted in the years that followed the
heavy·handed and lawless police crack-down in the unrest. Because the
security system put no effective restraints, on police action, in unrest
situations, the important principle of minimal force had been replaced by
excessive and indiscriminate repression; and this replacement created the
future guerilla movements.
The ctaim by security authorities, that they adhered to the principle of minimal
force, was simply not bome out by the facts. A distinguished foreign
correspondent, writing in The Observer of 4 May 1986, noted that there had
been 1500 unrest deaths in the preceding 20 months and that two-thirds of the
deaths were the result of security force actions.402 Of the 879 dead in 1985,
over half, (441), were apparently the result of security force operations.403 The
percentage of persons killed by the security forces had been over fifty, in the
past few years and this must represent a reduction, since only, in those
previous two years. had the phenomenon of seJf-directed Black vioJence,
become a reality.
By contrast, of the 2455 deaths that occurred in Northern Ireland, unrest in the
period 1969-85, the security forces were responsible for 265 - a percentage of
10,8.
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This meant that security forces in South Africa. had been responsible
for at least five times more killings, than their counterparts in Northern Jreland.
In 1985, the security forces in South Africa, killed over 400 persons, as
opposed to, the 265 killed by Northern Ireland forces in 17 years of civil strife.
These comparisons, are not meant to play down. the horror of opposition
violence in South Africa, whether it be in the form of necklacing, gunning down
officials or bombing soft targets. There can be no objection to strong action
against the perpetrators of such terrible deeds. What was unacceptable in
South Africa, was the indiscriminate and excessive nature of anti-unrest
operations.
Security forces were contributing to unrest, by broadening and intensifying
bitterness in Black townships. The bitterness was being broadened by police
action against peaceful protestors, and demonstrators. Security law, in fact
compelled the police to act against peaceful dissenters, because every
outdoor meeting was illegal, unless prior magisterial permission had been
obtained; as soon as people gathered in the open, their dispersal was required·
to prevent a violation of a valid, but incredibly stupid law. Black anger was also
being aroused, and intensified by the indiscriminate use of police power in the
townships. There were almost, daily reports, many apparently true, of
unnecessary beating and shooting of children, of the reckless use of tear-gas
canisters and of assaults upon innocent detainees. Even if jackboot tactics in
the townships succeeded, in putting down the unrest, Black hatred and anger
had been so fuelled, that more horrific township strife was probable.
All these considerations, amply justify, the comment in a recent analysis, of
the relationship between law, order and state security in South Africa, that
"coercion from above ... tends to give rise to chaos from below" and that
"inopportune behaviour, by the authorities, that are in the state themselves,
can also present a threat to state security".405 While the basic causes of
unrest, are undoubtedly social and political, legalised coercion in the form of
harsh security laws had become a potent contributory cause. Moreover, the
harm caused by the security system, was not limited to the direct aggravation
of unrest. Because that system, empowered the authorities to neutralise or
eliminate Black leaders in various ways, there was a lowered incentive to
engage in a process of negotiation and accommodation. Why talk if you can
"legally" ban, detain, shoot or drive into exile, the troublesome opponents of
apartheid?
The availability of an arsenal of repressive security measures, had tempted
the authorities, into postponing the search for political accommodation,
thereby making its achievement, infinitely more difficult. As Colin Legum had
observed, "there is a new generation of Blacks emerging who believe that
violence is the only language, the ruling Whites understand".406
This belief was a direct result, of the repression of Black political aspirations
through the security system, and grew in response to lawless emergency rule;
and as it grew, so too did the political damage caused by the security
legislation. That legislation, had become a coercive and destabilising
substitute for the politics of negotiation and consensus. Far from creating the
preconditions for political dialogue, it was actually destroying the chances of
political reform. In fact, security law had substituted violence for politics as the
mode of resolving BlacklWhite conflict in South Africa and the drastic
amendment of that law was essential for establishing the predominance of talk
and compromise over the bullet and the bomb.
I may conclude, that the South African security system, indefensible by
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acceptable standards of moral and political judgement, was as great a failure,
when assessed by its own implicit standard of justification - effectiveness in
securing a peaceful and stable society. There was no chance, moreover, of
increasing its efficacy, by a more rigorous application of security powers. The
creation of a peaceful, prosperous and stable society required just the
opposite of that - radical reform of security law in the context of overall
political reform.
(19.) THE SECURITY SYSTEM AND THE RULE OF LAW -
GENERAL CONCLUSIONS:
The South African security system had brought about the root-and-branch
elimination of the rule of law; but this rather obvious conclusion is, not only
one yielded by the preceding analysis of security legislation, according to the
yardstick of legality.
The process of the legislative erosion, of the rule of law, had entailed the
fearful corollary of the enthronement of the security authorities, as a lawless
power in the country. Lawlessness in all its forms, is no doubt to be deplored;
but there is nothing quite so corrupting as official lawlessness. When those
who stood officially as the enforcers of the law, may dispense with all its
traditional constraints, it was not long before others followed their example,
even to the extent of losing respect for, and understanding of, the principle of
government under law. In this sense, the security system had become a
potent generator of the disorder it was ostensibly designed to eliminate.
The consequences of undermining legality and converting law into a naked
instrument of power, was tragic for all groups in South Africa, including the
group responsible for that transformation. The danger of the perversion of
legality had been dramatically illustrated in a country, to the north of South
Africa. The lan Smith security machine developed in Rhodesia, in a futile
attempt to secure White rule, by freeing the security forces from legal
accountability, had been gratefully accepted, by the Mugabe Government in
"liberated" Zimbabwe. Among the first victims of the management of the Smith
security machine, were some White military officers, who were detained
without trial and tortured under laws which they had helped to enforce. Such
ironic twists of fate, are commonplace in history, but the lesson which they
teach - that freedom is dependent upon the maintenance of the rule of law -
has still to be learned.
Perhaps the finest dramatisation of that lesson, is Robert Bolt's play, A Man
For All Seasons, and particularly the following exchange in the play, between
Raper and More:
Raper: "I'd cut down every law in England to do that."
More: "Oh? And when the last law was down, and the Devil turned
round on you, where would you hide, Raper, the laws being flat?"
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There was no place to hide in modern Zimbabwe, for those who incurred the
displeasure of the Mugabe security forces, had enforced the Smith "laws"
without pity against Nkomo supporters. Similar treatment, to that being
inflicted on the opponents of the Botha Government, lay in store for both Black
and White, in any future South Africa, with flattened laws. It follows, that one
of the highest priorities for reformers concerned with freedom and justice, is
the reconstruction of the rule-of-Iaw state in this country.
SECTION D: THE SOUTH AFRICAN SCENARIO: THE
POST APARTHEID ERA:
The process by which a society gives itself a Bill of Rights, can be viewed as
the ultimate exercise of democratic power.407 The introduction of a justiciable
Bill of Rights for South Africa in 1994, ushered in. an entirely new legal and
constitutional dispensation. The South African Bill of Rights, like other Bills of
Rights, constitutes a cogent manifestation, of universally acknowledged moral
and ethical norms, clearly enumerated, to constrain the legal behaviour of
political and administrative office bearers, in all branches of Government, and
administration, and even the conduct of individual citizens, in relation to one
another, in certain circumstances.
The South African Bill of Rights, with its emphasis on liberty and equality, is
the very antithesis of the policy of apartheid, that perniciously infused, all
aspects of our previous constitutional dispensation.408 Moreover, when South
Africa sought to place itself on the side of the "free" West, it undertook the
burden of ensuring that the State, in its dealings with citizens, will recognise
their humanity and right to civilised treatment.
However, even after apartheid, South Africa will remain a complex society. It
will have to reckon with the heritage of apartheid, in personal prejudice and
institutional inequity. It will have to press forward on urgent tasks of economic
development. It will need to meld together people of various racial and ethnic
groups, worshipping in different religions and holding an array of political
convictions.
Given these realities, South Africa cannot escape the possibility of serious
domestic conflict, despite the achievement of majority rule. The Government
will need the ability to prevent the disagreements such differences will
inevitably spawn, from descending into sectional warfare and even revolution.
At the same time, South Africa will face the risk of Governmental tyranny.
Modem" history, is filled with examples of revolutionary social transformations,
that have degenerated into regimes, as oppressive as those they displaced.
Sometimes, these ghastly results are the product of the intensifying ideological
and personal designs of the revolutionaries; sometimes, they are the bitter fruit
of the traditions of the old regime, traditions that the new rulers inherit more
fully than they themselves may recognize. Whatever the cause, there is no
reason to believe that South Africa is uniquely immune to this infection. It is
important, therefore, to guard the new South Africa as well as possible,
against this danger.
Emergency powers are a particularly threatening source of tyrannical authority
- and also a potentially essential weapon against it. The very power, the state
may need to preserve a benign social order from destruction, is the power that
it may abuse, to produce a new oppression.
In this Section, I will inter alia, outline certain factors that may determine how
often a post-apartheid government will need emergency powers and other
features that may affect the magnitude of the risk, that these powers will be
misused as well as used. These factors are not matters on which easy
predictions are possible, but I will suggest that it is safe to assume, both that
South Africa will need emergency powers and that it might abuse them.
In the light of this prospect, South Africans will need to shape a constitutional
response to the problem of emergency rule, a response that should both allow
and restrain emergency authority. In the second part of this Section, I will
examine two broad strategies for accomplishing this end. The first,
paradoxically, is to say nothing about emergency rule in the Constitution; the
second is to make explicit provision for it.
Each of these options, I will argue, is capable of being an effective response to
the dilemmas of emergency rule, and each is subject to serious pitfalls. The
purpose of this Section, is of course, to assist those who will choose among
these strategies rather than to prescribe a choice. I will ado, however, that the
carefully drafted, explicit constitutional provision, namely Section 37, of the
Constitution of the Republic of South Africa, 1996, which deals with states of
emergency, was the most promising option for South Africa, and I will outline,
the sorts of textual provisions, that could be employed, to circumscribe this
ominous power, as effectively as possible.
(1.) CONSIDERATIONS BEARING ON THE TREATMENT OF
EMERGENCY POWERS:
The design of a constitution is much more than a technical process. The
powers of a government, ought to be the powers that it is expected to need.
The limits that constrain a government, ought to be those, required to deal
with the dangers, that the government's powers are expected to pose. We
must therefore consider, first, how much a new South Africa may need
emergency powers, and second, how much it may have to fear them. The
answers to these questions, depend broadly on the sort of country the new
South Africa is. Those who drafted the constitution for this new country,
needed to weigh soberly the realities of their nation; they were also, however,
in a position to shape those realities through the political struggles that led to
the new South Africa.
(1.1) WILL A STATE OF EMERGENCY BE THE NORM?:
Every govemment needs to wield some emergency powers, on some
occasions. The proper constitutional treatment of such powers, however,
depends on whether the occasions for their exercise are expected to be
common or rare. If a country is expected to face such persistent and profound
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problems, that emergency will be the normal state of affairs, then perhaps the
constitution should not raise serious obstacles to the exercise of special
govemmental power. But the more South Africa faces endemic emergencies,
and the more its constitution is written to accommodate the regular exercise of
emergency power, the less this constitution will be able to secure the rights of
individual South Africans against the State. If, on the other hand, South Africa
will not frequently need to resort to emergency powers, then the standards for
the use of such authority, can be made more stringent.
South Africa will face difficult social problems even after apartheid is gone.
Whether those social problems will require emergency solutions, however, is
another matter. At least three overlapping factors, will bear on the likelihood,
that South Africa needs to rule by emergency power: the extent to which the
country is united or divided under the new Constitution; the nature of the social
policies of the new Government; and the adequacy of the normal constitutional
powers, for dealing with the exigencies to which the country will be
exposed.409
First, it is useful to remember that "a house divided against itself cannot
stand. ,,410The nature of the transition to the new South Africa undoubtedly
affected the chances for harmony in the society. The more fully the
Govemment can command the support of the entire South African population,
and the more readily the various parts of that population subscribe to the
venture of building a new nation, the less often the State will need emergency
powers.411
Conversely, the more divided the new South African society is, the greater the
possible need for emergency powers will be. An example from another country
may illustrate this point, as well as the risk of abuse of this rationale for
emergency powers engenders. After the overthrow of Somoza, Nicaragua
established special courts, to handle the cases against its supporters. The
Inter-American Commission on Human Rights considered these courts, a
violation of "the right to a competent, independent and impartial tribunal,,,412 a
right secured by Article 8 of the American Convention on Human Rights.413
Nicaragua, however, contended that its establishment of these courts,
"somewhat dampened the rage of the masses and reduced the danger of a
confrontation, between the thousands of family members, of the heroes and
martyrs that died in the struggle, who wanted to take the law into their own
hands, and the recently constituted authorities."414 Nicaragua's defence of its
policies mayor may not have been persuasive, but the general proposition is
inescapable: a country experiencing, or approaching, violent civil strife is likely
to need emergency powers to deal with this threat.
Second, the nature of the social policies the new Government envisions will
affect the ease of their implementation. The more profound and abrupt the
social transformation that the Government plans, the more likely it will be, that
normal governmental processes, will not suffice to bring it about. John
Hatchard, quotes the argument of a former Zimbabwean Minister of Home
Affairs, who said in 1983 that,
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"Social change does not move in a police minuet; revolution is not a tea
party with silver teapots and waiters. To meet the emergent economic
threats, we need emergency powers to deal with economic sabotage
that always threatens societies in the midst of change.,,415
Third, the more effective the ordinary constitutional powers of the government
are in dealing with potential threats, the less need there will be for emergency
rule. If advocacy of racial prejudice is a threat to the stability of a new South
Africa, that may be a reason to deprive such speech of constitutional
protection, even in ordinary circumstances. If localized resistance to majority
authority is a danger, that may be a reason for firmly establishing the pre-
eminence of national authority over local govemmental points.
The more such dangers as these, can be handled through the normal
provisions for the government's powers, the less need there will be for
emergency rule. Obviously, however, it is no solution to the risk of
governmental overreaching to give the Govemment powers, that make such
overreaching the norm rather than the exception. One challenge South Africa
will face, is the task of giving its rulers enough authority so that they do not
need to resort frequently to emergency power, yet not so much that they
themselves become a constant - rather than only intermittent - danger to the
citizens' liberty.
(1.2) WILL THE RISK OF ABUSE OF EMERGENCY POWERS BE
SUBSTANTIAL?:
No one who had sought to challenge the South African state of emergency,
will doubt that emergency powers can be abused. South Africa's grim record,
however, is not unique. As I have demonstrated, the danger of emergency
authority is endemic throughout the world. This fact in itself, makes it clear that
the new South Africa takes account of the prospect. I will suggest, moreover,
that it is important for those who shape the new South Africa, to consider
certain features of the new nation, in order to gauge the particular gravity of
the threat posed by emergency powers.
That emergency powers are prone to abuse is, unfortunately, all too clear from
the world's experience with them. As Clinton Rossiter observes,
"The most obvious danger of constitutional dictatorship ... is the
unpleasant possibility that such dictatorship will abandon its qualifying
adjective and become permanent and unconstitutional. Too often in a
struggling constitutional state, the institutions of emergency power are
served as efficient weapons for a coup d'etat. ,,416
In a similar vein, the International Commission of Jurists, comments that there
is a "disturbing tendency" for states of emergency "to become perpetual.,,417
Syria, to take just one example, "has been under a continuous series of
emergencies since the end of the Ottoman rule in 1920.,,418
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Emergency powers, tempt reformers as well as reactionaries, populists as well
as autocrats. In 1978, at least a fifth of all the world's countries, were in states
of emergencies.419 The attraction of emergency powers, moreover, is hardly
confined to new nations. liThe crisis history of the modern democracies
demonstrates," Rossiter writes, "that executives usually ask for more power
than they really need .... ,,420
In the United States, President Truman declared a national emergency in .
1950, as the Korean War approached. As Jules Lobel comments, "[~at
national emergency remained in effect for almost twenty-five years." 1 Midway
through that period, and long after the end of the Korean War, President
Kennedy used Truman's emergency proclamation, "to provide the legal
predicate for the embargo against Cuba."422 Much more recently, according to
a newspaper report,
"Lieutenant Colonel Oliver North and the Federal Emergency
Management Agency ... drafted a contingency plan, providing for the
suspension of the Constitution, the imposition of martial law, and the
appointment of military commanders, to head state and local
governments, and to detain dissidents and Central American refugees,
in the event of a national crisis".423
Given the widespread use of emergency provisions, it should not surprise us
that South Africa's four-year state of emergency was by no means unique,
among the nations of Southern·Africa. The Governor, of what was then
Southern Rhodesia, declared a state of emergency before lan Smith's
unilateral declaration of independence in 1965; Robert Mugabe's govemment
continued the state of emergency when it came to power in Zimbabwe in
1980.424That count~'s declaration of emergency "has been renewed over 40
times since 1965."4 The Emergency Powers Act, that Zimbabwe now
applies, was first passed in 1960, to combat African nationalism,426 and grants
the President powers, quite similar to those conferred on South Africa's State
President, by Section 3(1 )(a) of the Public Safety Act 3 of 1953, which has
been deaJt with, in some detail, in Section C of my dissertation.
No country can afford to ignore the risk of abuse, of emergency powers. The
greater the need for such powers, the greater the risk, but there are two other
broad factors that are likely to affect the extent of that risk, in a post-apartheid
South Africa: the political beliefs of the new nation and the structure of its
government. The importance of the political beliefs of those who lead the new
South Africa, and of the people whom they lead, is plain. The more strongly
South Africans embrace the idea that the powers of their Govemment should
be limited by principles of human rights, the less likely an abuse of emergency
powers will be. Those in the Govemment will be more averse to such abuse,
while those in opposition parties will be more vigilant in decrying any
govemmental surrender to temptation. Indeed, the people themselves will be
more determined to reject usurpation of authority by their leaders.
In addition, the structure of the government, can help constrain the danger of
abuse. Attention to the structure of government, was a central focus of those
who shaped the United States Constitution. As James Madison, one of the
framers, wrote in 1787, "[ilt is in vain to say that enlightened statesmen will be
able to adjust these clashing interests, and render them, all subservient to the
public good. Enlightened statesmen will not always be at the helm.,,427 The
United States Constitution reflects this insight, in an array of structural
features meant to make it difficult, even for unenlightened rulers to oppress
their people.
The structure of the government, will affect the use of emergency powers both
directly and indirectly. The direct effects, will be those resulting from whatever
procedures may govern the establishment and continuation of states of
emergency. The greater the role of the legislature and the judiciary in decision-
making about emergencies, the better the chances of preventing abuse by the
executive power.428
There will also be a more indirect impact of governmental structure. Whatever
the particular rules goveming the use of emergency powers may be, the ability
of the rUling party to abuse those powers, will depend partly on the extent of
that party's unity and pre-eminence over other voices in the system. The more
vigorous the parliamentary opposition parties are, and the less rigidly the
majority party controls the votes of its members, the harder it may be for the
government to muster the votes necessary, to support an abuse of emergency
powers.
The more assiduously and emphatically courts identify and decry human rights
violations, the more likely it is that public and parliamentary opposition to
govemment excesses, will also be sharp. However, more effective checks on
the goveming party's ability to act improperly - or indeed at all. Again, the
design of a system that secures enough, but not too much, power for the
government to govem, was a delicate task for those who wrote the new South
African Constitution.
This Section will not attempt to make detailed predictions, but I will assume, I
hope not too optimistically, that a post-apartheid South Africa, will not need to
resort to emergency powers as a matter of course. I will also assume, I think
realistically, that South Africa - like most, if not all, nations-will face a serious
risk that any emergency powers it grants, will be abused. With these
perspectives, we can now consider what emergency provisions, if any, the
South African constitution should include.
(2.) CONSTITUTIONAL STRATEGIES FOR REGULATING
EMERGENCY POWERS:
I have called this section "constitutional strategies" rather than "constitutional
provisions", because one of the two principle strategies, is to make no explicit
provision for emergency powers at all. The other strategy, of course, is to
address the issue of emergency provisions explicitly, in greater or lesser
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detail. Each of these methods, can contribute to the effective supervision of
emergency powers, but neither is guaranteed to be successful. The choice
between them, must turn on an analysis, not only of their intrinsic properties,
but also of the political environment in which either of these strategies is to be
deployed.
The strategy of textual silence, can help to foster a constitutional climate in
which emergency powers are effectively, though tacitly, disfavoured.
Unfortunately, it is difficult to be confident, that textual silence would have this
effect in South Africa. Explicit constitutional treatment of emergency powers,
can also help to cabin emergency powers, if the constitutional text is written to
circumscribe rather than to encourage, the use of such authority.
This Section, will present in some detail, the sorts of explicit textual
safeguards that could provide the needed limits. The central danger of the
strategy of textual explicitness, however, is that those who adopt the new
constitution may choose not to adopt such safeguards. In that light, I will argue
that textual explicitness, is the most effective response to emergency powers
in·South Africa - but that its value, will be jeopardized, unless there is a firm
political commitment to the enactment of a rigorous text.
(2.1) Textual Silence:
Silence may not seem like much of a solution to the dilemma posed by the
necessity and danger of emergency powers. In the past, South Africa's
constitution's general lack of entrenched human rights limits on governmental
power, is demonstrably no solution at all, to the need for restraining
governmental abuse.
The United States Constitution, embodies the strategy of textual silence, and a
look at this experience, will help my inquiry. In that country, textual silence has
proven - perhaps unsurprisingly - to be quite a workable predicate, for the use
of governmental powers in emergencies. At the same time, textual silence
may have been of value as a source of restraint on those powers as well. The
meaning of the United States Constitution, after all, emerges only from its
interpretation, and the silence of the text may have shaped that interpretation
in ways that helped engender a tradition of control of governmental authority.
Once we understand the role that textual silence can play, however, we must
ask whether the American experience would travel well to South Africa. I will
argue that, unfortunately, we cannot be confident that textual silence would
play the same benign role in South Africa, as it has in the United States.
.Let me begin this examination of the United States Constitution, by
acknowledging that this document, is not entirely silent on the issue of
emergency powers. Nevertheless, the list of provisions that explicitly authorize
emergency deviation, from normally guaranteed rights, is very short. One
section authorizes the suspension of the writ of habeas corpus, "when in
cases of Rebellion or Invasion, the public safety may require it.,,429 The Third
Amendment, prohibits the quartering of soldiers, in any house, without the
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owner's consent, during peacetime, but allows it, in a time of war.
430
Finally,
the Fifth Amendment, waives the requirement of a presentment or indictment,
for "cases arising in the land or naval forces, or in the Militia, when in actual
service, in a time of war or public danger. ,,431
To be sure, those who wrote the United States Constitution, realized that there
might be emergencies to face. Congress can declare war,432 and the President
is the commander-in-chief of the armed forces.
433
The militia may be called out
to enforce the laws, subdue rebellion, or repel an invasion.434 On application
from a state, the United States is bound to protect that state from domestic
violence.435 In addition, the President wields the "executive power"436 and
"shall take care that the laws, be faithfully executed.,,437 Much might be, and
has been inferred from these and related grants of power. However, no
provisions other than those cited in the previous paragraph, specifically permit
emergency abrogation of the Americans' normally available rights, and no
provisions expressly authorize the imposition of martial law, or the declaration
of a state of emergency. In contrast, the language of the United States Bill of
Rights, securing individual liberties is, in general, notably unqualified.
Despite the relative silence of the United States Constitution, government
officials can and do exercise emergency powers. Just before this conference
began, for example, state and local officials responded to the effects of
hurricane Hugo with such steps, as a six p.m. to seven a.m. curfew and an
order blocking citizens from returning to their homes, until rescue work was
over.438
Emergency powers have also been used in more controversial ways. Local
governments coping with urban riots in the 1960s "not infrequently" imposed
curfews or other emergency measures in response. 439 The Mayor of
Milwaukee, Wisconsin, confined all city residents except "doctors, nurses and
others performing essential services" to their homes for twenty-six hours, with
two brief pauses to permit food shopping.44o Riot curfews were "generally
upheld" by the courtS.441 The Mayor of Philadelphia, proclaimed a state of
emergency pursuant to a local ordinance, after the assassination of Martin
Luther King, Jr., and banned almost all types of outdoor gatherings of twelve
or more persons.
The United States Supreme Court, found that an appeal challenging arrests,
under this state of emergency, did not present a substantial federal
question.442 In 1955, a labour dispute in Indiana, became so violent that
martial law was imposed.443 Perhaps most notoriously, during World War 11,
military authorities excluded from the Pacific Coast area, all people of
Japanese descent, including American citizens, and confined many, in
internment camps. The constitutionality of this extraordinary action, was
upheld by the United States Supreme Court. 444
In short, textual silence does not make emergency powers unavailable. If
silence is not abolition, however, perhaps it is - or will be taken to be - assent.
In that case, textual silence would have little to recommend it as a strategy, for
it would amount to a blank check to the executive authorities.
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Notwithstanding the litany of uses and abuses of emergency power just
mentioned, ordinary life in the United States is substantially free of the
pressure of emergency authority. No doubt, the source of this good fortune,
lies largely in broad political and social characteristics of this country, features
that are unrelated to the particular omissions and inclusions in the U.S.
Constitution. In particular, the United States' relative internal peace since the
Civil War, and its freedom from external invasion, have surely reduced its
need for emergency powers. I suspect, however, that the silence of the U.S.
Constitution on emergency powers, also plays a role in limiting their use.
This constitutional silence, makes the existence of emergenc~owersand the
occasions for their exercise, matters of inference and debate. 5
In three distinct ways, moreover, the text's silence may contribute to the
outcome of this debate being favourable to citizens' rights. First, the presence
of explicit guarantees of rights, and the absence of explicit grants of
emergency power affect what might be called the "balance of argument." No
one engaged in this debate is likely to be indifferent to the need for the nation
to survive the emergencies it faces. The tenor of the constitutional text,
however, serves as a constant reminder, of the importance of searching for
solutions that do not trammel guaranteed liberties. Responsible officials, may
give such concerns greater weight, than they, otherwise would. If they do not
do so, of their own accord, their opponents may object more powerfully than
they otherwise could.
Second, the absence of express authorization for emergency rule, assures
that such power remains special, even if it is accepted as legitimate. We
tolerate what is ordinary and familiar, more readily than what is extraordinary
and strange. The U.S. Constitution's silence, makes emergency power always
extraordinary, and so again, bolsters the force of the arguments against its
use.
Third, the uncertain reach of emergency powers and the absence of express
vesting of prerogatives, in the executive branch open the way for the
involvement of the other branches. If the existence of checks and balances,
within the government is in general, an institutional safeguard of liberty, the
same system may be of value when emergency action is considered. To be
sure, an explicit provision, calling for judicial review or legislative consideration
of the use of emergency power, would provide, at least as great an
encouragement for such involvement, by the other branches, as does textual
silence. But textual silence is much better in this regard, than an explicit text,
which places such matters unmistakably, in the discretion of the executive
alone.
In fact, both Congress and the courts in the United States, have on occasion,
sought to limit the boundaries of executive emergency powers - although the
record of both legislative and judicial intervention in this sphere is a mixed
one. Congress enacted several pieces of legislation in the 1970s, including the
War Powers Resolution of 1973,446 in an attempt to cut back on the previous
decades' expansion of executive emergency powers.447 These efforts have
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been attacked as a dismal failure,448 but Congress may be able to block
particular executive ventures, even if it does not divest the executive of
general discretion. Individual members of Congress, also can help catalyze
public concern, even when they cannot prevail in the legislative process.
The courts, have also contributed to the limitation of emergency power. To say
this, is not to deny that the courts have sometimes shied away from
controversies that threatened to bring the judiciary into collision with the
political branches of the government.4W9 Indeed, emergencies, by their nature,
are likely to generate forces so intense that courts, (and even legislators), may
find it politic to avoid the issues. It is therefore, no surprise that some
judgements have endorsed extremely broad deference to executive
emergency decisions.
45o
Despite such constraints, the United States Supreme Court, has recently
declared that, "We can readily grant that a declaration of emergency by the
chief executive of a State, is entitled to great weight but it is not conclusive. "451
It has also been held, that even when military powers must be used, "the
allowable limits of military discretion, and whether or not they have been
overstepped in a particular case, are judicial questions."452 Although the same
decision properly recognizes !la permitted range of honest judgement as to the
measures to be taken, "453 this discretion is not unlimited. The U.S. Supreme
Court has repeatedly curtailed emergency bypassing of the courtS.454 During
the Korean War, the Court went so far, as to invalidate President Truman's
contention that the seizure was necessary, to forestall a strike that would
directly jeopardize the war effort.455
More broadly, the courts may contribute to a climate of restraint, not so much
through their relatively infrequent decisions on grand issues of executive
emergency power, as through their day-to-day work on the articulation of the
balance of individual rights, against the needs of the state.456 This task has
long been one of the staples of the courts' work. The United States
Constitution, guarantees a right of free speech, for example, and no word in
the text permits this right to be taken away.457
It has fallen primarily to the courts, to decide when speech poses such a
danger to the nation, that it can constitutionally be suppressed. The courts'
record in answering this question, has not always been an admirable one.
Over the years, however, the courts have wrestled with the question, first
evolving the "clear and present danger" test and, more recently, the stringent
"incitement" test to help specify those circumstances, under which
governmental necessity can justify controlling political speech.458 In making
these decisions, and a host of others, the courts have given force, to the claim
that constitutional rights and national security are compatible. The more this
claim becomes a part of the bedrock of political belief, the less room there is,
for abuse of executive power-and the silence of the text provides the space for
this principle to gather force.
In short, the result of textual silence, is that the extent of emergency powers,
becomes the product of an ongoing debate among the people and among the
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branches of government of the United States. The case for adopting the
strategy of textual silence, is that it has not unduly cramped the government's
powers, and yet it has contributed to a climate, in which those powers have
been used with relative restraint.
Unfortunately, it is far from clear, that such a climate could be fostered in the
same way, in a post-apartheid South Africa. The evolution of American
constitutional understanding, is undoubtedly the result of a host of factors,
more or less peculiar to American history and society; South Africa's
constitutional meanings, will be equally the product of the particular facets of
South African life. In this sense, for South Africa, the strategy of textual silence
is almost a shot in the dark.
While it is impossible, to predict the course of South African history, it is
possible to identify grounds to fear, that textual silence in South Africa, would
not be heard as it has been, in the United States. One basis for this
proposition, is that in South Africa, "the genie is out of the bottle": emergency
powers were in use, and their potential necessity in the future, was hardly
ignored by the drafters of a post-apartheid constitution. The risk exists, that
emergency powers will be needed, even in a post-apartheid South Africa, and
if that unhappy possibility is realized, then a constitution silent on the issue of
emergency powers, may be read as reflecting the drafters' implicit decision,
not to regulate this field at all.
This reading, seems all the more plausible for two reasons. First, much South
African constitutional tradition, emphatically conveys the message that
parliamentary supremacy, is virtually absolute. Even with the adoption of a
post-apartheid constitution, that does create enforceable limits on state power,
this tradition may leave behind a reluctance to infer unstated constitutional
limits on the power of the state. At best, the notion that there are unstated
constitutional limits on emergency powers, while limits on other aspects of
state power are spelled out, may seem anomalous and confusing for those in
the government or in the courts, who are called upon to abide by it.
Second, a number of important international agreements that protect human
rights, incorporate explicit provisions for states of emergency. To omit a
textual treatment of emergency powers, when such prominent models exist,
and when so many other matters will no doubt be receiving explicit textual
discussion, would be odd and even perilous. In South Africa, textual silence
might not become a part of a slow accretion of constitutional tradition, limiting
emergency powers, but instead could come to be seen as a tacit acceptance
of a largely unlimited extraordinary authority.
To be sure, the framers of the United States Constitution, also wrote with the
memory of the revolution fresh in their minds. Those in power, in the early
years, saw threats that tempted them to limit citizens' liberties.459 These early
events, could have become the seeds of a radically different understanding of
the balance of governmental power and individual rights, in the words of the
American Constitution. I do not suggest, therefore, that the fact that
emergency powers cannot be ignored in the deliberations over a new South
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African Constitution, compels their explicit treatment in that document. I do
suggest, however, that the strategy of textual silence in South Africa, may well
be a gamble against the odds.
(2.2) Textual Explicitness:
While textual silence is not a dependable curb on emergency powers in South
Africa, it remains to be seen whether textual explicitness is a better
alternative. Textual explicitness is a pdpular strategy in modern human rights
documents, but the task of crafting constitutional provisions to ensure a
narrow delineation of emergency powers, is not a simple one. Moreover, the
stakes are high, for a loosely worded provision, will not impose restraints on
emergency powers and may instead, encourage their use.
Two sorts of responses are necessary to meet this risk. The first, is to
determine what protections must be embodied in the constitution, in order to
limit effectively the dangers of emergency power. The second, and ultimately
more important response, is to generate the political will required to ensure the
adoption of the textual provisions that are called for. I will argue that a "logic of
emergency" tends to undermine the commitment to liberty that is needed.
Furthermore, the full range of potentially helpful provisions may be so
extensive that, even with the best of intentions, the drafters may conclude that
some have to be omitted from a constitution. The upshot is that only dedicated
political leadership will ensure that textual explicitness does not become an
even weaker safeguard of South Africans' rights, than textual silence might
be.
(2.2.1) THE ELEME"NTS OF AN EFFECTIVE TEXTUAL
LIMITATION ON EMERGENCY POWERS:
In identifying the constitutional language that might regulate emergency
authority, we can draw on a range of models, for if textual explicitness is a
risky strategy, it is non~theless a strate~ in wide use. A number of
international human rights instruments, as well as many nations'
constitutions,461 make explicit provision for emergency powers.462 Some
commentators also support this strategy.463 One early endorsement came
from Machiavelli:
"Now in a well-ordered republic, it should never be necessary, to resort
to extra-constitutional measures; for although, they may for the time, be
beneficial, yet the precedent is pernicious, for if the practice is once
established, of disregarding the laws for good objects, they will in a little
while, be disregarded under that pretext for civil purposes. Thus no
republic will ever be perfect, if she has not by law provided for
everything, having a remedy for every emergency, and fixed rules for
applying it".464
The South African Law Commission took such a course. It recommended the
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following in Article 30 of its Bill of Rights:
"The rights granted in this Bill, may by legislation, be limited to the
extent, that is reasonably necessary, in the interests of the security of
the state, the public order, the public interest, good morals, public
health, the administration of justice, the rights of others, or for the
prevention of disorder and crime, but only in such measuressand in
such a manner, as is acceptable, in a democratic society".46
The Law Commission's proposal, may very well be meant to provide genuine
restrictions on the State's power to abridge the rights guaranteed elsewhere in
the Bill of Rights. It is far from clear, however, that it would have had this
effect in practice. Article 30 permitted the restriction of rights for a very wide
range of reasons. Indeed, it would seem that any legitimate purpose of
legislation, might also be a legitimate basis for interfering with constitutional
rights, for all such purposes would surely be embraced in "the public interest"
to which this Article referred.
Moreover, although courts could actively enforce the requirement that the
limiting of rights not exceed the measure and manner "acceptable in a
democratic society," this standard is neither clear nor necessarily strict. It
seems quite possible, that the actual result of this provision, would be to do
precisely what textual silence can avoid doing - to make the invasion of rights
for a number of reasons, seem normal.
If this undercutting of constitutional guarantees is to be avoided, the exception
provision must be drafted much more restrictively. I believe, that those who
draft the constitution's emergency clauses, will need to look, at three sorts of
restrictions, on the power to derogate from rights: rules specifying, the
procedures to be followed, by the executive and legislative branches, in
wielding emergency authority; substantive limits, on the extent of the
emergency powers available, to the government; and provisions for judicial
review, to enforce some, or all of the foregoing requirements. I suggest a
consideration of the following elements, but there are surely others that will
also be worth including.466
(a.)Procedures for Executive and Legislative Emergency
Action:
(i) A MsunsetfWprovision~ that any existing proclamation ofa
state ofemergency~and any existing legislation~providing
for emergencypowers~ to abridge normal rights~ lose all
effect~ with the adoption of the new constitution: The effect
of this sunset rule, would have been, that the leaders of. the new South
Africa, would have had to apply their own minds, freshly to the question, of
what emergency powers, they would have needed.
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(ii) A prohibition on invasion ofrights except pursuant to
statutory authorization: If the Law Commission's provision for a
limitation of rights "by legislation" impliedly excluded limitation without
legislation, it created precisely this prohibition. The virtue of such a prohibition,
is that it denies legitimacy to pretensions of power that have not won
legislative approval. For this very reason, however, those responsible for
preparing such legislation, might be prone to phrase it broadly and thus
explicitly authorize emergency action, which might otherwise come to be
considered beyond constitutional bounds. Explicit statutory treatment of
emergency powers, like explicit constitutional treatment, may restrict less than
it permits. Whatever the decision on the requirement of statutory authorization,
it should be made clear that no emergency powers, statutory or otherwise, can
be exercised except in accordance with the restrictions on emergency powers,
set out in the constitution itself.
(iii) A requirement~ that any declaration~ofa state of
emergency lapse~ unless it is specifically approved, by the
legislature~within a stated short period, (such as fourteen
days)~ after its proclamation~a similar requirement~for
legislative approva/~ofany emergency regulations~adopted by
the executive: Conditioning the use of emergency powers, on legislative
approval, will press the legislature, to give direct consideration to their use. In
contrast, a provision, which allowed the executive to proceed, so long as the
legislature did not actively disapprove, would shift the burden of inertia, so as
to favour executive power.467
The importance of legislative involvement, in the decision to use emergency
powers, also counsels, in favour of a requirement, that the legislature, be
called into session, without delay, if an emergency is declared while it is in
recess, and perhaps, for a requirement, that the legislature remain
continuously in session, for the duration of any emergency.468 Dissolving the
legislature during an emergency, should be prohibited unless a new legislature
is to be democratically elected without delay.469 Similarly, altering the structure
of the judicial branch through emergency power, should not be permitted.47o
(vi) A requirement that legislative approval of the use of
emergencypowers~be by a super-majority vote: Invasion of rights
is a serious matter. If the government cannot muster a super-majority, (such
·as a two-thirds vote), perhaps that indicates that the necessity for such
interference with constitutional rights, is not clear enough to the population at
large, to justify going forward. 471
(v) A requirement that any declaration ofa state ofemergency
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or emergency regulations lapse after a limitedperiod of time,
(perhaps six months), subject to a renewal by the executive
and re-approval by the legislature.472
(vi) A furthe~ IIsunset"provision, for new emergency
legislation, such that, this legislation, would have to be
reconsidered, and re-enacted, on a periodic basis: Both (v) and
(vi) are meant, like certain of the other procedural requirements, to try to
generate periodic executive and legislative reassessment, of the case for
emergency action.
The effect of these suggestions, would be to make rule by emergency power
somewhat more difficult to initiate and maintain. Nonetheless, an executive
that commanded a large parliamentary majority, would be able to meet all of
these requirements. Because future South African politics, like that of so much
of the last forty years, could be dominated by one political party, two other
sorts of protections should be considered as well. The first, is the imposition of
substantive restrictions on emergency powers. The second, is the guarantee
of judicial review to enforce the various procedural and substantive
restrictions, set forth in the constitution.
(b.) SUBSTANTIVE LIMITS ON THE EXTENT OF EMERGENCY
POWERS:
(I) Permitting invasion ofrights, only Min time of war or other
public emergency, threatening the life ofthe nation" : 473 The
effect of this limitation, should be both, to restrict the occasions, for the
invasion of constitutional rights, and to emphasize to rulers and citizens alike,
that such invasions, are the exception, and not the rule. Admittedly, even this
limitation may be subjected to loose interpretation, and some deference to
those authorities charged with identifying and responding to such dangers, is
entirely appropriate.
Such a provision, does seem to capture, however, the important distinction
between situations that threaten the nation's existence and other occasions,
such as natural disasters, that constitute emergencies of a lesser order. The
effect of making this distinction, should not be to preclude all abridgement of
citizens' rights in these lesser emergencies. Rather, the effect of this
restriction would be to empower the courts, to assess the legitimacy of these
other abridgements, within the general body of the doctrine that govems the
rights themselves. "Normal" restrictions would be assessed in the light of the
normal doctrine; only emergencies affecting the life of the nation would justify
more substantial invasions of rights.474
(ii) Permitting invasion ofrights only Mfo the extent strictly
required by the exigencies of the situation": This limitation" is a
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part of both the European Convention on Human Rights
475
and the
Intemational Covenant on Civil and Political Rights. 6 The standard is meant
to be a genuine limitation, but would appropriately be applied with substantial
deference to the judgement of the executive branch, as confirmed by the
legislature, that particular steps were needed.
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A related principle, would call on governments not only to show "the need for
the measures in question, but also ... to demonstrate the efforts made to
ensure that the measures employed will not be abused. "478 A review of
emergency measures after the end of the state of emergency, might also be
required to insure that injustices are found and corrected as far as possible.
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(iii) Forbidding derogation from certain rights: It is painful to
identify rights from which derogation should never be permitted, because the
very act of ensuring some rights, announces the vulnerability of others.
Nonetheless, protecting some rights from derogation, seems better than
protecting none. Conceivably, the detailing of non-derogable rights will also
have the salutary effect of reinforcing the general value, placed on the
protection of rights.
International human rights treaties, that do permit some derogations are useful
sources of suggestions, for the list of rights that must never be violated. The
International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, makes the following rights
non-derogable: the right to life; the right to be free of torture or cruel, inhuman,
or degrading treatment; the right not to be enslaved; the right not to
imprisoned for failure to fulfill a contractual obligation; the right not to be
punished under retroactive criminal laws; the right to recognition as a person
before the law; and the right to freedom of thought, conscience, and
religion.480 The International Covenant, also forbids any derogation from rights
that "involve[s] discrimination solel~ on the ground of race, colour, sex,
language, religion or social origin." 81
The American Convention on Human Rights, is broadly similar to the
International Covenant, but it also protects the following rights, not made
inviolable by the Covenant: certain rights of the family; the right to a name; the
right of children to protection; the right to a nationality; and the right to
participate in government.482 The American Convention, also secures "the
judicial guarantees essential for the protection of such rights. "483
The International Commission of Jurists, offers extensive recommendations
for making various due process rights non-derogable.484 Due process
protection, is not made inviolable in the International Covenant or the
American Convention.
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The South African experience, however, underlines
the importance of securing this complex of rights.
In particular, even if detention without trial is to be permitted, it is essential to
guarantee certain protections for detainees. The International Commission of
Jurists, identifies a number of important protections of detainees, such as the
right to see counsel and family members.486 It urges, in addition, that
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"The ordinary civilian judiciary, should retain jurisdiction, to review
individual cases of detention, in order to ensure, that the stated
grounds, are within the purposes of the emergency legislation,
authorising detention orders, that proper procedures have been
followed, and to ensure that the conditions of detention, comply with the
law".487 .
It maintains as well that "the ordinary courts should retain jurisdiction over
charges of abuse of power, by security forces.,,488
Finally, to the extent that the new South African Constitution confers
enforceable social and economic rights, it will be necessary to consider
whether, and to what extent, derogation from these rights, should be permitted
during an emergency. The International Covenant on Economic, Cultural and
Social Rights "does not contain a provision, permitting derogation in times of
emergency,,,489 but I doubt that in an emergency, in which many human
freedoms, are subject to abridgement, there would not be valid cause for
interference, with at least some economic or social rights.
This detailing of non-derogable rights, may seem to deprive the emergency
exception of its value to the government. Even if all of the rights identified here
were made non-derogable, however, emergency powers could still be potent
sources of govemment authority. The government could wield increased
power to search, arrest, and perhaps to detain without trial, to restrict citizens'
movements within the country and across its borders, and to restrict such
fundamental elements of liberty as freedom of speech and freedom of
assembly. Moreover, the limits on these actions, that would be imposed by
such substantive and procedural provisions as I have outlined, will be prey to
violation, unless they can be enforced. For that reason, judicial review is a
critical component of a constitutional limitation on emergency powers.
(C)GUARANTEEING ~UDICIALREVIEW OF THE JUSTIFICATION
FOR INVADING CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHTS:
I would suggest, that the courts be empowered and required to review whether
an emergency exists, and whether it justifies the particular steps the
government has taken to deal with it.490 It is undoubtedly difficult for courts to
weigh the gravity of a threat to the nation, or to determine whether particular
steps, need to be taken in a situation so serious, that the govemment has
labelled it an emergency. Precisely for this reason, deference to the
judgements of the other branches on these questions, will be appropriate.
This deference, however, should not be complete. There are cases where
elements of such review, have been accomplished, not only in the United
States, but also, notably, in South Africa. Quite recently, in End Conscription
Campaign and Another v Minister ofDefence and Another,491 Justice
Selikowitz determined that war, did not "actually prevail" in the Western Cape
and therefore martial law could not lawfully be imposed. Perhaps courts will
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overturn executive and legislative assessments, of the existence of an
emergency, only when the government's predicate for acting is strikingly
unjustified, but even the possibility of their intervention, can be a valuable
safeguard.492
Where the issue is not the existence of an emergency, but the steps taken to
address it, the courts' role can and should be more vigorous. Lower courts
have sometimes performed this role, with striking vigor and even under South
African law, in reviewing and disapproving aspects of the emergency
regulations issued by the Government.493
In assessing the steps the government takes, in an emergency in South
Africa, the courts will be performing a function which a post-apartheid
constitution is likely to call on them to perform, in many contexts-the weighing
of claims of constitutional or legal right against the needs of the State.
Moreover, the courts will, at least in part, be applying specific constitutional
provisions-such as the procedural and substantive limits, discussed earlier in
this Section-which are meant to apply, in this very context. We can fairly
expect, therefore, that they will be capable of playing a valuable role, in
adjudicating such issues in emergencies as well.
(3.) THE CERTIFICATION ~UDGEMENT:
On 6 September 1996, the South African Constitutional Court,494 in an
unequivocal and jurisprudentially penetrating judgement, declined to certify the
proposed draft of the new National Constitution, indicating that in certain
defined respects, it did not comply with the Constitutional Principles.495 One
such area being Section 37, which dealt with states of emergency. In regard to
Section 37, the Constitutional Court, made the following observations:
"NT 37 envisages national legislation authorising the temporary and
partial curtailment of the Bill of Rights, in limited circumstances and
subject to detailed conditions. In principle, there can be no objection to
such authorisation. Partial curtailment of a Bill of Rights during a
genuine national emergency, is not inherently inconsistent with
"universally accepted fundamental human rights, freedoms and civil
liberties". Nor can it be said that the safeguards provided by NT 37,
against possible legislative or executive abuse of emergency powers,
are inadequate. Two subsidiary points, relating to the section have,
however, been raised.
The first, was that NT 37(1) authorises national legislation governing
the declaration of an emergency without specifying who may be
empowered to issue such a declaration. Although it is correct that the
sub-section leaves it to Parliament to make the designation, that cannot
found a valid objection to certification of NT 37. Constitutional Principle
ii does not require constitutional designation of the entity which is to be
empowered to declare an emergency, nor does universally accepted
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human rights jurisprudence. None of the other Constitutional Principles
does so either. The envisaged legislation will be subject to
constitutional control and, insofar as the executive branch of
government may be vested with the power, it is significant that NT
37(2) and (3) involve the legislature and the judiciary as watchdogs.
That amply complies with international norms. In the result, the
objection must fail.
The second point, which arose in the course of oral argument, relates
to NT 37(4) and (5), which read as follows:
"(4) Any legislation enacted in consequence of a declared state
of emergency may derogate from the Bill of Rights only to the
extent that -
(a) the derogation is strictly required by the emergency; and
(b) the legislation -
(i) is consistent with the Republic's obligations under
international law applicable to states of emergency;
(ii) conforms to sub-section (5); and
(iii) is published in the national Government Gazette as soon
as is reasonably possible after being enacted.
(5) No Act of Parliament that authorises a declaration of a state
of emergency, and no legislation enacted or other action taken in
consequence of a declaration, may permit or authorise -
(a) indemnifying the state, or any person, in respect of any
unlawful act;
(b) any derogation from this section; or
(c) any derogation from a section mentioned in column 1 of the
Table of Non-Derogable Rights, to the extent indicated
opposite that section in column 3 of that table."
The problem, lies in a provision, in the table referred to in NT 37(5),
rendering derogable, inter alia the right of accused persons, guaranteed
by NT 35(5), to have evidence obtained, in circumstances violative of
the Bill of Rights, excluded if its admission, "would render the trial
unfair, or otherwise be detrimental, to the administration of justice".
Had sub-section (4) stood alone, paragraph (a) of it might well have
sufficed for the protection of rights dUring states of emergency, to the
extent commensurate with such situations of peril. The addition of sub-
section (5), however, has introduced a differentiation between the
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importance of various rights, which seems invidious and, in some
instances at least, so inexplicable, as to be arbitrary. We think of no
reason why some of the rights that are said to be derogable in states of
emergency should be treated as such. A clear example, is the
derogability of NT 35(5). Derogation from such a right cannot be
justified even in an emergency. Any attempt at such justification would
fail in terms of NT 37(4). No purpose is therefore served by this attempt
to render derogable what can in practice, never be justified.
Although we accept that it is in accordance with universally acceptable
human rights to draw a distinction between those rights which are
derogable in a national emergency and those which are not, this should
be done more rationally and thoughtfully than it is done in NT 37(5)".
The profound concern that the Court has, clearly manifested for individual
rights, is apparent from the criticism it leveled at certain powers accorded to
the executive in a state of emergency, unequivocally stating that the judiciary
should not be bypassed especially, in times of national crisis or disaster.
Briefly, the Court found that differentiation between certain rights that in a
state of emergency are derogable, and others that are not "in some instances
at least, so inexplicable as to be arbitrary.,,496In this regard the Court held that
"[a]lthough we accept, that in accordance with universally accepted
fundamental human rights, to draw a distinction between those rights, which
are derogable in a national emergency, and those which are not; this should
be done more rationally and thoughtfully, than done in NT 37(5)" .497
The above aspects were rectified and the "new and improved" Section 37
appears below.
(4.)THE "USTIFICATION FOR SECTION 37 OF THE
CONSTITUTION OF THE REPUBLIC OF SOUTH AFRICA, 1996:
STATES OF EMERGENCY:
37.
(1) A state of emergency may be declared only in terms of an Act of
Parliament, and only when -
(a) the life of the nation is threatened by war, invasion, general
insurrection, disorder, natural disaster or other public
emergency; and
(b) the declaration is necessary to restore peace and order.
(2) A declaration of a state of emergency, and any legislation
enacted or other action taken in consequence of that
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declaration, may be effective only-
(a) prospectively; and
(b) for no more than 21 days from the date of the declaration,
unless the National Assembly resolves to extend the
declaration. The Assembly may extend a declaration of a
state of emergency for no more than three months at a time.
The first extension of the state of emergency must be by a
resolution adopted with a supporting vote of a majority of the
members of the Assembly. Any subsequent extension must
be by a resolution adopted with a supporting vote of at least
60 per cent of the members of the Assembly. A resolution in
terms of this paragraph may be adopted only following a
public debate in the Assembly.
(3) Any competent court may decide on the validity of -
(a) a declaration of a state of emergency;
(b) any extension of a declaration of a state of emergency; or
(c) any legislation enacted, or other action taken, in
consequence of a declaration of a state of emergency.
(4) Any legislation enacted in consequence of a declaration of a
state of emergency may derogate from the Bill of Rights only to
the extent that -
(a) the derogation is strictly required by the emergency; and
(b) the legislation-
(i) is consistent with the Republic's obligations under
international law applicable to states of emergency;
(ii) conforms to subsection (5); and
(iii) is published in the national Govemment Gazette as
soon as reasonably possible after being enacted.
(5) No Act of Parliament that authorises a declaration of a state of
emergency, and no legislation enacted or other action taken in
consequence of a declaration, may permit or authorise-
(a) indemnifying the state, or any person, in respect of any
unlawful act;
(b) any derogation from this section; or
{c) any derogation from a section mentioned in column 1 of the
Table of Non-Derogable Rights, to the extent indicated
opposite that section in column 3 of the Table.
The decision to include a provision on states of emergency and the
suspension of fundamental rights in the 1993 Constitution, was controversial.
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Many opposed its inclusion because of serious human rights abuses in the
past. Some argued, that a Bill of Rights should not, allow for the suspension,
of the very rights, it has to protect. There is also the disturbing tendency for
f t b Ut I" 498states 0 emergency 0 ecome perpe ua .
Not all "emergencies" justify an official state of emergency and the suspension
of fundamental rights. Only those, which threaten the life of a nation, require
exceptional measures. The best way to prevent abuse of this power, and
unlawful infringement of fundamental rights, is to provide for comprehensive
constitutional checks in such situations. In times of emergency, the protection
of fundamental rights becomes all the more important. Section 37 is such an
emergency clause, which may only be implemented under the control of a
supreme Constitution, which provides for extensive judicial and legislative
controls.
The absence of such a provision in a Constitution, is no guarantee that
exceptional powers will not be invoked. Even countries without explicit
derogation clauses in their Constitutions, sometimes find it necessary to
invoke emergency powers.499 Such measures are then justified by invoking
"implied provisions", common-law grounds, prerogative powers, martial law,
the principle of sa/us reipublicae suprema lex, or the right of the state to self-
defence, or necessity. The danger, is that these grounds may suggest some
"extra-constitutional" source of executive power which is beyond normal
constitutional and judicial control.
A clear and adequate provision in a justiciable Constitution, provides for a
more satisfactory and transparent treatment of this subject-matter. It is also
the best way to restrict emergency powers, to the truly exceptional instances
when ordinary measures have become inadequate to protect the life of the
nation. The 1996 Constitution, now governs this whole area. Concepts such
as prerogative powers, martial law, and other common-law provisions, which,
in the past excluded judicial control, can no longer apply.
(5.) THE RELATION OF SECTION 37 TO OTHER FUNDAMENTAL
RIGHTS:
Section 37 forms a part of the Bill of Rights of the Constitution. This provides
an important guideline with respect to its interpretation. Suspension of rights
should be interpreted strictly, and the formalities and requirements should
always be adhered to. The ultimate aim, remains the protection of society, by
safeguarding fundamental rights, constitutionalism, and democratic
government. The purpose is never to protect the government of the day.50o
The interpretation of Section 37, should be based on the new and original
basis provided for by the Constitution of 1996. Previous judgements have
become largely irrelevant. New guidelines, in addition to the text of Section 37,
are in terms of Section 39(1), to be gleaned from public international law and
foreign case law. Most international human rights conventions, contain
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derogation clauses.501 Their implementation reveals useful guidelines and
case law. The international-law requirements, with respect to public
emergencies, do not flow from international agreements only. They are
provided for in customary international Jaw as well. 502
As pointed out, in Section A of my dissertation, the International Law
Association has approved a set of minimum standards, referred to as the Paris
Minimum Standards of Human Rights Norms in a State of Emergency. These
standards govern all aspects related to the declaration and administration of
states of emergency. The Siracusa Principles, also dealt with earlier, deal with
limitation and derogation, as developed under the International Covenant on
Civil and Political Rights. 503
The South African courts, have already indicated their preparedness to adhere
to other international standards, such as the Standard Minimum Rules on the
treatment of prisoners. In S v Daniels,504 this was done without any detailed
analysis of their legal status. The Supreme Court, simply accepted them as
"riglyne vir die behandeling van gevangenes wat deur talle lande as 'n
bloudruk vir hulle gevangenisstelsels beskou word". It also took judicial notice,
of the fact that prison authorities in South Africa already follow a policy of
adhering to these guidelines. This seems to suggest that international state
practice and standards, are acceptable as a yardstick for executive action.
After the coming into effect of the 1996 Constitution, they may serve the
additional purpose, of elaborating and explaining certain provisions of Chapter
2.
A suspension clause, should be distinguished from a limitation clause. The
latter will not provide adequate legal guidance in times of public emergency.505
A limitation clause authorizes restrictions on fundamental rights under "normal"
conditions. A suspension clause, on the other hand, provides for temporary
suspension of rights, and operates only in exceptional situations, when a
public emergency threatens the life of the nation.
The following discussion, will deal with the formal and substantive
requirements applicable to a state of emergency and the suspension of
fundamental rights.
(6.)THE EXISTENCE OF AN EXCEPTIONAL THREAT:
What is the precise definition of the kind of emergency, which justifies the
suspension of fundamental rights? Section 37, requires that such an
emergency, shall be declared only "when the security of the Republic is
threatened by war, invasion, general insurrection or disorder or at a time of
natural disaster, and if the declaration is necessary to restore peace and
order".
The use of the word "where" (in Afrikaans "waar") in the 1993 Constitution was
unfortunate. At first glance, it suggested location, instead of the more logical
requirement that when certain conditions prevail, then an emergency may be
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declared. This was the type of formulation adopted with respect to a "national
disaster" and has been reformulated in the 1996 Constitution, to read as,
"when the security of the Republic ... ".
Certain exceptional conditions, must exist before an emergency may be
declared. This is also the internationally accepted approach. Both the
European Convention and the International Covenant on Civil and Political
Rights (ICCPR) indicate when an emergency may be declared.506
The following requirements, with respect to, the nature of the threat, must be
met:
(a) The emergency must be actual or imminent. There must be a real threat of
war, invasion, general insurrection or disorder, or a national disaster must
already exist. A "preventive emergency" will be unlawful.507 Convincing
proof of the existence of an imminent threat, will be required. This requires
a factual judgement of the evidence available.
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(b) The emergency must be of exceptional magnitude. This usually requires a
threat to the whole of the population.509 An emergency experienced in one
part of the country only, but affecting the whole nation will satisfy this
requirement. A localized emergency affecting only the local population-i
may be problematic, although some commentators find it acceptable.5 0
Chowdhury,511 provides the following useful discussion:
"Relying upon the decision of the European Court in Ireland v UK,
Buergenthal points out, that a public emergency need not engulf or
threaten the entire nation before it can be said to "threaten the life of
the nation". One must distinguish between the seriousness of a threat
and the geographical boundaries, in which the threat appears or from
which it emanates. A public emergency which threatens the life of a
nation "could presumably exist even if the emergency appeared to be
confined to one part of the country - for example, one of its provinces,
states or cantons - and did not threaten to spill over to other parts of
the country". A contrary interpretation, argues Buergenthal, would be
unreasonable "since it would prevent a state party from declaring a
public emergency in one of its remote provinces, where a large-scale
armed insurrection was in progress merely because it appeared that the
conflict would not spread to other provinces"."
(c) The life of the nation must be threatened. This requirement is found in both
the European Convention and the ICCPR. This has been interpreted by the
European Court, in the Lawless case, to "refer to an exceptional situation
of crisis or emergency, which affects the whole population and constitutes
a threat to the or~anized life of the community, of which the state is
composed ... ".51 Another commentator interprets this requirement to mean
"a crisis situation affecting the population as a whole and constituting a
threat to the oraanized existence of the community, which forms the basis
of the State".513'
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Section 34 of the 1993 Constitution, unfortunately, deviated from this
requirement and employed a formulation of uncertain content: "the security
of the Republic". The concept of "state security" formed the basis for
previous states of emergency, which were widely condemned because of
wide executive discretion, human rights abuses, and lack of judicial
protection.
"Security" was qualified in Section 34(1) by linking it to war, invasion,
general insurrection or disorder, or national disaster. This created another
problem. Lists are incomplete, (as this one was514) and could not anticipate
all possible manifestations. Each case has to be judged on its own merits,
taking into account the overriding concem for the continuance of a
democratic society.
This problem has been rectified by Section 37 of the 1996 Constitution,
where the words "the security of the Republic is threatened " have been
replaced with the words, "the life of the nation is threatened ". Moreover,
the list of possible manifestations is not a closed list, and its scope has
been increased with the insertion of the words "or other public emergency".
The list provided in Section 34(1), created an additional and serious
problem. A "state of war" was the first of the conditions listed, as justifying
a public emergency. Section 82(4) empowered the President to declare a
"state of national defence".
Nowhere was any official, empowered to declare war, apparently with the
objective in mind, of bringing the South African position in line with the
United Nations Charter. Article 2(4) of the UN Charter, states that all
members "shall refrain in their intemational relations from the threat or use
of force against the territorial integrity or political independence of any
state, or in any other manner inconsistent with the purposes of the United
Nations". Article 51 permits only individual or collective self-defence.
Section 34(1), should clearly have referred to a "state of national defence"
and not "war". As it stood, a state of war was possible because Section 34
foresaw it. However, nothing in the 1993 Constitution regulated its
declaration. (It seemed that the technical committee drafting Section 82 of
the 1993 Constitution, forgot to inform the drafters of Chapter 3). This
introduced the danger of unwritten or prerogative powers being retained,
which would have undermined the supreme character of the 1993
Constitution and its comprehensive control of executive powers.
Since the implications of the above problem were realized, and it was
recognized that there are no powers beyond those provided for in the
Constitution, Chapter 5 of the 1996 Constitution, dealing with the powers
and functjons of the President, has omitted the words "declare a state of
national defence".
The intemational standard used, is one, which puts the emphasis, on the
118
gravity of the circumstances. 515 That facilitates subsequent judicial scrutiny. As
a result of the unfortunate formulation found in Section 34(1), another
international standard, ("to the extent strictly required by the exigencies of the
situation"), was lost. The Siracusa Principles deal with this standard in
considerable detail, and list severity, duration, and geographic scope as
requirements. 516 A more satisfactory application of the proportionality test,
would then also have been possible. Proportionality is inherent in the words
"strictly required".
It should be possible to deal with certain events such as strikes, less
severe natural disasters, or even internal strife by imposing "normal"
restrictions on the freedom of movement or assembly, as provided for in a
typical limitation clause. Such events, do not as a rule, constitute a threat
to the life of the nation. The real test, is the gravity of the situation and
whether the measures taken are necessary "to the extent strictly required
by the exigencies of the situation". Fortunately, the 1996 Constitution,
rectified this problem and the words "strictly required" have been added to
Section 37.
Economic difficulties per se, unaccompanied by an additional crisis, should
not constitute a threat to the life of the nation. The opinion has also been
expressed that "prolonged economic problems of underdevelopment are
not inherently temporary phenomena, and are thus incompatible with the
requirement that the threat to the life of the nation, be exceptional".517 It
may conceivably be necessary to resort to emergency measures, in order
to secure the sURply of essential goods and services, under exceptional
circumstances.5 8 The lawfulness of such measures, will depend on the
gravity of the situation, whether the measures are proportionate to the
need, and whether the limitation powers are insufficient.
(d) A state of emergency must be a measure of last resort. If the ordinary law
of the land can deal with the needs of a situation, a state of emergency is
not permissible. The normal provisions of the law should first be
exhausted.
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They include the limitation clause, providing for evef<rday
constitutionally acceptable limits to the exercise of human rights. 52 Section
37(1), seems to recognize this principle, by requiring that a state of
emergency will be declared only when "necessary to restore peace and
order".
(e) A state of emergency must be a temporary measure. This flows from its
very nature. Suspension of rights, must therefore end, when the threat has
disappeared. "Permanent states of emergency" are unlawfuI.521 Section 37
is basically in conformity with this re~uirement. Once peace and order is
restored, an emergency should end. 22 It shall be of force for not longer
than twenty-one days "unless it is extended for a period of not longer than
t~ree months, ~r consecutive. periods of not lon~er than three months at a
time, by resolution of the National Assembly".52 Each such extension, will
have to be justified in terms of the requirements for lawful emergencies
and any superior court, shall be competent to examine each extension, in
terms of all the substantive and procedural requirements provided for.
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(7.)OFFICIAL PROCLAMATION AND ~UDICIALCONTROL:
A state of emergency cannot,exist, unless officially declared. Its proclamation
must be by an authority competent and legally empowered to do so. The
reason for such a proclamation, is to announce publicly the existence of an
exceptional situation and to inform the public about the special conditions,
powers, suspension of rights, controls, and remedies which will apply. Such a
declaration, and all subsequent regulations, should contain sufficient
information to explain the reasons for the emergency, when it will come into
effect, and the scope and effect of any suspension of rights. A de facto state
of emergency is not permitted.
These requirements are to ensure respect for the rule of law, constitutionalism
and a Bill of Rights. They also find support in public international law.524 Under
international human rights agreements, states are in addition, required to
inform other state parties and supervisory bodies in international
organizations.
Public announcement and justification, will help to prevent arbitrariness, lead
to a greater appreciation of the seriousness of such an exceptional state of
affairs, and secure greater transparency. Judicial and political control, with
respect to both announcement and implementation, are necessary to ensure
the achievement of these goals.
Section 37 provides for practically all these requirements. The following may
be pointed out:
(a) All powers with respect to the proclamation of emergencies, flow from the
Constitution and laws passed in terms thereof. Prerogatives and wide
discretionary powers no longer exist.
(b) A state of emergency is to be declared with future effect, ("A state of
emergency shall be proclaimed prospectively ... ,,525).
(c) No rights may be suspended unless a state of emergency is first
proclaimed.
(d) An Act of the new Parliament, will have to be adopted, to provide for the
power to declare an emergency. The fact that emergencies are foreseen to
be proclaimed "under" an Act of Parliament, suggests the passing of a
general empowering Act, which provides for subsequent executive action.
(e) Such an Act, will have to comply with all the requirements of Section 37
and the Constitution in general, in order to be valid. The Constitutional
Court may decide its constitutionality, as it may do with respect to all bills
and Acts of Parliament.
526
Section 37(3), ptovides for a critical role for the
judiciary: "Any competent court, may decide on the validity, of a declaration
of a state of emergency, any extension of a declaration of a state of
1'lO
emergency; or any legislation enacted, or other action taken, in
consequence, of a declaration of a state of emergency."
May judgement be passed on the substance of the proclamation, (the need
for it, its justification), or only on procedural matters? Does the "political"
nature of the decision to proclaim an emergency, exclude judicial control?
The "validity" of a state of emergency must inevitably include those
substantive grounds justifying its proclamation. Sufficient factual proof of
the existence of the threat of war, invasion, insurrection, etcetera should
be supplied, in order to justify the extraordinary device, which a state of
emergency is. In addition it will also have to show that "a state of
emergency is to restore peace and order" and why less severe measures
will not suffice. Such facts are constitutional preconditions, for declaring an
emergency.
Care should be taken, not to continue with former practices and
approaches inhibiting judicial control or to introduce new doctrines, which
compromise the Constitution. It is a supreme Constitution, which has to
give effect to the objectives of the constitutional state and an enforceable
Bill of Rights. The judiciary has a constitutional obligation to protect and
enforce this Constitution. This inevitably entails effective control over all
exercise of power, which may violate the Constitution.
Section 37 forms a part of the Bill of Rights, the ultimate purpose of which
is to protect fundamental rights. Suspension is an extraordinary power and
decisions to proclaim emergencies, should be subjected to strict judicial
scrutiny. All the organs of the State, now have to respect and promote the
new constitutional order, which is based on the "sovereignty" of the
Constitution. The sovereignty of Parliament is over.
(f) The executive branch, will be responsible for the actual proclamation of an
emergency and for specific regulations, in order to give effect to it. This is a
decision to be taken by the President in consultation with the Cabinet.
(g) A state of emergency shall last not more than twenty-one days. Extension
for periods not exceeding three months, or consecutive periods of three
months, is possible. Such an extension, requires a resolution by a two-
thirds majority, of all the members of the National Assembly. This provides
for control by the legislature, and is an important example of checks and
balances. An elected legislature, is to demand convincing proof before an
extension will be granted.
. (h) Certain substantive constitutional limits are set for law, regulations, or
executive action dealing with public emergencies. No retrospective crimes
may be created, state responsibility cannot be avoided, and certain
fundamental rights, are considered non-derogable, and may therefore, not
be suspended during an emergency.527
(i) Judicial remedies and relief are provided for, covering all aspects of an
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emergency, its declaration, and all steps taken thereunder. This, inter alia,
includes issues such as the constitutionality of the Act proclaiming an
emergency, referred to in Section 37(1), the declaration of an emergency,
control over subsequent action, (including the ultra vires principle), and
relief for individuals, acting under Section 38.
Section 37 provides an important yardstick for judicial review. Rights may be
suspended only "to the extent necessary to restore peace and order". This is a
clear proportionality test528 and permits judicial investigation into the object
and effect of suspension and of the cause of the emergency. The State will, by
necessity, have to provide proof justifying its measures.
0) The Constitution's jurisdictional provisions must be taken into account.
Only a "competent court", may enquire into the validity, of a declaration of
a state of emergency, its extension, and "any legislation enacted, or other
action taken, in consequence, of a declaration of a state of emergency".
This latter formulation is unfortunate. It apparently excludes the jurisdiction
of lower courts with respect to executive acts and human rights protection
otherwise enjoyed. The lower courts do, however, have jurisdiction with
respect to at least, those aspects of an emergency dealing with detained
people.529
(k) The position of persons detained during an emergency, (the term
"detention without trial" is avoided), is dealt with extensively. Provision is
made for notification of relatives, publication of the names of detainees,
judicial review of the duration of detention, access to legal representatives,
and medical services. The state "must present written reasons ... "justifying
detentioQ or extension thereof.530 This suggests, that the executive branch
is required to provide reasons, and to provide substantive grounds for the
further detention of a detainee.
(8.) NON-DEROGABILITY OF CERTAIN FUNDAMENTAL RIGHTS:
TABLE OF NON-DEROGABLE RIGHTS:
1 2 3
SECTION NUMBER SECTION TITLE EXTENT TO WHICH
THE RIGHT IS
PROTECTED









10 HUMAN DIGNITY ENTIRELY.
11 LIFE ENTIRELY.
12 FREEDOM AND WITH RESPECT TO
SECURITY OF THE SUB-SECTIONS (1 )(d)
PERSON AND (e) AND (2)(c).
13 SLAVERY, SERVITUDE WITH RESPECT TO
AND FORCED LABOUR SLAVERY AND
SERVITUDE.
28 CHILDREN WITH RESPECT TO:
- SUB-SECTION (1 )(d)
AND (e).
- THE RIGHTS IN
SUB-PARAGRAPHS
(I) AND (11) OF SUB-
SECTION (I) (9); AND









35 ARRESTED, DETAINED WITH RESPECT TO:
AND ACCUSED - SUB-SECTIONS
PERSONS (1)(a), (b) AND (c)
AND (2)(d);
- THE RIGHTS IN
PARAGRAPHS (a)














Even in times of emergency, there are certain rights that may not be
suspended. The State has to refrain from suspending certain non-derogable
rights. Extra care should be taken during a public emergency, to ensure strict
respect for the law. The Constitution and the law in general, do not cease to
apply during an emergency. It is a legal condition, governed by those
provisions in the Constitution, provided by Section 37. The courts and other
organs of the State will continue to function, and responsibility for unlawful
behaviour will still ensue.
Apart from the obligation not to suspend certain fundamental rights, a state
must also:
"[tlake special precautions, in a time of public emergency, to ensure,
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that neither official nor semi-official groups, engage in a practice of
arbitrary, and extra-judicial killings, or involuntary disappearances, that
persons in detention, are protected against torture, and other forms of
cruel, inhuman, or degrading treatment, or punishment, and that no
persons are convicted under laws or decrees, with retroactive
effect".531
Public intematiOriallaw, is of considerable importance in this regard. Under
customary intemationallaw, no state, may suspend or violate the right to life;
freedom from torture or cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment,
and from medical or scientific experimentation; the right not to be held in
slavery or involunta~servitude; and the right not to be subjected to retroactive
criminal penalties,53 which is generally recognized, as one of the most
fundamental human rights, never to be suspended.
This is an extensive list, and requires some clarification. A suspension clause,
is based on a principle which limits the right of the state, to take measures
suspending certain human rights standards when it faces an emergency. Why
should certain fundamental rights be non-derogable? In terms of what criteria
should they be selected? It is difficult to detect any single set of criteria from
the wide list provided in Section 37.
The first important consideration, is that Section 37 provides for all
emergencies - from a localized natural disaster to a full-scale war.533 There
remain no extra-constitutional powers, such as martial law which will allow
stricter emergency measures.
To argue that such rights may be limited under Section 36, is to miss the
important difference between a limitation and a derogation, (suspension)
clause. The former is of permanent application - in normal and "peaceful"
times. It provides for the regulation by the state, of the exercise of fundamental
rights, never for their suspension. Suspension is only possible under Section
37. If the latter, singles out certain rights and puts them beyond the reach of
suspension, then they are permanently non-derogable.
To make the list of non-derogable rights as wide as possible, in the belief that
a pro-rights approach is thereby displayed, is mistaken. The exact opposite
may be achieved. To include rights, which are not particulaw at risk in
emergencies, could have an adverse psychological effect.5 In the case of
war, which is the gravest emergency, more extreme needs, are experienced,
than in situations of less gravity. The temptation may then arise to resort to
"implied" powers going beyond Section 37, in order to suspend certain rights,
because of extreme need, despite the fact that they are listed in Section 37 as
non-derogable. Justifications may be "discovered" elsewhere in the
Constitution. That will undermine the effect and finality of Section 37, as well
as the supreme nature of the Constitution, as a whole. It should be accepted,
as is clearly shown by the practice under international human rights treaties,
that not all rights have the same relevance with regard to suspension and
public emergencies. Those rights, which are more important, also need closer
and stricter scrutiny when the necessity for suspension, (and proportionality) is
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determined.535
The approach should rather be to identify a criterion, in terms of which to
determine non-derogability. That is why "a threat to the life of the nation",
which is found in most international instruments,536, (including Section 37), is
such a central concept. If some examples are still to be included, a shorter list
is to be preferred. It will give strength to the category of such rights. Only
those rights, which are absolutely fundamental and permanently indispensable
for the protection of human beings, should be included. They are the rights
whose suspension, can never be justified, because their exercise will not
hamper the protection of the life of the nation.
International instruments contain four common non-derogable rights: the right
to life; the right to be free from torture or inhuman or degrading treatment;
"freedom from slavery or servitude"; and the right to be free from a retroactive
application of penal laws. These rights are generally accepted to besnot onlynorms of customary international law, but also norms of jus cogens. 37
Certain international agreements, such as the 1949 Geneva Conventions on
the Laws of War for the protection of war victims, (to which South Africa is a
party) and its 1977 Protocols, (to which South Africa is not a party), contain
important principles and indications of non-derogable rights. Under the 1977
Additional Protocol 11, the following rights with respect to penal prosecution,
shall be respected under all circumstances by state parties to the Protocol:
(a) The duty to give notice of charges without delay and to grant the necessary
rights and means of defence;
(b) Conviction only on the basis of individual penal responsibility;
(c) The right not to be convicted, or sentenced to a heavier penalty, by virtue
of retroactive criminal legislation;
(d) The presumption of innocence;
(e) Trial in the presence of the accused;
(f) No obligation on the accused to testify against himself or to confess guilt;
and
(g) The duty to advise the convicted person on judicial and other remedies. 538
Some ILO Conventions, contain a number of rights, dealing with such matters
as forced labour, freedom of association, equality in employment, and trade
union and workers' rights, which are not subject to derogation during an
emergency; others permit derogation, but only to the extent strictly necessary,
to meet the exigencies of the situation. 539
(8.1) Detainees:
Chapter 2 of the Constitution provides for two categories of detainees. Section
1'26
35 deals with "arrested, detained and accused persons" under the fair trial
provisions. Section 37 deals with detainees held under emergency powers.
Only this latter category of detainees, is considered in this Section.
Persons detained under a state of emergency, should be protected against
arbitrary detention and the right to due process of the law, should be provided
for. Section 37(6) provides for most of what is required, in this regard.
Although the protection is listed as "conditions" of detention, it amounts to
rights, which "must" be protected. The broad provisions of Section 38, will
allow for the necessary locus standi, to ensure compliance. That is why "an
adult family member or friend of the detainee must be notified of the detention
as soon as is reasonably possible". The other conditions relate to the official
publication of the names of detainees, access to courts, legal representation
and access thereto, and access to a medical practitioner of the detainee's
choice.
Further protection, should include safeguards against incommunicado
detention and to ensure humane treatment, judicial review of the period of
detention and of its lawfulness, notification, general due process standards,
and protection against interrogation abuses and against changes in the
application of the law of evidence. Not all of these safeguards appear in
Section 37.
When the due process provisions of Section 35, or those recognizing the
freedom and security of the person under Section 12 are suspended, the
detention has to be reviewed by a court of law, within ten days. The court
"must release the detainee unless it is necessary to continue the detention to
restore peace and order".54o This amounts to full substantive judicial control. "If
a court releases a detainee, that person may not be detained again, on the
same grounds, unless the state first shows a court good cause for re-detaining
that person". 541
These are minimum guarantees, which have to ensure the correct application
of a suspension clause, with respect to detainees, as required by the principle
of proportionality.542 The right of the State to take measures in times of an
emergency, is always conditioned by the principle of proportionality, which
holds that measures must be strictly required, by the exigencies of the
situation.
It is important to emphasize the non-derogable character of these remedies.
Many of them are based on the minimum guarantees contained in the four
1949 Geneva Conventions on the Laws of War and its subsequent Protocols.
South Africa is a party to the 1949 Conventions. The principles of public
international law contained in the Conventions, has become domestically
applicable, especially through customary international law, in terms of Sections
232 and 233 of the 1996 Constitution. International humanitarian law,
increasin~ includes human rights standards applicable to internal strife and
uprisings. 3
1'27
(9.) THE RULE OF PROPORTIONALITY:
Droportionality is a general principle of law, that finds application in several
areas, especially in human rights. It is of particular importance, in the context
of the suspension, (derogation of rights). Here, it is the main substantive
criterion to assess the legality of the suspension measures, taken by the State
in situations of emergency. Suspension measures must be proportionate to
the threat. That is why a central criterion such as "a public emergency
threatening the life of the nation" is so important. Its absence from Section 34,
of the Interim Constitution was detrimental to the meaningful operation, of the
requirement of proportionality and the use of comparative case law. Practically
all, international human rights instruments, employ this concept. However, as
pointed out earlier, this problem has been rectified in Section 37 of the 1996
Constitution.
Proportionality applies after the first suspension measures have been taken.
Circumstances change during the existence of an emergency, and the gravity
of the situation can vary. Measures dealing with the emergency, must also
vary accordingly. Proportionality must exist in each of the phases. Once the
emergency has ended, or its gravity diminishes, the suspension measures no
longer have any justification. International practice, has generated the
-following principles, with respect to the proportionality of suspension
measures:
"1 Measures derogating from human rights standards can be taken only
when the ordinary provisions of the law and the limitations foreseen for
peacetime, are not enough to deal with the emergency.
2 The mere existence of a public emergency threatening the life of the
nation, within the meaning of the derogation clause, does not justify
ipso facto, every derogation from human rights standards. Each
measure of derogation, taken in a lawfully declared emergency, should
be necessary and proportionate to the threat.
3 Each measure of derogation, has to bear a relation to the threat; in
other words, there must be a link between the facts of the emergency
and the measures taken.
4 The measures of derogation, taken by the government, should
potentially be able to overcome the emergency. This, however, does
not mean that the judgement on the strict necessity of the measures,
will depend on the fact that the measures actually overcome the
emergency.
5 At the same time, the fact that a government did not take preventive
measures before the emergency arose, or at an earlier stage, does not
affect its right to take derogating measures once the emergency has
arisen. The necessity and the proportionality of the measures should be
judged, in the light of the current state of emergency.
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6 As far as the rights recognized, in the human rights treaties are
concerned, not all rights have the same relevance. Therefore, those
rights, which are more important, need closer and stricter scrutiny,
when the necessity for derogation and the proportionality to the threat
are judged.
7 In assessing whether a derogating state has complied with the principle
of proportionality, the monitoring organs, have to take into account, not
only the need for bringing the derogating measures into operation, but
also the manner in which the derogating measures have been applied
in practice.
8 In analysing the principle of proportionality, the monitoring bodies,
should take into account, not only the necessity and proportionality of a
given measure, for example, administrative detention, but also the
necessity and proportionality, of the suspension, of some of the
guarantees, linked with the derogated right, for example, the writ of
habeas corpus.
9 In order to assess the proportionality of the derogating measures, the
monitoring bodies, should analyse the other less grave alternatives
open to the government, in dealing with the emergency.
10 In assessing the compliance, with the principle of proportionality,
special importance should be attached to the necessary safeguards
taken by governments in order to avoid abuses.
11 In order to analyse the proportionality of the measures, and the
sufficiency of the safeguards against abuses, attention should be paid
to every different phase of the emergency.
12 ... [s]tates of emergency are essentially temporary; in other words, they
are only justified, as long as, the emergency lasts. Consequently, all
measures of derogation are justified, only as long as the emergency
lasts. Therefore, a derogating measure, is not strictly required by the
situation, if it continues to be in force once the emergency has
ended.,,544
(10.)THE PRINCIPLE OF NON-DISCRIMINATION:
The principle of non-discrimination, finds application in the context of
suspension clauses too. Some international instruments prohibit discrimination
on the ground of race, colour, sex, language, religion, or social origin. It is also
a requirement of customary international law. A general non-discrimination
clause, elsewhere in a Bill of Rights, should be adequate to ensure respect for
equality, also when public emergencies are declared and suspension
measures are taken.
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(11.) CONSISTENCY WITH OTHER INTERNATIONAL LEGAL
OBLIGATIONS:
International instruments, often determine that the right of a state to take
suspension measures, in times of emergencies is limited by the condition that
such measures, must not be inconsistent with the state's other obligations
under international law.545 This will have the effect of raising requirements, to




It is not easy to devise universal norms, for regulating the conduct of the ruling
elates, in different states of emergency. Emergency situations create an
insurmountable dilemma for democratic governments because, on the one
hand, such a government is under an obligation to protect the integrity of the
state, while on the other, it is under an obligation to protect human rights. It is
because of such a dilemma, that even in the liberal democracies of the West,
suspension of basic human rights, during a public crisis, has received
constitutional sanction.
However, in my dissertation, I have attempted to illustrate, without minimizing,
the gravity of the problems, that states of emergency pose, that it is possible
to devise the norms, and mechanisms of a viable international system, to
regulate the behaviour of public authorities, in a state of emergency, in
conformity with the common legal aspirations, of the world's community, of
legal scholars and practitioners. In a nutshell, the hurdle that needs to be
overcome, by a state facing a public crisis, (particularly where, the executive
branch of government, assumes more power, than is healthy for a state, as
occurred in South Africa), will meet the same difficulty, as Alice met, in the
dialogue with Humpty Dumpty:
"When I use a word," Humpty Dumpty said in a rather scornful tone, "it
means just what I choose it to mean, neither more or less." "The
question is," said Alice, "whether you can make words mean so many
different things." "The question is," said Humpty Dumpty, "which is to be
master - that's all.,,546
If we are to believe in the rule of law, and have a successful system of
government under the law, we cannot ignore violations of a gross, systematic
and egregious nature, which took place in our recent past. The events did not
happen either by accident or in a vacuum. They have left behind aggrieved
individuals, families and loved ones. They have torn the fabric of our society.
They have demeaned South Africa internationally. However, as writer and
philosopher, Laurens van der Post, importantly points out:
"Everything in life is a story. And the story of mankind is history: without
history we have no meaning. The story of man, and of life made flesh in
man, is the soul of its own perceptions. It provides us with the sense of
living mystery in life. And it helps to heighten our sensitivities, our
perceptions, our awareness. And it carries us on."
Our new Constitution, is one law for one nation. It ensures that no government
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the life of the whole nation; the reality seems to be, that for the purposes of
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process, in the shortest possible time. In other words, revolutionary
governments are ·not disqualified from use of the derogation privilege, but they
may not abuse it to consolidate power rather than to reflect the will of the
~eople". (Emphasis added). Ibid, Siracusa symposium, 118-19.
5 Daes, supra note 35, para 67(a) at 193.
56 Conclusion 5 of Committee I, Lagos Conference on the Rule of Law, 1961,
.Brownlie, supra note 11 at 427-8.
57 UN Seminar on Effective Realization of Civil and Political Rights, Kingston,
Jamaica, 1967, STITAO/HR-29, para 173 at 40. Certain speakers at the
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when that body is not in session and for reasons provided in the
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limited, as it is essential to specify concretely those rights and
guarantees whose enjoyment cannot be fully ensured." See 1959
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66 Mission to South Africa: The Commonwealth Report: The Findings of the
Commonwealth Eminent Persons Group on Southern Africa (Penguin, 1986)
at 64. Some of the relevant findings of the EPG are as follows:
(a) In 1960 a state of emergency was declared throughout the country. This
gave wide powers to prohibit gatherings, to search people and premises
and to resort to force. New powers of detention without trial were
introduced; it became an offence to make any statement likely to subvert
the authority of the government or to incite others to resist; newspapers
could be banned. When the state of emergency was lifted, many of the
new powers became prominent features of the South Africa laws.
(b) The lifting of the 1960 state of emergency did not end the scope of
detention without trial. The security laws were extended and were
consolidated in the Internal Security Act of 1982. This, among other
formidable powers, allowed for indefinite preventive detention for
"interrogation", a power, much abused, by the security forces. The same
Act also contained the power for a Minister to "ban" organizations and
individuals. The banned individual could be required to stay for years in a
certain place, prohibited from attending gatherings and prevented from
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being quoted. A typical example of the extensive scope of the banning
orders would appear from those served on Mrs Winnie Mandela.
(c) (annex 5 to the report) which covered the period from 2 July 1983 to June
1988). Such an array of state powers, many of which, were not subject to
review, by the courts, coupled with the extraordinarily wide definitions of
"communism", "terrorism", "treason" and sedition, rendered the country, in
the experience of the Blacks, a police state, with a permanent state of
emergency, so much so, that the lawyers with whom members of the EPG
spoke, had been surprised, that the government found it necessary, to
impose a formal state of emergency, in 1985, unless it were to placate, its
right wing.
(d) According to the EPG, this move saw three developments. First, the power
to make mass arrests and detention without trial was extended to every
single member of the police force, the railway police, the prison service and
the army. Second, the final vestiges of legal control, over the authorities,
were removed, by preventing the courts, from setting aside orders, made
under the emergency regulations, and in advance, all State officials were
made immune from liability, both civil and criminal, for all unlawful acts,
(except those, in which a complainant, could prove bad faith). Third, press
censorship was provided for, with bans on photographs and access to
affected areas.
(e) The emergency was lifted on 7 March 1986 during the visit of the EPG.
However, when announcing the lifting of the emergency, the govemment
foreshadowed increased powers for the security forces.
(t) There had been serious violations of the right to life and liberty. Since the
unrest at the time began, over 1700 people had been killed; another twenty
people were killed while in police custody, most of them under the age of
twenty-five, one was only thirteen. During the state of emergency alone,
the security forces admitted having killed about half of the 792 people
whose deaths were recorded in official figures; many of them were under
the age of eighteen.
(g) Again, during the state of emergency, an estimated 11,500 persons, were
detained without charge, including 2000 children, under the age of sixteen;
an additional 25000 people, many of them young, were arrested on
charges of so-called "public violence" - very few of them were ever
convicted, as most of those charges, were dropped. Most of the political
leaders detained during the emergency were not released even after it was
lifted. (It would be pertinent to recall that Nelson Mandela, the undoubted
leader of the overwhelming majority of the people in South Africa,
completed his twenty-five years of imprisonment on 5 August 1987).
(h) The Supreme Court, shortly after the emergency was lifted, invalidated a
number of banning orders which did not comply with the technical formalities
of the Internal Security Act; the Court had no power to inquire into the
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civil disturbance or opposition to military conscription. The definition of
"subversive statement" also included any opposition to the govemment or
promoting sanctions or disinvestments. The only public places where free
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Weekly, London, 22 June 1986).
The Supreme Court of the Transvaal declared invalid a wide range of
restrictions introduced by the new decrees, such as, orders gagging a 119
organizations opposing apartheid and the banning of many meetings. The
court ordered that only the Minister of Law or a Commissioner of Police could
issue such orders under the emergency regulations; they could not delegate
this authority to the ordinary Police Chiefs. This judicial attempt to regulate
emergency powers was however nullified when President Botha, overruling
the Court's decision, issued a new decree, early in August, which specifically
empowered the local Police Chiefs to issue orders invalidated by the Court.
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of the power, to detain, without trial, under the Act."
The Irish government, was required to furnish to Parliament, at least every six
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detention, the Commission considered to be no longer justified, those released
in consequence, of the Detention Commission's report, and those released by
the government, on its own initiative. Lawless case, supra, at 123.
The European Court, also took the view, that constant supervision, by
Parliament, which not only received precise details, of the enforcement of the
law, at regular intervals, but also could, at any time, by a resolution, annul the
government's proclamation, which had brought the Act into force, was a very
important safeguard. Lawless case, supra, para 37, at 478.
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Nigeria, 3-7 January 1961 (Geneva, 1961) at 15. The qualification of the
~rinciple in times of emergency is discussed below.
5 Professor Goodhart, supra note 79, gives a pivotal significance to control of
the executive and argues that in the absence of such control the whole system
breaks down: op cit 962. French writers, on the rule of law tend to make it
stand, for control of the executive, above all else.
86 The habeas corpus writ has been exhaustively discussed in legal literature.
There is little point in going over the ground again here. There is a good South
African study in the (1962) 79 SALJ 283.
87 Op cit 300.
88 Op cit 79.
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City, Mexico, UN Doe STITAO/HRl12, para 92 at 26, (1961).
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Level, Kingston, Jamaica, - STITAO/HRl29, para 237(g) at 51, (1967).
94 Daes, supra note 35, paras 90, 91 at 196.
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101 In Sterling v Constantin , 287 US 378, 400-1 (1932), the US Supreme
Court, was of the view, that whether or not declaration of martial law, was
justified, in the facts and circumstances of the case, was a judicial question,
and hence, the decision of the executive, was subject to review, by the
judiciary. The court held that in declaring martial law to control oil production,
the Governor of Texas had exceeded his authority.
On the other hand, a different view was taken in the Hirabayashi case, 320 US
81 at 93 (1943) where, upholding curfew regulations for Japanese-Americans
in the West Coast, the negative judicial role, was emphasized by the Supreme
Court, stating that, where "the choice of means by those branches (political) of
government, on which the constitution has placed, the responsibility for war-
making, it is not for this court, to sit in review of their wisdom, or substitute its
judgement for theirs. "
Some of the views expressed, in the much criticized decision, of Korematsu v
United States, 323 US 214 (1944), (where evacuation and detention, of
Japanese-Americans from the West Coast area, was upheld by the Supreme
Court), support a theory of total abdication, of the role of the judiciary, during
wartime emergency. Thus, Justice Jackson, though of the view that the
evacuation programme was unconstitutional, nevertheless, held that the
courts were powerless to prevent the abuse of war and emergency powers
and the responsibility must be left "to the political jUdgements of their
contemporaries and to the moral judgements of history." Ibid at 248; see also
Alexander, supra, at 14-27.
Like the British courts, Canadian courts are loath to look behind executive
declarations of emergencies: see Alexander, ibid, 42. In Malaysia, the courts
have consistently taken the view that the determination by the government
that an emergency exists and the issuance of proclamation of emergency, are
non-justiciable. See, ICJ, Emergency, supra note 31 at 207.
In India, the position is regulated by Article 352 of the Constitution. A
proclamation of emergency, can be made, if the President, on the basis of the
decision, of the Council of Ministers, is satisfied that a grave emergency
exists, whereby the security of India, or any part of the territory thereof, is
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threatened, whether by war, or external aggression, or armed rebellion. The
Constitution (42nd Amendment) Act, 1967 inserted a clause making the issue
or continuance of emergency immune from judicial review in all respects; this
has however been substituted by the (44th Amendment) Act, 1978.
One distinguished judge, of the Supreme Court, (Bhagwati J as he then was),
was of the view, that any provision debarring judicial review, of a proclamation
of emergency, would be contrary to the basic structure, of the Constitution of
India, and accordingly, unconstitutional and void: Minerva Mills Ltd v Union of
India, AIR (1980) SC 1789, para 105. Although not directly in issue, Bhagwati
J in the same case, expressed his view whether or not a proclamation of
emergency was justiciable. According to him, there is no bar to judicial review
of the validity of a proclamation of emergency merely because the question
has a political complexion. The court should not decline to examine whether it
involves any constitutional violation. He concedes, however, that the power of
judicial review is of a limited nature and would not extend to an examination of
the correctness or adequacy of the facts on which the satisfaction of the
central government is based.
But the existence, of the satisfaction, is a condition precedent, to the exercise
of the power; where therefore, the satisfaction is absurd or perverse, or mala
fide or based on a wholly extraneous, and irrelevant ground, it would be no
satisfaction at all, and would be liable, to be challenged, before the court: Ibid,
~aras 103-5.
02 For instance, one writer suggests both the need for a review and the
appropriate standard to do so: "To prevent the abuse of emergency powers,
courts must review both whether an emergency existed, and more important,
whether the measures taken were necessary to restore order. The best
standard to adopt would be a strict standard of necessity, which would require
that there not be available to the government, alternative means of coping with
the emergency that were as effective as the measures employed but less
restrictive of individual liberties." The National Security Interest and Civil
Liberties, 85 HARV L REV 1130, 1296-7 (1972). Also see, Alexander, supra
note 65 at 20.
103 LR (1980) AC 458 at 470-74. Also see the intervention of this writer in the
Montreal Report of the ILA (1982) at 114-15.
104 ICJ, Emergency, supra note 31 at 176-7.
105 G. Sadanandan v State of Kerala (1966) 2 SCJ 725; also see ICJ,
Emergency, supra note 31 at 186.
106 ICJ, Emergency, supra note 31 at 178.
107 (1981) 2 Supreme Court Reports 1 (decided 9 May 1980/13 November
1980).
.108 Ibid, 45.
109 (1967) 2 SCALE 1322, 1328-30, 1337-8.
110 For example, Bhagwati J, in the case of Minerva Mills v Union of India,
supra, at para 107, expressed his view, that there was nothing in the
Constitution, saying that a proclamation of emergency, validly issued, under
Article 352(1), should cease to operate, as soon as the circumstances,
warranting its issue, have ceased to exist; so long as the proclamation, is not
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revoked by another proclamation, under the Constitution, it would continue to
be in operation, irrespective of change, of circumstances.
111 335 US 160 (1948). In Hamilton v Kentucky Distilleries 251 US 146 (1919),
the Supreme Court held that the Wartime Prohibition Act would apply until
Congress determined that the need no longer existed. See also Alexander,
su;,ra note 65 at 16 .
11 264 US 543 (1924). Also see, Alexander, ibid, at 22.
113 Also see ILA Paris report para 22 at 71; ILA Belgrade report paras 19,20
at 93. In its Seoul report (1986) the ILA points out that the judiciary, in a state
of emergency, is often impaired in three ways:
the loss of jurisdiction to special courts or military tribunals;
the suspension of the writs of amparo or habeas corpus; and
(c) the creation of a climate of fear, sometimes by mass dismissals of judges,
leading to judicial timidity and ineffectiveness. Attorneys may also be
threatened or punished, further impairing the availability of judicial remedies
a~ainst excessive emergency measures (para 16).
11 ICJ, Emergency, supra note 31 at 437.
115 1bid at 16-18. Also see Hartman, Siracusa symposium supra note 18 at
107.
116 Subrata Roy Chowdhury, Rule of Law in a State of Emergency, supra note
34 at 89.
117 UN Doc ElCN 4/SR 127, 14.6, (1949).
118 1984 Report of the HR Committee, para 75 at 14.
119 UN Doe A/2929 at 47 (1955).
120 Siracusa symposium, supra note 18 at 25-6 (O'Donnell), Daes supra note
35.
34 para 185 at 203.
121 Daes, ibid, para 189 at 204.
122 Questiaux, supra note 3, para 44.
123 Buergenthal, supra note 27 at 84; according to this view, a twelve-day
delay, (which was not found fatal in the Lawless case, under the ECHR),
would not ordinarily satisfy the standard required by Article 4(3) of the ICCPR.
124 Daes, supra note 35, para 57 at 193; Questiaux, supra note 3, para 45.
125 Buergenthal, supra note 27 at 84-5.
126 Questiaux, supra note 3, para 46.
127 Daes, supra note 35, para 186 at 203. The travaux preparatoires of the
ICCPR does not cJarify the reason for the change from an amended Belgian
proposal, (which introduced the idea of the "provisions" derogated from to
"measures" taken), it however, seems that "a change of substance was
probably not intended". Hartman, Siraeusa symposium supra note 18 at 104-5.
Also see UN Doe ElCN 4/497 (1950), (for the Belgian proposal); UN Doc ElCN
4/528 at 32 (1951), (New Zealand was critical of the notification of "provisions"
rather than "measures").
128 Questiaux, supra note 3, para 47.
129 1981 Report of the HR Committee at 110, for the text of general comment
5/13.
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power to review submissions, for technical adequacy, as Questiaux suggests,
then the authorization of the Secretary-General, as a depository under Article
4, of the ICCPR, should be sufficient, to sustain the suggested procedure,
even without the two broader provisions, of the European Convention, namely,
Articles 15(5) and 57. The adequacy of a notice of derogation, can be
examined in a continuous and immediate manner, by the Human Rights
Committee, by appointing and delegating appropriate powers to rapporteurs
under Rule 62 of the Provisional Rules of Procedure. Siracusa symposium,
supra note 18 at 102-4.
131 1983 Report of the HR Committee, para 228.
132 Communication no. 34/1978, Jorge Landinelli Si/va v Uruguay, (decision
dated, 8 April 1981), 34/1981 Selected Decisions under the Optional Protocol,
New York, 1985, para 8.3 at 66.
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ANNEXURE 1:
POLITICAL DEVELOPMENT AND THE FOUNDING OF
THE REPUBLIC, 1948 TO 1961:
The day dawns: 31 May 1961
The birth of the Republic
171
"Ssh, now .• be nIce to him - .he says he's .
The 13 M misunderstood "
arch 1961 Commonwealth Conference'In London
The RepubrIC of South A .fnca's problems
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ANNEXURE 2:
THE POLICY OF APARTHEID FROM 1948 TO 1976:
LEGISLATION:
MAJOR LEGISLATION
The Implementation of Apartheid:
"THE PILLARS OF THE HOUSE OF APARTHEID"
1.
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The irony of race classification
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GROUP AREAS REMOVALS AS AT 31 DECEMBER 1971 i
Races No. of families No. of families I'
disqualified resettled
-------+---------:-------,
WHITES 1 598 1 433
COLOUREDS 76 544 41 199
INDIANS 38 561 26294
CHINESE 1 233 68
i .: -- " .. .;;.'-i;{-'-'--'-.,;;.;"...--.~-,.-... .;.... .....;.;;.... ~....
I _._~ :-:"~'---:__~---.;
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Forced removals from Sophiatown (1955)
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TERREIN VIR NIE-BLANKES 3 MYL LAER AF
VURE SLEGS IN VUUR-MAAKPLEKKE TOEGELAAT
SWEM VERBODE
DEPARTMENT OF FORESTRY
PICNIC SITE FOR WHITES ONLY
SITE FOR NON-WHITES 3 MILES LOWER DOWN
FIRES ALLOWED IN FIRE-PLACES ONLY
SWIMMING PROHIBIT.;D
tic;sionary bodies would no longer administer Black schools as this would now be
, ~o~e by the Native Affai.rs Department.
Of \·et\voerd explained the reasons for the passing of this Act as follows:' .
~ .. <q....•...•...........•.....•..•..••...••......•......•.....•.•.•..........
"7here is rz.91}qce, (fortheBan~u) irz th:eEurope~ncS1't:munitya~C?vetheieveI6f ..
certain fo"!!fO!1c#J?ur. ~- .Until1UiUJ .hehasbeen~ubj~cted t~c/§cliOoISyStem .. '
which dreuJ..!zi1r;q~qyfromhiiown. community{l~1:misledhitn :fJyshoWirzg. . .
him the:gr:~~rz.pastures.·ofE~rop:Cln :societ;rin'whicjz ·hewas noiallOwedto. .
,; :. . . ..graze .
----- _._-----_.
PER CAPITA EXPENDITURE ON EDUCATION:
Year Africans Coloured Indian Wh~teJ-
1953/4 R 17 R 40 R 40 R 1281969/70 17 73 81 282 !1975/76 42 140 190 5911977/78 54 185 276 6571980/81 139 253 513 9131982/83 146 498 711 1211.- - .
-.
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"Look! I'm " -savmgWh" "" -i1e civilisation
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HOMELAND I PEOPLE/LANGUAGE LEADER
1. Bophuthatswana Tswana Lucas Mangope
2. Gazankulu Shangaan (Tsonga) Hudson Ntsanwisi
3. Ciskei Xhosa Lennox Sebe
4. Kwalulu Zulu Mangosuthu Buthelezi
5. Lebowa Pedi (Northern Sotho) Cedric Phatudi
6. QwaQwa Southern SOtllO Tsiame Mopeli
7. Transkei Xhosa Kaizer Matanzima
8. Venda Venda Patrick Mphephu
Other national states were KaNgwane (Swazi) and Kwa N'debele (Ndebele). These home-
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The Bantu Homelands Citizenship Act of 1970
This act stipulated that all Africans w'ould not be considered citizens of South Africa but of
a particular national homeland.
Independent Transkei:
The irony of "self rule"






RESISTANCE TO APARTHEID, 1948 TO 1976:
Yusuf Oadoo, President of the TIC, addressing a huge crOWd.
Take note of Nelson Mandela to the right of Oadoo'
A rally held to protest the 300th anniversary of Van Riebeeck's arrival at the Cape
183
The Congress of the people in 1955 at Kliptown. People voiced their
demands by displaying huge placards
Part of the crowd from all national groups and many walks of life that adopted
the Freedom Charter at the Congress of the People in Kliptown, 26·June 1955
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An extract from The Freedom Charter
"wrE, mE PEOPlE OF SOU7HAFRICA, DECIARE FOR ALL O[JR COUATRYA!\V
mE WORlD TO KNOW·
That South Africa belongs to all who live in it, Black and White, and that no
government can justly claim authority unless it is based on the will ofthe people;
That ourpeople have been robbed of their birthright to land, liberty and peace
by a form ofgovernmentfounded on injustice and inequality;
That our country will neuer be prosperous or free' until all our people live in
brotherhood, enjoying equal rights and opportunities,-
That only a democratic state, based on the will of the people, can secure to all
their birthright without distinction ofcolour, race, sex 0, belief;
And therefore, we the people ofSouth Africa, Black and V7hite, together equals,
countrymen and brothers, adopt this Freedom Charter. And we pledge ourseh'es
to striv'e together, sparing nothing ofour strength and courage, until the demo-
cratic changes here set out have been won. "
From the Umkhonto we Sizwe Manifesto, 1961
"It is '" well known that the main national liberation or-
ganisations in this country haue consiStently followed a
policy of non-violence. They hav'e conducted themselves
peaceably at all times, regardless of Government attacks
and persecutions upon them, and despite all Govern-
ment-inspired attempts to provoke them to violence. They
have done so because the people preferpeaceful methods
ofchange to achieue their aspirations without the suffer-
ing and bitterness ofchil war. But the people"s patience
is not endless.
The Government has interpreted the peacefulness of the
mOv'ement as weakness; the people s non-violent policies
hav'e been taken as a green light for Government as an
invitation to use armed force against the people without
anyfear ofreprisals. The methods ofUmkhonto u:e Sizwe
mark a break with thatpast. "
185
.~~:::;~
.... : ..~.• ,~. M,
.....;:;;..:
"': ,.~:~~.~~~.~ ..,' .'
Electric pylons damaged after the ANC's military wing Uinkhonto
launched its attack against the State
BIKO AND SOLIDARITY
BLACK PEOPLFI COQE.TION




The making of mass politics: The ~.960s
Hamba dompas: Angry residents burn their reference books in public
at the height of the pass protests
Police standing on armoured vehicles shoot at the SharpevilJe protestors
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Racist arrogance
This is what PuntJansen, Deputy Minister ofBantu Education, stated in parlia-
ment in 1975 when asked whether he had consulted the African people on lan-
guage policy, he replied, "No, 1 have not consulted them and 1 am not going to
consult them. " He added that he thought "it a good thing that everyone should
learn as many languages as possible. An African might find that '!he big boss'
only spoke Afrikaans or only spoke English. It would be to his advantage to know
both languages."
Andries Treurnicht, who became Deputy _Minister ofBantu Education, said on
17June 1976· '7n the white areas ofSouth Africa, where the governmentpays, it
is certainly our right to decide on the language division ".
THE PROTEST MARCH















20 000 Soweto pupils take to the streets
Hector Peterson, first casualty
of the Soweto uprising, 1976
ANNEXURE 4:
THE WALK TO FREEDOM AND DEMOCRACY, 1976 TO
1994:
MK attack on SASOL plant (1980)
Police victims we~e given lar~e funerals that turned into political rallies.
NotIce the coffinS draped with the ANC flag
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Poster protesting against tricameral parliament
A COSATU poster mobilising worker support
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WORKERS OF THE WORLD UNITE
COSATU leaders, Elijah Barayi, Chris Dlamini, Jay Naidoo, Sidney Mufamadi and
Cyril Ramaphosa at a meeting in November 1985
UDF poster .
The UDF keeps protest alive:
poster, 1985
Alan Boesak delivering a public address
Addressing the large gathering, Boesak had this to say:
"Let me remind you ofthree little words... Thefirst word is "all". We want all our
rights, not just a few token handouts which the gOu'ernment sees fit to give - we
want all our rights. And we want all ofSouth Africa'speople to hau'e their rights.
Not just a selected few, not just "Coloureds" or "Indians", after they have been
made honorary Whites. We want the rights of all South Africans, including
those whose citizenship has already been stripped away by this government.
The second word is the word "here", We want all our rights here in a united,
undivided South Africa. We do not want them in impol/erished homelands, we
do not want them in our separate little group areas. We want them in this land
which one day we shall onc;e again cal! our own.
The third word is the word "now". We want all our rights, we want them here,
and we want them now. We have been waitingfor so long, we hau'e been strug-
glingfor so long. We havepleaded, cried, petitioned too long now. We have been
jailed, exiled, killedfor too long. Now is the-time. "
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Unrest report from The Cape Times, 12 JUly 1986. These reports, which appeared daily, showed the
politically-related violence that was taking place throughout the country. On this day there were
several incidents in the north of the country, but of course, violence occurred in many other areas
as well.
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Right-wing resista . ".'nee to reform
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Soweto, 29 October 1989. Part of
the crowd of 80 000 who attended
a rally to welcome home the
seven released ANC leaders
Freed Rivonia trialist Govan
Mbeki gets a helping hand















Nelson Mandela greets supporters upon his release from Victor Verster prison, 11 February 1990
Nelson Mandela with his ANC delegation at the opening of the Convention for a Democratic South
Africa in 1991. The CODESA emblem, showing the sun shining on the Republic's black and white




Marchers flee after Ciskei soldiers opened fire on them at the Bisho Stadium in September 1992
Eugene Terre' Blanche to-
gether with rightwing mili-
tants stormed the talks venue
in June 1993
Consequently, the A..N"C represented by Cyril
Ramaphosa and the NP represented by Roelf Meyer,
held secret talks which led to the concluding of a
"Record of Understanding" on 26 September 1992, an
agreement which was in reality a compromise.
The ANC's Cyril Ramaphosa









Nelson Mandela casting his ballot in
KwaZulu Natal
A day of peace dawned as millions of South Africans queued patiently to make their mark in the
country's first all-inclusive election
'I have waited
all my life for
this day. No long
queue is going
to stoprp.~




huys in Cape Town:
President Nelson
Mandela (centre)
with his two depu-
ties, Thabo Mbeki
(left) and F.W. de
Klerk
201




Well, t-here are times when
any government may have t-o
call a stat-e of emergency.
A REMINDER•••
"LET US STRIVE TO BRING ABOUT AN UNDIVIDED
SOUTH AFRICA, WITH ONE NATION SHARING A
COMMON CITIZENSHIP, PATRIOTISM AND LOYALTV,
PURSUING AMIDST OUR DIVERSITY, FREEDOM,
EQUALITY AND SECURITY FOR ALL, IRRESPECTIVE
OF RACE, COLOUR, SEX OR CREED; A COUNTRY FREE
FROM APARTHEID OR ANY OTHER FORM OF
DISCRIMINATION OR DOMINATION."
- THE DECLARATJON OF INTENT,
SIGNED IN MAY 1992.
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UNITED WE STAND ...
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